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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses YouTube-based programming in Saudi Arabia. It focuses on the 
bottom-up, professionally generated content (PGC) produced by the Saudi youth 
exclusively for YouTube between 2010 and 2016. It explores the economic, political 
and cultural context of YouTube-based programming and is aimed at understanding 
how the programme makers operate within such a restrictive political and media 
environment, and the interaction between the content creators, the audiences and the 
Saudi government.    
 
The thesis examines the perspective of the content creators by utilizing ten semi-
structured online interviews, and the view of the Saudi audience by employing seven 
semi-structured offline focus group interviews with twenty-nine participants in Glasgow, 
Scotland. The interviews were conducted and transcribed in Arabic, then translated into 
English. 
 
This analysis leads to the emergence of four primary themes: limited political and 
cultural empowerment for young Saudis offline; strong financial empowerment for the 
content creators; the government as the most powerful actor in the Saudi media scene; 
and the relevance of the content to the Saudi audience as the main driver for the 
popularity of YouTube-based programming.  
 
The analysis provides insights and implications for policy and practices, arguing that the 
concept and practices of cultural policy are humble in Saudi Arabia and that there is an 
urgent need for a political decision to establish a nationwide cultural policy to promote 
and govern the arts and culture. This policy needs to incorporate both online and offline 
creativity, including YouTube-based programming. 
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Introduction 
 
This thesis explores the economic, political and cultural contexts of YouTube-based 
programmes in Saudi Arabia by employing grounded theory methodology, which 
allows the emergence of new meanings in order to better understand the process and 
configurations of YouTube in the context of the Saudi experience.  A number of studies 
that have investigated Arab social media, as outlined in Chapter One, tend to be 
administrative in nature, focusing on the wider uses of social media platforms, 
embracing the positivist approach to examine complex media issues, or deliberately 
eschewing difficult questions because of the political sensitivity of the topic and 
suppression by the Arab governments.   
 
This thesis aims to respond to this gap by contextualizing the research problem within 
the economic, political and cultural settings of one of possibly the most conservative 
countries in the world.  It poses critical questions by examining YouTube-based 
programmes in the Saudi context of power, and the religious and cultural structures of 
domination and exploitation which have shaped certain aspects of the study’s objects. It 
moves away from asking typical questions that tend to investigate the use of social 
media by individuals, commercial companies or government agencies, and instead 
explores how the use of YouTube by one of the marginalized segments of the society, 
the youth, has influenced online media activity, and what dynamics have surrounded 
this process in relation to both culture and power.  
 
It examines the complex relationship between the state and religious institutions, and 
also the content creators who utilize the platform to manufacture new critical online 
culture. These content creators are pushing the boundaries further and creating new 
online interpretations of offline public events that have been subjected to state 
monopoly for decades. The thesis also addresses the commercial opportunities created 
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by the content creators, the relationship between capital and the tone of the programmes, 
and their effect on the local media market. In addition, it goes further by critically 
examining the audience’s views: how they access, perceive and react to the content.  
 
This thesis aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the object of analysis by 
examining both spectrums - the content creators and the audiences - and taking into 
account the specificity of Saudi Arabia. The study of YouTube in Saudi Arabia can be 
seen as incorporating both global and local forces into one paradigm; it is an exploration 
of the effect of a global media platform (YouTube) in a localized and specific setting 
(Saudi Arabia). This thesis’ aim is to generate rich explanations and analytical concepts 
for the growing body of literature, and more importantly to contribute to our 
understanding of these practices in non-Western contexts.   
 
This thesis is motivated by three areas of interest: 
 
 First, the heavy coverage of the Arabic and Western press and television regarding 
YouTube in Saudi Arabia; 
 
 Second, personal curiosity to know how young people operate in such a restrictive 
media environment, where the political culture does not tolerate a wide range of voices; 
 
 
 Finally, the serious lack of empirical studies that have, to the best of my knowledge, 
investigated this research problem (explored in Chapter One). This dearth of existing 
research was a significant factor in motivating me to conduct this study.   
 
In seeking to address the first of these three motivations, a number of articles exploring 
the phenomenon of YouTube in Saudi Arabia have appeared in the public domain (for 
instance, Ayed, 2013; Britton, 2017; BBC Trending, 2016; Kerr, 2014; and Smith, 
2013).  These articles have provided international readers with snapshot ideas and 
 
 
14 
 
thoughts about YouTube-based programmes, employing a journalistic approach to 
deliver new stories from the conservative country of Saudi Arabia. The tone and the 
conceptions of some of these articles have contained elements of exaggeration, using 
terms such as ‘explosion’ and ‘revolution’ to describe the growth and development of 
Saudi content.  
 
Others (i.e. Black, 2013 and Owens, 2012) tend to be more reasonable, investigating the 
subject by interviewing content creators and media and political commentators to 
highlight the impact of social media upon the society, but these articles have not 
provided sufficiently deep investigations of the issues of interest. Some have reported 
on the role of Saudi women in YouTube (Marshall, 2016 and Weiss, 2016), but the 
angle of the coverage has tended to focus on some isolated aspects of women, with little 
attention paid to the inter-relation of cultural and political dynamics in the Saudi context.  
This media visibility has created a public interest in the social phenomenon among 
Saudi and non-Saudi observers, but the limitations of the scale and scope of the press’ 
investigations have triggered academic interest to investigate this research problem in 
greater depth.  
 
Secondly, personal interest was another reason to pursue the academic analysis within 
this thesis. The nature and the development of the content on YouTube was eye-opening 
because it embarked on new political, cultural and societal parameters for Saudi public 
discourse. The platforms of YouTube and Twitter are very prominent in Saudi Arabia, 
but as Boyd and Ellison (2008) maintain, distinct cultures have emerged around 
different social network sites despite the presence of some common features across the 
platforms. The novelty and widespread growth of the YouTube narrative in the Saudi 
context have drawn attention towards it, making it a significant object for analysis. 
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 The production of local content by and for young people in order to address social and 
political topics beyond the state-monopolized information system is a new and 
emerging trend that deserves to be observed and analysed. Understanding this change 
and its implications is important to better comprehend the contemporary role of a video 
sharing site in the wider Saudi context.  
 
Finally, the field of Arab media in general and Saudi Arabia in particular suffer from a 
lack of empirical studies because of various political and cultural factors which are 
discussed in Chapter One. The general empirical deficiencies of research on YouTube 
in Saudi Arabia serve as a catalyst for seeking to contribute to original research to this 
area.  Although rapid changes in technology and its applications may outstrip the 
relevance of the analysis in the thesis, a critical and detailed exploration can be useful to 
establish correlations between emerging platforms, traditional media outlets and their 
interactions with society in the Saudi context.    
 
   Defining YouTube-based Programming  
 
Digital technologies (Srinivasan, 2017) are not neutral, but rather socially constructed 
by users who are guided by their own sets of beliefs, values and presumptions. More 
importantly, Srinivasan points out that online platforms have been built by global 
American and European corporations which are accountable to the commercial 
priorities of shareholders who are driven by their own agendas, and therefore they 
should not be treated as entirely neutral public spaces. 
 
 Meikle (2002 and 2016) asserts that Web 2.0 - or Version 2.0 as he described it in 2002 
- is shaped by the values of corporate interests which has resulted in closed architecture, 
centralized control and the commodification of popular and political culture.  This 
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behaviour has created a closed proprietary media space for users of social media. For 
instance, the models of corporate social media platforms such as Google (Fuchs, 2017) 
are based on economic surveillance, user data commodification and the unpaid labour of 
internet users, all of which exemplify exploitation and ideology that have shaped the 
structures and practices of social media platforms.  
 
However, the structure of YouTube can, arguably, allow a degree of freedom for 
individuals and communities which have led to unexpected use for the public. For 
instance, Strangelove (2011) argues that YouTube is a virtual social space that offers 
domains of self-expression, community and public confession in order to represent the 
cultural politics of the present time.  
 
In addition, the development of the platform has continued to be seen as a mechanism 
for cultural participation, identity construction and empowerment for various segments 
of society, including youth and women.  For example, Lange (2007) highlights that 
YouTube is used by youth and young adults to project identity and to affiliate with 
certain social groups, and that content can be shared or withheld according to individual 
needs and social relationships. 
 
 Broadly speaking, the advance in technology has enabled ordinary people to become 
more visible, and consequently it has created a new class of celebrities and influencers 
that did not previously exist. Turner (2010) conceptualizes this phenomenon as a 
‘demotic turn’; this describes the construction of celebrity and its ability to open up a 
new field of relations between media and culture. 
 
Launched in 2005 and acquired by Google, Inc. in 2006 (Snickars and Vonderau, 2009), 
YouTube enables individuals to discover, watch and share user generated content (UGC) 
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(YouTube About, 2017). It has gradually launched local versions in more than eighty-
eight countries to expand its geographical reach, and it has attracted more than one 
billion global users, half of whom stream the content through mobile devices (YouTube 
Press, 2017). Google’s ownership has shifted the platform and its commercial 
applications by monetizing and controlling the content in order to secure a return on its 
investment (Wasko and Erickson, 2009).   
 
Although YouTube has influenced the distribution system of traditional media, it should 
not be perceived as a revolutionary medium, but rather as a natural evolution within the 
field of media because it imitates the rules of traditional media. For example, it has been 
influenced by traditional media in terms of broadcasting, genre of content and issues of 
copyright and advertising (Kim, 2012).  This, Kim argues, has institutionalized the 
platform, shifting it from heavily focusing on UGC to professionally generated content 
(PGC) and embarking on the emergence of the new YouTube industry with new policy 
implications.   
 
This institutionalization presents methodological and epistemological complexity for 
researchers because YouTube now enables a top-down approach for traditional media 
outlets and a bottom-up mechanism for individual amateurs and professionals.  
Therefore, every scholarly investigation into YouTube has to make a choice between 
these interpretations and frame the object of the study in a specific context and time 
with specific methodology because different settings can lead to different interpretations 
and understandings of a social problem (Burgess and Green, 2009).   
 
This thesis, therefore, focuses on the bottom-up approach of YouTube-based 
programming created exclusively by PGC producers for YouTube in Saudi Arabia. It 
explores the economic, political and cultural context of the emergence of locally made 
programmes for YouTube by Saudi youth between 2010 and 2016.  More importantly, 
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the thesis excludes from its investigation the content produced by UGC producers, such 
as video blogs and family diary content.  
 
The terms ‘youth’ or ‘young people’ carry various meanings in different cultures and 
geographical locations. Statistically, the United Nation defines a ‘youth’ as a person 
between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four years. However, UNESCO has adopted a 
more flexible definition when implementing regional programmes in line with the 
definitions of different member states. For instance, it defines ‘youth’ in Africa as every 
person between fifteen and thirty years (UNESCO, 2017).  The thesis moves away from 
the epistemological tension of the concept, and it adopts a flexible and broad definition 
of ‘youth’ for the purpose of this research.  
 
This thesis defines YouTube-based programming in Saudi Arabia as the process of 
constructing and organizing new critical interpretations of Saudi public discourse, 
reflecting the thoughts of ordinary Saudi youth in the form of localized video products.  
These programmes have a number of features. First, they cover issues that tend to be 
ignored or minimized by the Saudi media mainstream. Second, they adopt new genres 
and formats that have not been used on Saudi television such as borrowing the format of 
the American programme, The Daily Show, and applying it to YouTube. Third, they 
employ simple communication methods to convey messages indirectly, particularly 
through humour. Finally, they employ sophisticated aesthetic video skills to produce 
high-end cultural products.  
 
This has resulted in the creation of a YouTube business market in which inexperienced 
young media personnel have proven themselves capable of attracting the attention of the 
Saudi audience with an unprecedented number of views. Consequently, Saudi Arabia 
has become the world's top per capita user of YouTube, according to Google (Ayed, 
2013).  
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The growth of YouTube, along with exclusive productions for the platform, has brought 
about new business opportunities and shaped its relationship with the traditional media 
and advertisement industry in Saudi Arabia. The first opportunities were for new talents 
who could occupy basic but essential roles such as camera operators, editors, directors, 
presenters and actors; this demand for professionals quickly extended to roles in sales, 
marketing and managing. As a result, some small firms have transferred to YouTube 
production houses and this has increased competitiveness as these new production 
houses have emerged.  
   
For instance, one of the leading production houses for YouTube in Saudi Arabia is 
UTURN Entertainment, with more than two billion lifetime views (UTURN, 2016).  
Telfaz11 is another production house with more than one billion views (Telfaz11, n.d). 
Myrkott is a leading animation studio, with more than 360 million views; it produces a 
number of animation programmes including the popular Masaamir (Nails) (Myrkott, 
2017).  
 
There are other production houses and programmes with millions of views and strong 
social media influence, but the argument to be advanced here is that these YouTube-
based programmes have created a new stream of capital in the market and new business 
and job opportunities for Saudi youth. In addition, some production houses have 
advanced their capability by merchandising the characters in their animations, an 
example being Myrkott’s Masaamir (Nails). These programmes are produced by Saudi 
youth for Saudi youth in a country whose cultural system is relatively closed; for 
instance, a cinema ban remained in effect at the time this research was conducted.    
 
Finally, as the thesis will show, YouTube-based programming in Saudi Arabia has 
undergone several phases and its tone has coincided with the political climate in the 
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region. For example, the content was highly critical during the Arab revolutions of 
2011-2012, but the tone became softer following the counter revolutions of 2013-2014; 
as the region was swept with the old political regimes, content concentrated more on 
entertainment and soft news.  
 
The Research Questions 
 
Some of the research questions that guided this thesis were initially constructed 
following the identification of the gap in the literature. However, the fieldwork allowed 
the emergence of new questions and it also reshaped the old constructed queries.  The 
thesis has three research questions that focus on the perspective of the content creators 
and one query to address the audience.   
In order to investigate the category of content creators, the following questions have 
been formulated:  
RQ1 What role does YouTube-based programming play in the cultural and political 
context of Saudi Arabia?   
RQ2 What is the business model of YouTube-based programming in the Saudi media 
context? 
RQ3 What is the relationship between YouTube-based programming and the 
government of Saudi Arabia? 
 
In addition, one question was advanced to explore the category of the audience: 
RQ4 Why have YouTube-based programmes become so popular among young 
audiences in Saudi Arabia? 
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The Significance of the Study 
 
The significance of this thesis stems from its ability to contribute to three dimensions of 
various media theories that are concerned with the global, regional and national debates 
about media and its applications in different settings.   
 
The nature of the research, which incorporates both YouTube as a global platform and 
its local Saudi employment, can be used as an analytical category to broaden media 
theories by offering new accounts of the implications of the platform outside the 
American context, the USA being the home of the platform. This analysis also acts as a 
contribution to the concept of de-Westernizing media studies (Curran and Park, 2000) 
by drawing upon the specific media experience of Saudi Arabia instead of generalizing 
from the experience of the Anglo-American orbit. It contributes to our understanding of 
the effects of global platforms like YouTube in specific localized settings to indicate the 
correlations between global media and local dynamics, which vary from one country to 
another.   
 
Another area that the thesis contributes to is the developing Arab media field. This is a 
discipline that suffers from a wide range of difficulties such as a reliance on Western 
media theories which do not fit the Arab context, a lack of empirical research, and the 
absence of a strong research tradition in the region (Ayish, 1998; Hafez, 2008; and 
Zayani, 2012).  The detailed analysis of this thesis, which generates an explanation for 
the changing situation and analytical concepts, aims to add empirical values to the Arab 
media field through the experience of Saudi Arabia.  
 
Employing a grounded theory approach enables the thesis to produce new explanations 
that contribute to the body of knowledge that is grounded in the historical and socio-
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political experience of Saudi Arabia. The Arab philosophical independence (Nassar, 
1988) is a strategy to innovate new philosophies and knowledge that emerge from and 
fit into the context of the Arab specificity in order to break from the Western 
philosophical and theoretical superiority and to establish and enhance new Arab 
development in different fields. This thesis has built upon the Western methodology of 
grounded theory because its framework helps to yield new, original, emerging, natural 
output as opposed to the superficial analysis that has resulted from applying Western 
media theories to the Arab media field.  
 
The third area that can benefit from this contribution is the field of media research on 
Saudi Arabia. The significance of this contribution stems from being the first critical, 
detailed and empirical investigation - to the best of my knowledge - to investigate 
YouTube-based programming in the country.  It reflects upon the socio-cultural and 
socio-political dynamics of Saudi society, the struggles and the aspirations of the Saudi 
youth, and the subtle changes to the political mode in the country towards officials.  
 
 This thesis contributes to this category by contextualizing the research problem in its 
natural setting. In so doing, it moves away from, for instance, the lens of security 
obsession that is used to perceive Saudi Arabia and therefore shape the outcomes of 
such research. In addition, it yields a better understanding of a specific use of a specific 
platform in Saudi Arabia, avoiding the generalized and generalizing analysis of social 
media as the all-in-one object of the analysis.  
 
This thesis argues that various Saudi and Western policy makers could be interested in 
the findings of the research. As for Saudi policy makers, the drop in the price of 
petroleum has created new economic circumstances (for instance, the cut in subsidies 
for welfare in the country) and therefore it may be a new opportunity to re-organize the 
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political and cultural dynamics in the light of new economic and technological forces 
that affect the country. 
 
 Another example is the poor structure of the cultural industry in Saudi Arabia and 
whether, with a better policy framework, the state can capitalize on the professional 
media productions of young people along with other cultural activities to establish a 
new entertainment industry for its population. Such a move could be developed 
gradually to create a Saudi cultural industry that can feed into the cultural and economic 
activities of Saudi Arabia.  
 
With regard to Western policy makers, the current significant position of Saudi Arabia 
in the global energy sector has granted the state an influential place in global economic 
activities. More importantly, the recent emergence of Saudi Arabia as a regional power 
in the Middle East, its involvement in Yemen against Iranian-backed militia, the crisis 
in Syria and the regional tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran and, more recently, 
with Qatar are all other factors that have brought Saudi Arabia to the regional and 
global forefront.  
 
The thesis will provide detailed insights into the intra-dynamics of the country, 
especially between young people and the state. It showcases the online and offline 
change which has occurred in Saudi Arabia through YouTube-based programming and 
how such internal dynamics might influence the foreign policy and the face of Saudi 
Arabia in the coming decades. 
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The Organization of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters.   
Chapter one is concerned with reviewing and critiquing the existing research in the 
field to identify the main trends, concepts, approaches and methodologies in order to 
stimulate the construction of the thesis. It reviews the historical development of the field, 
starting from the broader context of Arab television before moving on to the 
introduction of the internet and social media platforms. It adopts this mechanism to 
present the prominent role of the state and the political system in shaping media 
behaviour in the region. The chapter identifies the Western theoretical influence over 
the Arab field, the technological determinist approach to the study of social media 
platforms in the context of the Arab uprisings, and the lack of critical studies that are 
specifically aimed at YouTube-based programmes in Saudi Arabia.  
   
Chapter Two examines the qualitative approach of the thesis before moving on to 
explain the methodological considerations demanded by this study, describing the use 
of semi-structured online interviews with content creators and face to face focus group 
interviews with the diasporic audience in Glasgow. After that, the transcribing and the 
translation process are illustrated, and then the data management and the analysis of the 
findings are explained.  
 
Chapter Three critically analyses the relationship between the absence of authorized 
offline public cultural and political places and the flourishing of YouTube programmes, 
especially between 2010 and 2012. The formation of these programmes has been driven 
by the desire to discuss public issues from the youth perspective. Issues of 
representation, motivation and empowerment have been conceptualized to reflect on the 
findings. In addition, the gender struggle emerged as a prominent theme due to the huge 
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cultural pressures faced by female Saudi presenters as a result of their public appearance 
on YouTube.  
 
Chapter Four discusses the business model of YouTube-based programming, and how 
it has created new business opportunities for Saudi content creators. It explains the 
different stages of the business models both prior to and after the intervention of 
YouTube. Chapter Four also examines the role of YouTube based-programmes in 
affecting the behaviour of advertising throughout the different stages, and the dynamic 
relationship between YouTube-based programmes and advertising.  
 
Chapter Five explores the regulatory context of YouTube-based programmes to see 
whether the programmes operate within a constructive regulatory framework (or not) 
and the attitude of the content creators to this. After that, it moves on to investigate the 
reactions of the Saudi government to the content and what strategies have been 
employed to deal with the programmes as the content creators perceive them.  
 
Chapter Six shifts the focus to twenty-nine participants who took part in seven semi-
structured focus group interviews to seek to understand why YouTube-based 
programmes gained popularity and how the Saudi audience perceived and interpreted 
those programmes.  
 
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis by synthesising and highlighting the empirical 
findings in relation to the research questions before moving on to discuss the 
implications of the findings for practice and policy. After that, the limitations of the 
research are discussed and potential ideas for further research are suggested.  
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Chapter One: Literature Review 
 
  Introduction 
 
This thesis examines the economic, political and cultural context of YouTube-based 
programming in Saudi Arabia.  In response to the serious lack of academic research 
regarding YouTube in Saudi Arabia specifically and Arab social media studies in 
general, and to avoid investigating the research problem in isolation, the literature 
review will carefully and critically examine established areas of academic debates in 
order to provide the readers with a well-rounded background. The literature discussed in 
this chapter has been drawn from a wide range of fields within the literature on Arab 
and global media studies to help contextualize, synthesize and inform the later analysis. 
    
The chapter consists of five main sections. First, it begins by providing an overview of 
the challenges associated with Arab media research as a whole, highlighting the 
political, cultural and social factors that hinder progress in this area. In doing so, it aims 
to set the stage to showcase the conceptual and theoretical struggles in the domain.  In 
the second section, the chapter moves on to explore the academic development of the 
field, mapping out key academic contributions and investigating the factors that have 
helped establish and expand the terrain of Arab media studies. It attempts to extract 
major themes and concepts to guide the process of the research and to pave the path to 
the analysis. Third, the discussion builds upon the major theme that emerges from the 
second section, critiquing the controversial relationship between media institutions and 
states to understand the complexity of this theme. Next, the chapter analyses the 
academic discussions that have evolved around the business model of YouTube to 
understand the context so it can build upon these concepts when exploring the business 
model’s application and use in the Saudi context of YouTube. Finally, it sheds light 
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upon audience discussions, contextualizing Arab audience studies within the wider 
borders of audience scholarship to synthesise it with the research question that focuses 
on Saudi young audiences.  
 
The Challenges of Arab Media Research 
 
The Arab media industry has recently grown significantly, resulting in a stronger 
demand for audio-visual content compared to other developing regions (Amin, 2008), 
but as Sakr (2007) argues, this growth has been largely subject to the political changes 
in the region.  The industry’s growth has attracted academic attention but the field, in 
general, has not been highly responsive or comprehensive enough to reach deep 
understanding of this dynamic industry. For example, a vast amount of Arab media and 
cultural studies have been dedicated to Egypt due to its dominant production role until 
quite late in the twentieth century (Armbrust, 2012). This unfair distribution of studies, 
which has focused mainly on Egypt and also on Al Jazeera due to their prominent role 
in the contemporary Arab media and cultural context, has created narrow and limited 
scales and scopes for the evolving field.  
 
This growth has coupled with methodological complexity to investigate the field 
because it moved from only being associated with news to being integrated with wider 
aspects of everyday practices. Armbrust (2012) maintains that Arab media studies enjoy 
lively engagement with popular culture, religion, digital activism and political economy, 
which introduce the field to non-conventional categories of investigation. Consequently, 
this has led to some serious methodological challenges and empirical weaknesses, 
giving rise to a culture of essays that scarcely met the requirements of peer-reviewed or 
refereed academic journals. Ayish (1998) agrees that research has been mainly 
descriptive and administrative in nature, while the theoretical research that has 
dominated the field of communication was inspired mainly by external sponsorship.   
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This has resulted in the fragmentation of the subject of the analysis, and the lack of 
adequate theoretical frameworks with which to examine the emerging field was 
amongst the reasons hindering the development of the domain (Zayani, 2012). Zayani 
continues by arguing that the richly complex region of the Middle East requires that the 
cultural, anthropological and socio-political disciplines be weaved together to conduct 
theoretically informed analysis of various research problems on Arab media. This can 
offer informative and theoretical research which contributes to the discourse and 
generates solid research outputs. 
 
Another reason for the theoretical deficit in Arab media studies is the reliance on the 
Western media theory when investigating research problems in the Arabic context. For 
instance, a number of studies have sought to test Western communication theories and 
hypotheses in the Arab setting (Ayish, 1998), and these have yielded insufficient and 
superficial research outputs.  
 
Zayani (2012) also draws attention to the absence of strong research traditions in the 
region as one of the factors responsible for the underdevelopment of the domain. In 
addition, the absence of networking mechanisms among Arab academics who operate in 
isolation has contributed to the struggle of the discourse (Ayish, 2008).  The academic 
discourse has not kept pace with the rapidly evolving field because of the lack of 
professional Arab researchers who can theoretically contribute to this academically 
under-represented field.  
  
Also, the highly sensitive attitude of authoritarian regimes towards independent 
researchers and their interpretations in the Arabic context are problematic, as such 
research can be perceived as an attempt to destabilize the political and social status quo. 
Consequently, and as Fandy (2007) maintains, participants fear taking part in research, 
especially if it connects to politics and public activities. Fandy goes on to explain that it 
is extremely difficult to write or speak freely about particular governments or societies 
 
 
29 
 
because the price paid by those who violate the political restrictions can range from 
imprisonment to kidnapping or disappearance or, in many instances, death.  
 
This culture of fear can arguably lead to financial struggles for independent research 
institutions and researchers because of the upper hand enjoyed by states in the region.  
For instance, Boyd (1982) reveals that a lack of funding and the misunderstanding of 
interpretations of research results affected the seriousness of the research output in Arab 
countries. The lack of funds shaped the reward system within Arab academic 
institutions, which in turn weakened the quality of scientific research. 
 
This section has briefly summarized some significant challenges that hinder the 
development of the Arab media field. Key concepts and themes have emerged to 
characterize the novelty of the field, such as the lack of theoretically informed analysis 
and the struggle of the academic system, which includes the proficiency of research 
outputs. The reliance on Western theories in an Arabic context and, more importantly, 
the authoritarian nature of governments are all massive factors that have contributed to 
the condition of Arab media research. This reflects the need to construct theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks that respond to the political and cultural specificity of the region 
in order to build a coherent empirical analysis in line with the distinct patterns of the 
Arab social context.   
 
These factors could have implications upon the construction of the literature review of 
this thesis in terms of its scale and its scope. For instance, it minimizes the possibility of 
employing Arab media studies literature that is written in Arabic. Rather, I am going to 
rely heavily upon media studies written in English to build an informative context for 
this thesis. This can lead to certain types of bias in constructing the critiques in this 
chapter.  
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In the next section, it seeks to historically critique and review the evolution of the field 
by examining the concepts, theories and phenomena that emerge in the literature in 
order to place the thesis in its context and to identify its future direction.  
 
   The Development of Arab Media Research 
 
The development of the Arab media field and its political and cultural context has been 
subject to a number of studies and debates by Western scholars. For example, 
typologies and classifications of Arab media systems have stemmed from and been 
influenced by early Western scholarship efforts, such as that of Sibert et al (1956), 
which was an early attempt to conceptualize and framework the media models. Arab 
media discourse benefited from critical studies that examined Sibert et al’s work as it 
led to new research directions for de-Westernizing media studies. See, for instance, 
Nerone (1995); Graber (1997); Bennett (2000); Curran and Park (2000); Hallin and 
Mancini (2004); Yin (2008); Oates (2009); and Hallin and Mancini (2012). 
 
One of the leading efforts to shed light upon Arab press media studies was presented by 
Rugh (1979). According to Nasser (1980), Rugh's book was the first serious attempt to 
analyse the complexity of media government relations and their effects on press 
freedom in the Arab World. The book filled a huge gap in the study of Arab media and 
has provided a helpful insight to mass communication academics and students in the 
West.  In another publication, Rugh (2004) asserts that the basic assumption of his 
research was that news media institutions do not exist independently of their 
environments, but rather take the form and colouration of the social and political 
structures within which they operate.  It seems that the four theories of the press – the 
authoritarian, the libertarian, the social responsibility and the totalitarian – shaped the 
philosophy of Rugh in introducing Arab media systems. Nevertheless, he clarifies that 
“the Arab media do not fit neatly and completely into any of these categories, but there 
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are elements of all four present in the Arab world” (Rugh, 2004, p. 23). He observes 
that “none of the existing analytical theories helps much in going beneath the surface of 
the Arab media systems, and in order to explain their real functioning, we must devise 
new theories designed to fit the cases at hand” (ibid). 
 
Rugh suggests four new classifications that cover the variety of Arab media systems. 
The first is the mobilization press, which includes the Arab republics which have 
undergone the most political changes in recent years, such as Syria, Libya, Sudan and 
Iraq until 2003. The second is the loyalist system, which describes the countries which 
experienced linear development along traditional authoritarian lines and where private 
ownership is allowed; for example Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Palestine, Bahrain 
and Oman. The third is the diverse system that allows countries a clear degree of 
diversity and freedom of expression, with limited influence of governments over media 
outlets. The best example of this system would be Lebanon. Additionally, Kuwait, 
Morocco and Yemen would fit into this category even they are less independent 
compared to Lebanon.  Finally, Rugh (2004) suggests the transitional system in which 
self-censorship exists, but restrictions of press freedom are widely and openly discussed. 
Another feature of this system is that governments attempt to influence media by using 
legal means such as the court.  Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia and Iraq after 2003 are 
all examples of this system. 
 
In contrast however, Mellor (2005) challenges Rugh's classifications and points out 
some shortcomings; for instance, the typology does not account for the recent situation 
in the Arab news media which has developed rapidly since the 1990s. Mellor further 
notes that the classifications are rather vaguely defined and do not draw a clear line 
between mobilization press and loyalist press.  Also, it seems that Rugh neglects the 
role of journalists and journalistic culture, which might differ from one country to 
another.  Finally, Rugh based his theory on state ownership, but recently private 
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ownership has been allowed in several Arab countries; therefore, it could be argued that 
all these roles are taken up by different media outlets in the same country. 
 
Another criticism has been discussed relating to Rugh's typology by Abderrahmane 
(1986, quoted in Mellor 2005, p. 54), who provides four main criticisms. Firstly, the 
typology stems from Western theories of the press and lacks critical evaluation of their 
applicability to the Arab media.  Secondly, the typology suffers from simplification and 
generalization.  Thirdly, the typology does not reflect the cultural and social contexts 
surrounding the Arab press.  Finally, Rugh's typology does not take into account the 
content of the press, focusing only on one variable: the relationship between the press 
and government. He was also accused of not adhering to a clearly defined methodology 
and of ignoring the Palestinian press. 
 
A study by Ayish (2011) uses different typology to survey the development of 
television broadcasting in the Arab world since the mid-1950s, paying close attention to 
the effect of Arab broadcasting on politics, culture and democratization in the region 
since the mid-1990s. His typology of Arab television broadcasting evolution illustrates 
the formation phase (1954-1976), the national expansion phase (1976-1990) and the 
globalization phase. He concludes that communication can play a role in changing 
society, but it cannot lead to change as such without real life political transition. 
 
Additionally, Rinnawi (2006) highlights in his research that TV broadcasting in the 
Arab World can be traced to the creation of the Arab nation state. The service was 
limited to the borders of each Arab state and sometimes to limited parts of neighbouring 
countries.  The general goal of the states was to use TV services as a political tool to 
maintain the unity of the nation under the authority of the state by dominating the 
national media narrative in their countries.  
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The political motivation was a prominent reason for developing media infrastructure 
and narratives to respond to internal and external challenges against Arab regimes. For 
instance, Boyd (1982) mentions various reasons for operating a TV service in Saudi 
Arabia, but the goals were clear and defined (see also Boyd, 2001). For instance, Boyd 
has pointed out that in late 1963, the Saudi  government announced several reasons for 
building a national television system, including providing the country with modern 
technology and educational awareness, unifying the nation, and countering the Egyptian 
radio station that was attacking the House of Saud, the royal family of Saudi Arabia. 
  
The external threat against the Saudi ruling family contributed to the development of 
Saudi media. For instance, Egyptian radio’s attack against the Saudi government played 
a central role in progressing the media and its narrative in Saudi Arabia. In his 
comparative analysis research, Kraidy (2012) gives more details about how Saudi-
Egyptian tension played a key role in the flourishing of terrestrial television channels in 
Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government had “stepped into the transnational realm as a 
reaction to external threats”. During the 1960s, the Egyptian revolution “subjected the 
House of Saud to a relentless onslaught of propaganda that abated only after [Egyptian 
president] Abdel Nasser's defeat in the 1967 war” (Kraidy, 2012. p:189).  For example, 
the Egyptian radio station - Voice of the Arabs - described the Saudi King Faisal as the 
enemy of God; therefore, as Kraidy explains, the Saudi Government was motivated to 
develop a media strategy to retaliate. King Faisal’s strategy was to establish a media 
focused on a global Islamic audience, in line with the King's Islamic Solidarity Policy 
initiated in 1966 (Rugh, 1980 quoted in Kraidy, 2012) in response to the Arab 
nationalism movement in Egypt.  
 
Another work by Kraidy (2013) has signalled an interesting analysis regarding the 
Saudi satellite evolution and how the Saudi government developed a Pan-Arab media 
regime in order to “enable Saudi Arabia to project power and influence beyond the 
kingdom's borders” (p:28).  As a result, the royal family and associated businessmen 
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launched the first Pan-Arab satellite TV Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC), 
based in London in 1991.  Saudi moguls, such as Prince al-Waleed bin Talal, launched a 
network of satellite TV channels called Rotana, as well as acquiring and investing in 
different Arab media ventures; for instance, a stake in LBC, a Lebanese satellite channel. 
Therefore, “these developments compelled Saudi authorities to expand their regional 
media capabilities” (Kraidy, 2013.p: 32) because their main political role was the 
continuity of the rule of Al-Saud, the royal family in Saudi Arabia.   
  
The study also highlights the television policy reform which resulted in the expansion of 
satellite channels targeting Saudi viewers in order to deter Saudi people from other non-
Saudi channels such as Al Jazeera TV, which is a Pan-Arab news channel that is funded 
by Qatar, the regional media rival of Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, it highlights social 
changes associated with Saudi women with scarf who became news anchors despite 
huge pressure from Saudi conservatives. One critique could be that the study has a lack 
of measurements regarding the modernization of Saudi satellite channels’ strategy in 
hoping to encounter other political agenda channels such as Al Jazeera.   Although the 
study cites a survey-quantitative method to prove the success of this strategy, a 
qualitative approach would have provided more in-depth clarification, especially after 
the Arab Spring of 2011, during which Al Jazeera was one of the main outlets to cover 
the uprisings in the Middle East.   
 
As for the internet, the political and cultural constraints of traditional media have moved 
to online media so Arab states can remain the most powerful players in the public 
domain. Mellor et al (2011) tackle the evolution of the Arab media and relevant recent 
trends and highlight reasons for the slow introduction of the internet to the Arab public.  
For example, the high cost of providing the service was discussed by the various 
governments in order to limit the internet access for its citizens.   
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Nevertheless, Abdulla (2007) affirms that during the late 1990s and beyond, the Arab 
governments started to invest in building strong and effective telecommunications 
systems and infrastructure for the public as the states realized the economic potential 
involved in this development.  For instance, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is unique 
in that it developed its digital infrastructure and related services rapidly to become a 
pioneering country amongst its Arab neighbours, especially in regard to the e-
government initiative and e-commerce sector. Abdulla (2007) follows the evolution of 
the traditional media briefly before focusing on the history of the internet in the Arab 
world, then examines Egypt as a case study through the uses and gratification theory. 
  
Kaba and Said (2014) highlight that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) had a better 
ICT infrastructure than the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other 
Arab countries. The study adopted the framework of The Global Information 
Technology Report 2009–2010 to measure the digital divide between these countries.  
This was enhanced by another report conducted by Mohammed Bin Rashid School of 
Government (2014), which analyses the development and the use of the internet in Arab 
countries. Their research indicates that there were more than 135 million Arabs using 
the internet in 22 Arab countries and more than 71 million active users of social 
networking technologies.  Furthermore, the examination asserts that Facebook is the 
most popular social website, followed by Google+, YouTube and then Twitter.  
 
The previous section critiqued the historical developments of the Arab media field by 
examining some of the most influential empirical studies in the domain in order to 
contextualize this thesis in its natural settings. Major themes and concepts have emerged, 
one being the Western influence over the field; Western scholars, theories and 
typologies established the field before several Arab academics and others, who are also 
based in the West, contributed significantly to the development of the field. In addition, 
the political motivation served as a catalyst to boost the media industry and accordingly 
the research in this area. Finally, the growth of academic debates was not sufficient as 
 
 
36 
 
Rugh (2004) argues that none of the existing analytical theories can help us understand 
the ever complex and growing terrains of media studies in Arabic countries.  
 
I intend to build upon this empirical evidence to take this thesis into the direction of de-
Westernizing research to allow the emergence of new fresh perspectives. This 
exploration helps to construct new analytical categories in response to YouTube-based 
programming in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, I am going to engage with the concept of 
the political motivation of media to examine if this can be applied to SNS platforms, 
namely, YouTube-based programming in the context of Saudi Arabia.   
 
The next section critically investigates the academic debates on the relationship between 
Arab states and the media to make sense of the aforementioned themes and concepts.  
            
The Relationship between Media and States 
 
According to Wojcieszak (2007), The Arab World had been traditionally accustomed to 
state controlled censorship of television because of its power to reach both literate and 
illiterate audiences. For example, Djankof et al (2003) examines two theories of 
government ownership of the media: the public interest theory in which state ownership 
cures market failure, and the public choice theory in which the government undermines 
political and economic freedom.  They “found pervasive evidence of worse outcomes 
associated with greater state ownership” (ibid, p.344).  The study also stresses that the 
influence of ownership and types of regulation vary significantly from one country to 
another.  The Saudi government, for example, approves the appointments of editors-in-
chief of newspapers and has the right to dismiss them, which consequently increases the 
influence of the state over content.  Finally, they conclude that “countries with greater 
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state ownership of the media have less free press, [fewer] political rights for their 
citizens and … less developed capital markets” (p. 373).  
 
Gehlbach and Sonin (2014) developed a theoretical framework to analyse government 
control of the media in less democratic states, where media are used to mobilize citizens 
to take actions that may be against the public interest.  Nevertheless, the study 
concludes that the attempt of any governments to control the media would result in 
several consequences; for example, it reduces the reliability of the content and therefore 
reduces the number of viewers.  The state controlled media frameworks have emerged 
because of certain political and economic circumstances that have enabled the states to 
build a media system and therefore stay in control of the media narrative. 
 
 For example, Rugh (2004) suggests that there are various reasons for the predominance 
of government-owned broadcasting systems among Arab regimes. First, the cost of 
establishing a television system was beyond the capacity of the private sector in these 
developing counties. Secondly, this high cost stimulated a monopoly and because of the 
wide reach of television, the Arab governments had an interest in investing in this new 
medium to politicize it or at least to keep it out of hostile hands. Finally, because of the 
lack of a tradition of independence, the concept of controlling every new media 
instrument by the governments was common at the time.   
 
A historical review by Yushi (2012) has recognized the close ties between government 
and media in the Arabic context.  The study maintains that Egypt and Saudi Arabia have 
the strongest influence over Pan-Arab media, thus it focuses on investigating how both 
countries have tried to control the Pan-Arab media since the mid-twentieth century. For 
instance, Amin and Napoli (2000, p.181) highlight that “the broadcasting systems in 
Egypt are absolute monopolies, under direct government supervision”.             
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State control has consequences for the local media narrative and its reliability in the 
eyes of the local audience. For example, Lynch (2006, p.37) affirms that the “[Arab] 
state-run television was a dreary affair, focusing on official business and completely 
closed to political opposition”. This led Arab intellectual and media professionals to 
relocate to Europe, especially London, to produce Arab newspapers, for instance, from 
abroad, but it was easy for Arab regimes to ban or censor those publications within their 
own territories.  Alternatively, “many Arab [citizens] turned to whatever foreign source 
might be available, whether BBC Arabic service, Radio Monte Carlo, the voice of 
America, or even in Jordan; Israeli Arabic language television broadcasting” (ibid, p.38).      
 
This state control has resulted in various behaviours and censorship styles in different 
Arab countries which vary depending on the relevant cultural setting. Al-Obaidi (2007) 
highlights five censorship models for the Arab media. He developed those models based 
on previous media models that have been discussed above; firstly, the Islamic 
jurisprudence model, which applies Islamic codes and instruction - for instance, the 
censorship systems in Saudi Arabia and Sudan, where the media must uphold Islam and 
oppose atheism. The second model is the regime-worship model, in which the media is 
completely owned and financed by the government as it was by Syria's Assad, Libya's 
Ghaddafi and Iraq's Saddam.  Thirdly, the traditional model exists, for example, in 
Algeria, Bahrain, Morocco, Oman, Jordan and the Gaza strip. Generally, this model has 
relaxed regulations of censorship. Fourthly, the transition model is where the media 
tends to be free from any government interference or restriction; for example, the Qatari 
government abolished the Ministry of Information. Finally, the liberal-semi-liberal 
model is where the liberal media could be enjoyed, such as in Lebanon.  
 
Nevertheless, in his study, Amin (2002) found that overt censorship and self-censorship 
are commonplace in the Arab media, especially when it comes to the news and current 
affairs content. He noticed that radio and television journalism are controlled more 
closely than print media because of their abilities to bypass illiteracy and their appeal to 
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mass audiences in the Arab world. For instance, Khazen (1999), who is a well-known 
Arab Editor-in-Chief for Pan-Arab newspapers, implied that the most prevalent form of 
censorship is self-censorship. Khazen indicated that self-censorship is usually followed 
by state censorship and the difficulty of that is that every Arab country has its own 
sensitivity taboo.  
 
The states employ various strategies to ensure that the media narrative is in line with the 
interests of those in power. Sakr (2003) has drawn attention to the fact that censorship 
in the Arab world was not only achieved through direct intervention of the state, but 
also by more fundamental and less visible means, such as by regulating ownership, 
distribution and the entry to the profession of journalism. Arab states could use the 
weapon of judicial intimidation of journalists to enhance control over the content.  Sakr 
indeed cites Saudi Arabian media institutions as being amongst the most tightly 
restricted in the home environment.  
 
As for online censorship, Saudi Arabia installed a public body to supervise internet 
activity in the country during the 1990s. Eid (2003) claims that Abdulaziz City for 
Science and Technology (KACST) was responsible for internet provision as well as 
providing several ISPs through which it extended its control by using certain techniques 
and filters to monitor and block websites. Eid argues that this method had enabled 
KACST to ban 200,000 websites by August 2001, and the number doubled over the 
following three years to 400,000 in 2004.    
 
According to the Open Net Initiative Report (2009), the Arab countries had to regulate a 
set of internet rules to ensure their citizens did not use the internet inappropriately. Arab 
states continued to invest in media and IT projects and at same time were continuing to 
invest in monitoring approaches and surveillance techniques to enhance their censorship 
ability over their citizens (Open Net Initiative Report 2009).  The report indicated that 
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the Saudi Arabia launched a new set of laws in 2008, including a penalty of ten years in 
prison and a fine for promoting or supporting terrorism activities, three years in prison 
and a fine for financial fraud and five years and a fine for those who promote and 
distribute pornography.  
 
 Online Activism and Society 
 
The rapid increase of scholarship in SNSs research in the Middle East can be attributed 
to the Arab uprisings that hit the region in 2011 in protest against dictatorships. From 
2011 onwards, the research on Arab social media gained attention, quickly rising to the 
top of the agendas of several researchers and institutions who wanted to understand the 
relationships between the platforms, the participants and the political, historical and 
cultural changes in the context of violence; for example, Lim (2012). A number of 
empirical studies have investigated how social media platforms enable participants to 
utilize and produce content in the context of civil disobedience and violence; for 
instance, Alaimo, (2015); Ali and Fahmy, (2013); Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos, 
(2012); and Khondker, (2011).   
 
These studies tend to examine the blogging sphere of young participants, outlining their 
role in reporting news that is unreported by the mainstream media. For instance, El-
Nawawy and Khamis (2013) point out that the main functions of those online activists 
were to call for action by mobilizing and organizing demonstrations, providing 
information and engaging in interactivity by participating in brainstorming between the 
bloggers and the protestors. They also documented government violations of human 
rights, limitations on freedoms and corruption through citizen journalism dynamics.    
Other academics have examined the role of Arab blogging in facilitating discussion and 
serving as a digital public sphere, especially for those with no access to public platforms 
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in the authoritarian Arab regimes (Ottaway, 2009; Riegert and Ramsay; 2012; and 
Etling et al, 2010).  
 
Howard et al (2011), for example, demonstrate the role of social media during the Arab 
revolutions as their study analysed more than three million Tweets based on keywords 
used. They focused mainly on Egypt and Tunisia by creating a unique database of 
information collected from Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. The research produced 
three main findings which confirmed empirically that social media played a critical role 
in shaping political debates in the Arab Spring, as it was used to conduct political 
debate by a key demographic group in the revolution. Another significant finding 
confirmed that online revolutionary communication preceded mass protest on the 
ground and this toppled the Egyptian and Tunisian dictatorships. Finally, the use of 
social media by advocates of democracy has helped to spread democratic ideas across 
international borders and therefore inspire other such advocates worldwide.  
  
Those studies indeed shed light upon the essential role of social media in affecting 
authoritarian rule as the current historical, political and cultural context of Arab 
discourse experiences a dramatic shift compared to the previous decade. In addition, 
another study by Tufekci and Wilson (2012) demonstrates that social media in general, 
and Facebook in particular, helped the citizens make decisions about participating in 
protests against the Egyptian Government, and half of those surveyed by the study 
disseminated visuals from the demonstrations. 
  
 However, as the vast majority of studies between 2011 and 2012 are based on a 
technological determinist approach to interpreting the Arab uprisings and social media, 
Fuchs (2012) contextualizes social media in the context of a moral panic model that was 
proposed by Cohen (2002). Fuchs argues that techno-optimism and techno-pessimism 
approaches are not sufficient to explore the phenomenon. Instead, he maintains that 
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critical research needs to be based on dialectical reasoning to allow casual relationships 
of media, technology and society to be seen and explored as multi-dimensional and 
complex phenomena.  
 
This scepticism within the literature as to the extent to which social media caused the 
upheaval switched the mode of researching gradually from the view of digital 
determinism to a more multi-dimensional paradigm. The critique of Fuchs and others 
has seemingly triggered a new trend of research that overcomes the binary interpretation 
of either technological determinism or social determinism for the research problems.   
 
For instance, Hammami (2016) examines the role of Facebook in Tunisia in the context 
of the public sphere, framing the cultural context of Tunisian society and linking  
Facebook to the historical process of the formation of the Tunisian public sphere. His 
research theorizes that the SNS has a public space in the cultural and political context of 
Tunisia and it took three different phases for Facebook to evolve in line with 
development of the offline activities. The outcome is the formulation of a new hybrid 
model of public sphere that combines that idea of discussion and representation of ideas, 
away from the Western-centric approach of the Habermasian view.   
 
Another piece of research by Zayani (2015) presents an in-depth analysis of the 
Tunisian context by taking into consideration various factors such as the youth and the 
politics of everyday life in the country. This research moves from the traditional 
question of how the youth-led movements utilized the digital networks to bring the 
authoritarian regime, instead asking the question of how the Tunisian youth became 
politicized digitally, taking into consideration their lack of concern for politics prior to 
the event.  
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The significant work of Zayani (2015) stems from three considerations. First, his 
analysis breaks away from the centrality of politics or what he described as the cause 
and effect types of political analysis of media and communication in the Middle East, 
theorizing a new mode of research to understand the complex relationship between 
media participation and an undemocratic context. Second, the research considers the 
players in the playing field, namely, the youth factor. This was significant because the 
general trend of Arab media research excludes young people because the youth are 
marginalized by the political institutions. Finally, the research invites a new way of 
thinking about the political use of SNSs by asserting the need to study the changing 
nature of political engagement itself rather than whether the SNSs were eroding the 
control of the state over political life.   
 
One academic work by Ramsay and Fatani (2016) addresses the issue of YouTube-
based programmes in Saudi Arabia. The chapter is located in a volume entitled Political 
Islam and Global Media by Mellor and Rinnawi (2016), which contextualizes Islamic 
identity and online religious activism across different countries. This analysis is 
possibly the first attempt to discuss the issue of YouTube-based programming in order 
to explore the research problem in the Saudi context. The study takes a centric position 
between digital optimism and digital pessimism, arguing that the political impact of 
YouTube programmes is overstated and that the programmes are grounded solely in 
commercial motivation and not political motivations. They also argue that whenever the 
programmes engage in politics, their engagement tends to be in line with the Saudi 
policy and not in opposition to the state.  
 
Their analysis represents a pioneering attempt to explore the unexplored issues, but a 
number of critiques can be made against the analysis offered by Ramsay and Fatani. 
First, the conceptualizing of the research problem is unclear in terms of differentiating 
between the top-down approach and bottom-up approach, and between UGC and PGC. 
Although the focus of the analysis is directed towards YouTube-based programmes, 
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better conceptualization was needed for the sake of clarity. For instance, they refer to 
YouTube-based programming as “Saudi new media”, which is an abstract term that 
needs further categorization and analysis.  
 
Secondly, the study abstains generally from critically examining the role of the 
government in the context of YouTube-based programming, referring, for instance, to a 
visit from the member of the royal family as giving their blessing to the production 
house of YouTube. Thirdly, the analysis of Ramsay and Fatani maintains that the 
political role of YouTube-based programmes is overstated and that there is no political 
impact at all because they are only concerned with profits.  
 
The internet has arguably introduced some form of threat to political systems around the 
world. Nevertheless, some academics have argued that the internet poses no serious 
threat towards authoritarian regimes, especially in the Middle East.  For instance, 
Kalathil and Boas assert that “the impact of the internet on authoritarian regimes of the 
Middle East is an open question, one that must be subject to systemic empirical analysis 
on a case by case basis” (2003, p104). Their study analyses the role of open networks in 
closed regimes including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Egypt by considering 
several variables such as wealth, size, literacy, geopolitics and technology.   
 
On the other hand, Khamis and Vaughn (2014) point out in their critical analysis how 
new modes of communication – namely online citizen journalism through Twitter, 
Facebook, YouTube and blogging – have affected the Arab media landscape and 
therefore fuelled the democratic transformation and the political change that threatened 
autocratic regimes such as those of Egypt and Tunisia during the Arab Spring in 2011. 
The study discusses “how online citizen journalism can provide effective tools for 
supporting the capabilities of the democratic activists by allowing forums for free 
speech and political networking opportunities ... to plan, organize and execute peaceful 
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protests” (p156). This resulted in real threats to the authoritarian rulers with the 
expulsion of both the Egyptian and the Tunisian presidents. Although the study 
documents the negative impacts of the internet, namely social media’s impact on the 
Arab dictators by, for instance, mobilizing the Arab public and accelerating the 
transition to democratization, it concludes that two essential points have to be 
considered.  The first is to avoid a simplistic approach to the role of technology by 
being aware of its limitations in bringing political changes as those modes of 
communication are not capable of enacting change without offline activism in the real 
world. The second is that digitization is not an exceptional actor but rather it is a single 
element alongside other actors such as social, historical and cultural elements in the 
Arab context.  
 
Ghannam (2011) explains in greater detail the role of social media in shaping the Arab 
political atmosphere. He argues that although social networking sites have brought 
change to the concept of freedom of expression among the Arab people, blogging and 
SNS alone cannot be expected to bring immediate political change. Indeed, it is long-
term impacts that might take place over the next ten or even twenty years that can be 
called a real change.  Ghannam also compares social networking to the Arab satellite 
channel, stating that “just as Arab satellite channels helped revolutionize broadcast news, 
social media is arguably changing the nature of news and community engagement, 
which continues to evolve with increased convergence of social media and satellite 
broadcasts, as seen in Tunisia, Egypt, and other countries of the region” (p.23).  
 
Howard and Hussain (2013) agree that online movements alone cannot facilitate 
political change; they highlight the importance of civil society movements on the 
ground in facing oppressors. In fact, those civil society movements can take advantage 
of social media to flourish and expand their influences towards the public, especially 
among young and tech-savvy supporters.     
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To conclude this section, the aforementioned discussion has critically mapped out the 
complex relationship between media and states in the Arab world. What has emerged 
from this section is as follows. First, the model of government ownership, be it directly 
or by proxy, is very common in the Arab media scene. This concept resulted in, 
secondly, creating a media market structure that is characterised as a monopoly or 
oligopoly. Thirdly, censorship and self-censorship became prevailing concepts and 
practices. Fourthly, and in response to these conditions, the audience, including the 
young, moved on to search for alternative media platforms and sources to fulfil their 
social and cultural needs. Also, digital determinism is an emerging theme in the 
literature. However, the academic critiques of several scholars, for example Fuchs 
(2012), have seemingly triggered a new mode of research. Consequently, new but 
limited critical research has been conducted, such as that of Zayani (2015). 
  
This circle of emerging concepts is significant because it lays out the historical and 
contemporary state of the field, and more importantly, it helps create a framework that 
suits this thesis. It can be noticed, however, that the nature of the above debate tends to 
be quite general, lacks a concise definition of field boarder, and avoids problematizing 
the research problem explicitly.  I intend to build upon these general frameworks and 
take these concepts forward to produce specific and defined analysis corresponding to 
the research questions of this thesis and their findings.  
 
The Business Model for YouTube 
 
 One of the main research questions in this thesis concerns the business model of 
YouTube-based programming in Saudi Arabia. It aims to explore how the Saudi youth 
monetizes their online influence in the complex context of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, it is 
essential to our understanding to integrate the academic debate regarding the business 
models for online platforms – specifically, YouTube – into the body of this chapter.  
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The previous discussions highlighted the political and cultural context of media in the 
Arab World including Saudi Arabia. This section now shifts the focus towards the 
business aspects of YouTube to construct a comprehensive framework for the research 
problem.  
 
In order to set the stage for the economics of video sharing platforms, some essential 
critiques have been advanced by Farchy (2009). He emphasizes the significance of the 
classic notion of a two-sided market in online platforms, which brings together audience 
and advertisers by offering free services online. The audience, according to this concept, 
is attracted by the free content, then the monetization of the audience occurs on the part 
of advertisers. Video sharing platforms such as YouTube and Dailymotion have adopted 
this model to finance and profit from their activities. The classic model of a two-sided 
market is further enhanced by interactivity, which allows the tracking of the behaviour 
of users and more importantly the segmentation of the audience, including their 
geographical locations. 
  
However, Wasko and Erickson (2009) argue that the huge audience and revenue of 
YouTube do not necessarily reflect a certain and sustainable business model for the 
video sharing platform. As a result, YouTube has turned to establishing new 
partnerships with content providers to form a new business model that is based on 
content so the revenue would be split between YouTube and its partner companies. 
YouTube moved to adopt a similar model with user generated content (UGC) but the 
audience ended up becoming fragmented. To solve this challenge for the purpose of 
sustaining revenues through advertising, YouTube categorized its videos, for example, 
in Most Viewed and Most Popular categories in order to draw attention to the 
fragmented content for advertising purposes. This segmentation enabled YouTube and 
advertising companies to commodify the user generated content that aligns with the 
advertiser’s target audience, which raised worries amongst media critics and academics.  
For instance, Davidson and et al (2010) argue that the recommendation system of 
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YouTube accounts for 60% of video clicks from the home page, which is a biased 
model that grants the platform control over the content.  
 
This segmentation can raise tensions in the economic relationships between advertising, 
content and copyright, a situation McDonald (2009) describes as digital discords in the 
online media economy. This stems from the fact that YouTube runs on advertising 
revenue. Keeping content attractive is necessary to draw the traffic in and in order to 
continue convincing advertisers to spend, but this model was used to confront the 
copyright industry in the USA during the early days of YouTube.  According to 
Andrejevic (2009), YouTube represents a hybrid medium that combines original 
material with copyrighted material, but professionally generated content (PGC) and 
copyrighted material are the most popular content that draws the traffic and revenue for 
the platform. Andrejevic further maintains that “one of the concerns of content 
producers is that reliance on an intermediate like YouTube relinquishes control over 
interactively generated user data that is becoming an important resource for targeted 
advertising campaigns” (2009, p:408).  
 
In critiquing the term user generated content in relation to YouTube, Andrejevic (2009) 
employs the terms free labour and exploitation to contextualize the relationship between 
the platform (YouTube) and individual content producers. Users are offered a limited 
degree of control over their creative outputs in exchange for building up an online 
community for the platform. This free participation is considered a form of productive 
labour captured by capital and “the offer to overcome estrangement produces a second-
order form of separation between uses and cyber commodities they generate about their 
social lives; their behaviour, their tastes, preferences, patterns of consumption and their 
response to advertising” (2009, p:420).   
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Although the offer of control over creative activity is regarded online as a form of 
exploitation, in the context of YouTube it can be seen as a different case because the 
final product is rendered in commodity form as the data are captured by marketers. 
However, while those who create user-generated content gain their own share of 
revenue and online influence in exchange for the provision of content, there is a 
difference between user-generated content and data-driven control, which are analytic-
based forms of marketing.  
 
Moving towards YouTube’s characteristics, the literature presents the features that have 
made YouTube videos popular and demanded by audience and therefore have increased 
the traffic and advertising for the platform. For example, Cheng et al (2008) highlight 
that while YouTube shares some features with traditional video repositories, the 
platform has unique characteristics that can be attractive for audiences and advertisers. 
The small-world YouTube feature that helps to establish communities and connect them 
is one interesting aspect that increases the website’s traffic. The networks of related 
videos that are based on user generated content “have both small world characteristics 
of a large clustering coefficient indicating the grouping of videos, and a short 
characteristics path length linking any two videos” (2008, p.216). YouTube expanded 
the scope of its business services by delivering video content to mobile users in 2006 in 
order to remain innovative and at the forefront of the video sharing platform industry. In 
addition, Hang (2008) examined the organizational structural of YouTube and found 
that the platform was the first to provide user-generated content via mobile telephones, 
thus expanding the recognition of its brand to mobile services.  
 
In her critical account of the relationship between YouTube and television, Van Dijck 
(2013) argues that professional and amateur – PGC and UGC – are interlocking despite 
the initial narrative of YouTube as video sharing site that presents an alternative to 
television. YouTube can differentiate itself from television by certain characteristics 
such as streaming, uploading and social networking features, but both television and 
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YouTube gradually became attuned to each other’s strategies, especially after 2008. 
This close relationship between the two parties can be found in their ownership, 
governance and business models. 
 
According to Van Dijck (2013), the ownership aspect reflects early legal battles prior to 
2008 between television and YouTube over copyright infringement and intellectual 
property (IP) violations. However, the search engine owned by Google and attractive 
PGC owned by American broadcasters bridged the gap in the common interest of both 
parties. YouTube developed itself to focus on professionally generated content and 
started to behave like a broadcaster, whereas the American broadcasters adopted the 
viewers’ model inspired by YouTube to attempt to dominate viewer numbers and 
therefore advertisers.  
 
Secondly, Van Dijck (2013) argues that governance of the content is another critical 
subject between both parties; YouTube behaved as a connector of users and UGC, and 
supporting the PGC model has gradually resulted in building professional content on 
YouTube that matches the broadcast industry’s definition of content. Finally, the 
business model of YouTube (Google Inc.) is based on maximizing its ability to 
distribute personalized commercial messages to a mass audience by the integration of 
content, searching and advertising. In addition, it applies a partnership programme with 
content producers through the splitting of revenue, but this has raised critical and ethical 
questions regarding the commercialization of content on YouTube.   
 
Although the relationship between YouTube and television is now interlocked, 
YouTube academics such as Kim (2012) have argued that it was not a threat to 
television because the two parties have different objectives. For example, the major 
broadcast networks have adopted online video services to make online video libraries an 
additional window of distribution for their content.  The critique by Kim may have 
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represented a specific Western context in a specific timeframe (i.e. 2012) and indicates 
that various findings are attainable in different contexts and different timeframes 
regarding the relationship between YouTube and television.  
 
However, Kim maintains that the potential for tension between user-generated content 
and professionally generated content on YouTube is bigger because of the interest 
conflicts between producers and advertisers, and more importantly because of the 
geographical availability of the clips. He concludes by arguing that online video 
platforms such as YouTube provide an alternative way to produce and disseminate 
cultural products, but television has struck back with institutional strategies including 
copyright protection and advertising.  In addition, the vast majority of popular content 
on YouTube comes from traditional broadcasters, and YouTube producers borrow the 
format and content of television to produce their content for YouTube.  
 
This section has focused on the academic debate that evolved around the business 
models of the video sharing platform, YouTube. The two-sided market, the 
sustainability of the business model and the challenging relationships between YouTube 
and television are all significant examples of emerging academic concepts in this 
domain. The literature concentrates on the American experience, highlighting the 
critical legal battles over the issue of copyrights between the platform and users. 
Applying these concepts into non-American contexts such as the Saudi applications of 
YouTube can be useful to explore and devise new analytical categories for the research 
problem.   
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The Study of Audience  
 
 In this final section, the literature extends to cover the terrain of the audience, not only 
because it is a significant part of the two-sided market concept discussed in the previous 
section, but also because it corresponds to one of the thesis’ research questions. 
Theorizing the audience is essential to setting up the stage for answering the research 
question because it enables the reader to position the analysis in its setting by 
understanding the main theories and concepts related to this field.  
 
To begin with, the term ‘audience’ has historically evolved around different meanings 
and categories depending on its context within society. The term is rather complex and 
invites conceptual difficulties for researchers. For instance, McQuail (1997) traces the 
development of the concept, highlighting the difference between group, crowd and 
public before investigating the audience as a mass because of the wider consideration of 
the changing nature of social life in modern society. McQuail also states that technology 
was one of the social forces that resulted in pushing the concept of audience into our 
everyday usage and caused the fragmentation of the term into what we perceive 
nowadays as a media audience.  
 
To build on this connotation, Webster (1998) attempts to categorize the literature of 
modern media audiences into three new models – the audience as a mass, as an outcome, 
and as an agent – in order to re-define their meanings and scope for the field of audience 
studies.  First, audience as a mass is the most common model and it is defined as an 
entity by its exposure to the media. This model regards the audience as a large 
collection of people spread across time and space with no immediate knowledge of one 
another. It concentrates on the consumption of materials, how individuals make sense of 
the content and how media offerings capture the masses’ attention.  
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The second model, according to Webster, is audience as an outcome, which has 
dominated the field of media studies. This model is concerned with the power of the 
media to produce a detrimental effect on citizens and on society as whole; therefore, it 
asks what effect the media has on people and society.   
 
The third model is audience as an agent, which conceives the audience as an active 
force or free agent who chooses the media content they want to consume, applies their 
interpretive skills to the message and uses the media to suit themselves and their values.   
 
However, Webster (1998) himself acknowledges the limitation of these models, 
maintaining that audience studies do not always fit neatly within models, but rather they 
can overlap the margins of these models. He argues that mixing these approaches can 
bring rich contributions to applied and theoretical constructs in audience research.  
 
As a result, the fields of media audience and reception research have developed 
dramatically in Western academic circles in different contexts. For instance, Alasuutari 
(1999) recognizes the richness of traditional cultural media research, but he also noticed 
the fragmented loose schools throughout the years, so he attempts to conceptualize these 
developments into three different generations or phases of cultural media research. 
These phases are reception research, audience ethnography and constructionist view.   
 
According to Alasuutari (1999), the emergence of the first generation is associated with 
Stuart Hall’s Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse (1973), which led to 
reception theory and subsequent research.  As a result, it re-addressed themes that had 
already been raised – for instance, use and gratification theory – and more importantly, 
it laid the foundation for and stated the problems to be examined in the reception 
paradigm in the media studies field. The encoding/decoding model of Hall implied a 
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shift from a technical to a semiotic approach to the prevailing message. This message is 
encoded by content creators and decoded (interpreted and made sense of) by receivers. 
This suggests that messages can be interpreted variously from one receiver to another 
according to individual ability and the thought processes of receivers. This approach 
therefore adopts an interpretive framework that places weight on the interpretation of 
the media messages themselves.  
  
The second generation of audience research is audience ethnography, which is 
qualitative audience reception studies that involve analyzing programmes and studying 
their reception amongst specific audience through in-depth interviews. This generation 
of researchers differed from the previous generation by moving from conventional 
politics to identifying politics by raising questions about gender, emphasising the 
functions of the medium, studying the everyday life of a group and relating the use of a 
medium to it.  Thirdly, the constructionist view is the third emerging trend in audience 
research; it entails a broader frame that combines and conceives media and media use.  
 
The goal of Alasuutari (1999) behind this critique and categorization was to pave the 
way for researchers to construct a new agenda and themes for the future of audience 
research discourse. Alasuutari postulates that a constructionist view can inspire new 
emerging trends which he suggested were increasing reflexivity, moving from audience 
psychology to sociology and addressing media culture as a whole instead of only as a 
component of mass communication research.   
 
In order to discuss another theoretical perspective on audience, Abercrombie and 
Longhurst (1998) suggest that there are three types of audience: the simple audience, the 
mass audience and the diffused audience. The diffused audience echoes the social and 
cultural change in contemporary society where everyone becomes an audience. The 
diffused audience constitutes a number of characteristics. First, individuals spend a 
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considerable amount of time in the consumption of mass media at home and in public. 
Secondly, the media are constitutive of everyday life where television and the internet, 
for example, are integrated into the practice of everyday life. Thirdly, the audience is 
created through the performative society (Kershaw, 1994), in which human attitudes are 
structured through the use of performative modes and frames. Finally, the audience’s 
characteristics reflects contemporary society and contemporary content rather than the 
enduring characteristics of humanity in general.  
 
Speaking about the internet audience is complex because of the multiple meanings of 
the concepts of internet and audience. There is a need to allocate specific theoretical 
perspectives to examine specific research problems because generalizing can produce 
insufficient analysis across various contexts and countries.  
 
Downes (2000) further suggests that one of the differences between the internet and 
earlier media are the audience characteristics; for example, the interactivity and the 
niche communities. He attempts to reconceptualise the internet audience as follows: the 
audience as a market; the audience as a public; and the audience as a relationship. The 
first type reflects the commercial relationship between the producer and the user or 
consumer and the changing revenue base for providers. The audience as a public implies 
that the free flow of information can promote participatory culture and a democratic 
public. The final categorization is associated with the active audience when producer 
and audience engage in a symbiotic relationship that governs the creation, production 
and distribution of content. 
   
The interactive capability of the internet enabled the audience to gain a certain degree of 
power and to become more creative in engaging with media content. For instance, the 
notion of ‘creative audience’ was coined by Meikle and Young (2012) in their 
discussion of media convergence, in which they argue that the engagement of an 
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audience is a social behaviour. The creativity of the audience manifests itself in several 
dimensions such as organizing, writing, manipulating and sharing the content, which 
can result in improving the media literacy, activism and critical skills of an audience.  
 
              Arab Audience Research 
 
In her attempt to highlight the significance of contextualizing the audience within their 
cultural and historical settings, Livingstone (2015) argues that the audience from a 
global perspective suffers from a number of challenges, including the hegemony of 
Western theories, and that there is a need to de-Westernize audience studies according 
to the particularity of every case. This de-Westernization can bring about new concepts 
and understandings in order to help understand the many forms of audience worldwide.       
 
When speaking about the audience in the Arab world, it is essential to state the 
significance of political factors that have affected the outcomes of audience research in 
the region.  For instance, the lack of research on audience responses to political content 
has increased the knowledge gap as a result of the perception of media-politics linkage 
amongst the viewers (Sakr 2007). This has caused, in certain cases, superficial analysis 
that has focused on promoting political objectives in line with the political agenda of the 
state (Amin 2008).   
 
Historically speaking, several Western associations have commissioned audience 
research in Saudi Arabia – for example, during the 1960s and 1970s – to understand the 
audience habits in the kingdom. Boyd (1982) highlights that the BBC and the United 
States Information Agency sponsored a study in 1972 for this purpose. Another Cyprus-
based marketing agency conducted research in 1977 and 1979, but the sponsor refused 
to grant permission to quote from studies.  
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Boyd elucidates that the restrictive policy of the Saudi government, with regard to 
allowing foreign entities to conduct a national survey and the cultural expectation of 
excluding women from any interviewing process, were complex political and cultural 
barriers for audience research. The Western audience research in the region, therefore, 
was not comprehensive and faced various logistical obstacles that prevented it from 
covering wider geographical locations, especially the rural areas of the Arab world 
(Mytton, 2011).     
 
Mellor (2013) states that the research field is in the process of development, with 
several Arab and non-Arab researchers attempting to fill the gap by producing more 
analysis that covers various geographical locations in the Arab world. It was this slow 
growth, coupled with a number of challenges, including the heavy reliance on a 
positivism paradigm, which has made qualitative interpretive scholarship in the field 
rather scarce. (See also Souri, 2008).  As the media industry grows, the audience 
becomes more fragmented and no sufficient methodologically-oriented studies have 
been able to cope with the growing trend. This has resulted in the absence of academic 
literature on Arab audiences or any ground-breaking audience research (Abdel Karim, 
2012). 
 
 The reliance on Western theories has further complicated the process of audience 
research in this emerging area, and several critiques have attempted to address this 
scholarship hegemony. For example, Ayish (2005, quoted in Abdel Karim, 2012) and 
Livingstone (2013) assert that Western audience theories stemmed from Western 
settings by Western academics in response to Western circumstances, which made the 
Western audience theories culturally-biased.  
 
There is, therefore, a need to encourage Arab scholarship that is culturally, empirically 
and theoretically based to investigate the marginalized Arab audience, to address the 
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patterns of change and to offer interpretative detailed exploration of this 
underdeveloped field.   
 
In order to address the patterns of contemporary change, Kraidy (2008) offers historical 
reviews of how the Arab audience has been imagined by the states, media corporations 
and advertising agencies, and how the media and audience growth have resulted in 
commercial implications. He pointed out that there is an urgent need to conduct 
empirical and theoretically grounded audience research, breaking down the focus on 
television and moving towards building research frameworks that integrate other 
components such as the internet audience.  
 
The commercial implications of media growth are acknowledged by Alterman (2005), 
who states that some market research conglomerates had conducted surveys on media 
consumptions and patterns in the Arab world for commercial and rating purposes. 
However, he argues that this research tended to deliver unreliable data for academics 
and policy makers because they focused on a limited number of prosperous countries 
and the research process is likely to have been driven by a commercial agenda.  
 
Sabry (2010) agrees that this type of research can result in poor answers about who the 
Arab audiences are and how they interact with the media. He adds that the general 
poverty of Arab audience research has additionally contributed to the general lack of 
Arab cultural studies within the Middle East. The market research lacks meaningful 
relevance to the audience’s perspective on their interpretation of the content, formats 
and also the issues rooted in the content (Ayish and Mellor, 2015).  
 
The above critiques of Arab audience research literature highlight that the state of the 
academic field is underdeveloped, fragmented in nature and heavily focused on 
positivism. More importantly, the political oppression by Arab governments and their 
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sensitivity towards academic research further complicate the academic progress in the 
field. The fourth research question of this thesis is concerned with the Saudi audience, 
and specifically with investigating the reasons behind the popularity of YouTube-based 
programmes amongst the young Saudi audience by employing focus group interviews. 
It aims to respond to the gap in the academic literature by providing solid analysis that 
can contribute to Arab audience research in general and to Saudi research specifically, 
contextualizing the Saudi context and empirically examining the Saudi YouTube 
audience.   
 
 
    Conclusion  
 
The above studies have represented what Patton (2015) calls the intellectual heritage of 
the field of study. It has reviewed and contextualized some of the most influential 
academic works in the field of Arab and global media studies in order to map out the 
concepts, themes, methodologies and limitations so the thesis can neatly position itself 
in the exposed gap. The chapter has consisted of five sections, some of which might 
have overlapped with each other considerably because of the interdisciplinary nature of 
the literature.  
 
In the first section, I weaved together broad discussions to produce specific and definite 
debates about the challenges of Arab media research in the Arab World. This was 
significant because it sets the tone for this thesis, highlighting the struggling state of the 
research and implying potential difficulties and consequences for critical and authentic 
research outputs in the region.  This was connected closely to the next section, which 
investigated the development of Arab media research. It examined the Western role in 
constructing and advancing the field and, more importantly, it highlighted the 
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theoretical deficits in correspondence to the particularity of Arab media field. A number 
of themes and concepts have also emerged relating to the growing demand to de-
Westernize media research and political motivation as a main driver for media 
development in the region.   
 
In the third section, the discussion of relationship between media and states was 
inspired by the concept of political motivation, which emerged in section two. The 
discussion illustrated the complexity of the relationship between the two parties, 
discussing the central role of authoritarian governments in the industry. This has 
resulted in several concepts, for example, Arab ownership models, Arab models of 
censorship and self-censorship, monopoly and oligopoly issues in the media market and 
the move of audiences to alternative platforms and sources.  
 
After that, the discussion shifted towards analysing the business model of YouTube to 
critically reflect upon its development and experience within the American context. No 
research has been conducted on the practices of the business model in the Arabic 
context, specifically in Saudi Arabia. The notion of a two-sided market emerged along 
with the concept of digital discords to reflect the struggle between the platform and 
other traditional media institutions. Finally, the last section shed light upon audience 
scholarship, outlining various types of audiences such as the diffused audience and 
creative audience to project the evolving nature of the concept in media applications and 
uses. The struggle of the Arab audience field is similar to the struggle of the Arab media 
field in terms of Western hegemony and the theoretical deficit.  
 
The aim of this chapter was to explore what the literature tells us about the Arab and 
Saudi media field and their complexity so we can identify and locate themes and gaps 
that can be utilized by this research. Despite the wide scope of the literature and its 
diversity, common themes have emerged strongly throughout the critiques.  
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Firstly, there are issues regarding the application of Western theories to Arabic contexts 
as a response to the Arab theoretical deficits in the field. The Western circumstance in 
which the theories have been developed are in sharp contrast to the Arab settings and its 
applications; therefore there is a demand for detailed critical analysis derived from the 
Arabic experience. This chapter has shown that some studies have attempted to produce 
a specific analysis to overcome the Western hegemonic narrative in the field (Boyd, 
1982; Kraidy, 2012; Sakr, 2007 and Zayani, 2015) by producing specific case studies 
that reflect the process and the experience of Arabic reality. However, many grounded 
empirical investigations are required to cover the ever increasing significance of the 
field by breaking away from pre-conceived Western assumptions and being open to new 
emerging theories and patterns that explain the specificity of the Arab experience.   
Secondly, the vast majority of Arab studies, including audience studies, tend to adopt 
positivist ideology, abstaining from exploring new territories and meanings in media 
and cultural studies. As a result, critical qualitative research about SNSs in the context 
of non-violence is rather scarce and limited, as opposed to administrative research about 
SNSs during the Arab uprisings of 2010 onwards. In fact, very few academic works 
have attempted to study specific SNSs in stable Arab countries by contextualizing their 
use in the wider political, economic and cultural context, the exception being Ramsay 
and Fatani (2016), whose study as we have seen is subject to significant critiques.  
  
Therefore, three main gaps have been identified in the literature: the Western theoretical 
influence over the Arab field; studying SNSs in isolation without taking into 
consideration their specific context; and the serious lack of specific analysis of 
YouTube-based programming in Saudi Arabia. No serious research based on empirical 
methods has been conducted on YouTube in Saudi Arabia, apart from Ramsay and 
Fatani (2016) and commercially driven marketing research.  
 
There is an urgent need to better understand the experience of YouTube-based 
programming in Saudi Arabia and its implications, so this thesis will respond to the 
 
 
62 
 
gaps in the research by offering empirical analysis through the lens of a qualitative 
approach and contextualizing the research problem in its natural framework to fill the 
knowledge gap in the field of Arab media studies and non-Western media context.   
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Chapter Two:  Methodology 
 
             Introduction 
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the economic, political and cultural context of 
YouTube in Saudi Arabia.  It therefore focuses on the actions and the processes of 
YouTube-based programming, its role in the Saudi cultural, commercial and political 
spheres and the interactions of young Saudi audiences with the content of YouTube 
based programming to which they are frequently exposed. 
  
As outlined previously in the literature review there is a narrow range of research in the 
field of Saudi media in general but there is a particular lack of research that attempts to 
offer a comprehensive perspective of Saudi youth production and consumption of 
YouTube in one of the most conservative and culturally sensitive countries, perhaps, in 
the world.  In addition, according to Khalil (2010, p:79), “it is worth acknowledging 
that the complexity level of research tools is yet unable to match the level of theoretical 
sophistication on issues related to youth.  Based on the methodological limitations of 
Saudi media studies that were demonstrated in the literature review this dissertation 
incorporates a qualitative research methodology to provide the reader with rich and 
inclusive accounts of the Saudi YouTube context by using a series of in-depth semi-
structured online interviews and face-to-face focus groups.  
      
This chapter begins with a brief background description of the qualitative method 
approach. After that, it moves on to explain the methodological considerations 
demanded by this study, describing the use of semi-structured online interviews with 
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content-makers and face-to-face focus group interviews with the audience. Finally, the 
procedure of data management and coding will be discussed.  
 
            Qualitative Methodology 
 
Initially several academics have highlighted the importance of adopting the research 
philosophy that determines the most suitable type of evidence and data-gathering 
methods for the research problem (Guba, 1990; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Blakie, 2010; 
Biddle and Schafft, 2014; Slife & Williams, 2013; and Creswell, 2014).   Others have 
also demonstrated the central role of the research design in academic studies (Creswell 
& Plano Clark, 2007; Jick, 1979; Olsen, 2004; and Hussein, 2009).  
          
In terms of the qualitative inquiry, “the word qualitative implies an emphasis on process 
and meaning that are not rigorously examined or measured” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; 
p.4). It is important to state that there is no single accepted way of conducting 
qualitative research but rather it depends on several factors such as the aim of the 
research, the characteristic of research subjects, the funders and the audience for the 
research (Ritchie et al 2014).  In fact, the justifiable use of qualitative inquiry for this 
study rests on several basics. Creswell (2013) outlines various reasons to conduct 
qualitative research; for instance, academics employ it to have a complex detailed 
understanding of the issue that can only be established when talking directly to people. 
In addition, it is employed to realize the context in which participants in a study address 
a problem. Hence, this inquiry is typically a theoretical framework for conducting 
research that involves collecting, analyzing and integrating data using qualitative 
strategies.  
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Methodologically speaking, a substantial number of Arab and Saudi media studies 
suffer from weak empirical grounds and they are also descriptive in nature.  This study 
attempts to add value to this discipline by offering an empirical analysis of the research 
problem through the qualitative lens to explore the reality of the social worlds of Saudi 
YouTube context. Bryman and Burgess (1999) state that qualitative research is a 
strategy of social research that deploys several methods and displays a preference for 
the interpretation of social phenomena from the point of view of the meaning employed 
by the people being studied the deployment of natural rather than artificial settings for 
the collection of data and generating rather than testing theory.  This in turn would help 
to produce more robust in-depth experiences from the research participants. According 
to Atkinson, Heath and Chenail (1991, p: 163), investigators “should be given the 
freedom to immerse themselves in unique experiences, follow their instincts and 
hunches, allow insights to arise and then to illustrate these insights vividly so their 
community can understand them”.  
 
There are several advantages in incorporating a qualitative approach. For example, it 
appears to be an emerging consensus that many research issues cannot be adequately 
examined through questions that are posed by hypothetical deductive methods and 
addressed with quantifiable answers (Jensen and Jankowski, 1995).  In addition, Strauss 
and Corbin (1998) point out that qualitative method can be incorporated to gain intricate 
details about phenomena such as feelings, emotions and thought processes which are 
difficult to extract through conventional research methods.     
 
 On the other hand, Atieno (2009) maintain that there are some limitations and 
challenges to employing qualitative research in academia. First, the ambiguities of the 
human language should be recognized. For instance, the word “red” could be used 
either to describe the colour or to reflect certain political categorizations. Second, the 
findings cannot be extended to wider populations with certainty because the findings of 
the research are not tested to discover whether they are statistically significant or due to 
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chance. Nevertheless, Mason (2002) emphasize that, while any piece of research may be 
criticized for its shortcomings, the idea that qualitative research has any inherent 
weakness is based on misunderstanding of the logic of qualitative inquiry.    
 
          The Data Collection Methods 
 
   The Online Interviews 
 
Semi-structured academic online interviews with content makers of YouTube based 
programming were conducted to explore unseen themes and patterns in relation to two 
main specific categories; the context of Saudi YouTube based programming and the 
Saudi government's attitude towards this phenomenon.  
 
In fact, the rationale for adapting online interviewing came as a reaction to not being 
able to obtain a visit visa from the Saudi authority. The intent of the research was to 
conduct face-to-face interviews in their natural settings at the studios, in Saudi Arabia in 
order to observe the work flow that could have offered the researcher with first-hand 
experience of the challenges and reality of production activities for YouTube. Therefore, 
this refusal by the Saudi authorities shaped the design of this study and its procedure. 
This logistical obstacle implies that re-applying again for the Saudi entry visa would 
cost extra time which is the resource that most needs a wise investment for this 
qualitative research. Furthermore, no positive outcomes could be guaranteed with 
another application. Therefore, fresh thinking was required and new decisions were 
taken to carry out in-depth interviews with Saudi content creators by employing a 
computer-mediated communication (CMC) mechanism.  
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Salmons (2015) note that online interviews are a viable alternative because researchers 
can choose from varied communication options and talk directly with participants 
anywhere at any time, which can bypass potential geographical and political obstacles.  
This requires basic IT skills for the participants of this research which was easily 
available to them as they are young with a great level of familiarity with technology. In 
addition, the nature of their creative work, which involves producing and disseminating 
cultural products for their audiences along with engaging with their fans and followers 
online, are other factors that made them already equipped with essential technical 
requirements for online interviews. Online interviewing is therefore considered to be 
inherently cost and time effective for the research. Yet, this new method brings its own 
challenges and difficulties which required attention and consideration for certain issues 
such as the authenticity of participants. The discussion below will highlight how the 
challenges have been dealt with throughout the fieldwork. Various softwares were used 
to conduct the interviews including video chat and voice call application (Skype), 
instant messaging and video chat communication platform (Google Hangouts) and 
voice-over internet protocol (TeamSpeak). The online interviews enabled flexible time 
scheduling for participants. For example, they made it easier to conduct an interview 
with one of the contributors who was studying in Los Angeles in the USA at the time of 
the interview.  
 
Adler and Adler (2012) point out that the best answer to the question of how many 
interviews are needed is to gather data until empirical saturation is reached.  Charmaz 
(2014) elucidates that the number of interviews depends on the analytical level to which 
the researcher aspires as well as the purpose of the research. Charmaz also points out 
that small samples can produce an in-depth interview study of lasting significance but 
this depends on the initial and emergent research questions, how the study was 
conducted and how the analysis was constructed.  As a result, this study conducted ten 
in-depth semi-structured online interviews which were flexible and emergent in nature 
and which brought usefulness and quality for the study of YouTube in Saudi Arabia.  
The interviews with the Saudi content makers were drawn on an informative and 
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intensive interviewing strategy that aimed at generating accurate responses and 
descriptions of events with clarification about the process, meanings, places and people 
involved in the production of YouTube-based programming.  
 
More importantly, the interviews were carried out until the researcher felt that no new 
concepts emerged. The saturation of concepts and their properties were an indicator of 
the number of interviews required for the thesis. However, reaching the level of 
saturation was not easily attained as it took extensive engagement with the data 
following each interview in order to search for concepts and logical leads from the data.  
Finally, Baker and Edward (2012) affirm that epistemological and methodological 
questions about the nature and purpose of the research contributed to the argument 
regarding the chosen number of interviews.  
 
As for sampling, I established initial sampling criteria for potential participants as a 
point of departure for the interviews before moving to the process of theoretical 
sampling that focused on concepts and the theoretical development of the analysis.  
 
The initial identified population was Saudi young people with practical experience in 
YouTube-based programming, whose programmes or YouTube channels have at least 
ten million views. The benchmark of ten million views was chosen randomly as an 
initial step because the number of views was relatively high amongst Saudi YouTube 
channels and this number was an estimated random average figure to help establish the 
initial sample. Secondly, it served as an initial filter mechanism to navigate through 
various Saudi YouTube channels.  
 
Following the initial sampling and interviews, the focus gradually shifted from people 
to concepts where each interview was followed by analysis which led to more data 
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gathering and analysis. This resulted in interviewing some participants who did not 
meet the criteria of initial sampling; for example, some interviews were conducted with 
participants whose YouTube channels had fewer than ten million views.  
 
This means the sample ended being as diverse as covering YouTube-based network of 
one billion views down to YouTube based programmes of 187,000 views.  By being 
driven by concepts, this allowed the research to explore the emergent concepts in depth 
and to identify various properties and dimensions of the research problem.  Theoretical 
sampling is important when studying new areas because it allows the opportunity to 
explore issues and problems from different angles (Corbin and Strauss, 2015) and it can 
be used as a strategy to narrow the focus on emerging categories, developing these 
categories and refining them (Charmaz, 2014).      
 
Following the initial sampling, a suggested shortlist of potential fifteen interviewees 
was drawn up. This included creative workers at Saudi YouTube-based programming, 
and those involved in production, management and presentation. However, 
considerations of theoretical sampling and theoretical saturation have shaped the 
procedure, and the researcher ended up interviewing ten content makers. This wide 
range of respondents was selected to incorporate a diverse range of voices and 
experiences into the research.  
 
 As the shift took place towards theoretical sampling, I contacted new interviewees who 
were identified and ranked according to the concepts which emerged. The interviewees 
were mainly approached by using an online news and social networking service, Twitter 
Inc., where all the participants are active on this platform. In some cases, some 
interviewees co-ordinated with me to approach certain people that I could not approach 
using Twitter Inc.  
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Table 1 outlines the participants and their positions in order to enhance the reader’s 
understanding of the interview materials to be clear who the interviewees were and on 
what basis they were contributing to the thesis. 
  Name Position YouTube 
Channel 
YouTub
e views 
Notes 
 
Abdullah 
Mando 
Co-founder 
and Ex-
CEO of 
UTURN 
network 
 
 
UTURN 
Entertainm
ent 
 
 
1.5  
Billion 
Left the 
network 
and 
establishe
d his own 
business 
 
Malik Nejer 
Art director 
and co-
founder of 
Myrkott 
 
Myrkott 
 
391 
Million 
 
Animation 
 
Abdulmajed    
Alkenani 
 
Co-founder 
and 
creative 
director of 
Sceen TV 
 
Sceen TV 
 
148 
Million 
Mixer of 
factual 
online 
shows 
Anonymous Presenter        Anonymous 30 
Million 
Saudi 
Female 
 
Mohammad 
Makki 
 
 
Director 
 
        TakkiSeries 
 
49 
Million 
Drama 
online and 
then 
appeared 
on TV 
Aymen 
Khoja 
 
Director 
 
SargoShow 
  
233K 
New 
Saudi-
American 
drama in 
Jan 2016 
Mohammad 
Bazaid 
 
Presenter 
Quarter to 
Eight  
(talk show) 
 
18 
Million 
The first 
Saudi 
show on 
YouTube 
 
Safana 
Sejini 
 
Presenter 
Tabatek 
    (cultural show) 
- Saudi 
female 
Saeed 
Baeshen 
Actor and 
film maker 
 
8arwasha 
 
 
40 
Million 
Drama 
that 
reflects on 
migrants 
Ahmed Aref Presenter      DeSTRoYeR 81 
Million 
Games 
 
Table 1: The participants and their positions 
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For those who agreed to participate, an introductory email, outlining the purpose of the 
research, was sent to them, which was followed by a short online video meeting of ten 
to fifteen minutes (with some of the interviewees) to demonstrate the procedure, 
explaining the ethical form and its applications, agreeing upon the date of the main 
interview and the anticipated length of the interview.  
  
This step was time-consuming but it was essential to engage deeply with participants in 
order to build robust and personal relationships with them so that they became 
comfortable in sharing their experiences with the researcher. Importantly, this also 
served as a professional etiquette technique to verify the authenticity of the interviewees 
by comparing their identity to information obtained from internet search. For instance, 
their photos on Twitter, their performance on YouTube and the news available about 
them in the public domain.  It must be noted here, however, that some subjects did not 
have the time for the initial online video meeting so they preferred to be informed by 
the e-mail and then they participated in the main interview without the introductory 
meeting.  
 
 There have been some cases when some interviewees asked to look at the questions in 
advance, and so the researcher provided them with the main themes of the interview, 
indicating to them that the interview was semi-structured and that it would be based on 
the emergence of information. (the guide interview can be found in Appendix A)   
 
 In terms of the time-frame, the process of recruiting was intricate as the Saudi 
YouTube market is not fully institutionalized but rather differs greatly throughout the 
market. For example, I experienced different mechanisms of contact that spanned from 
contacting personal assistants of certain YouTube figures to direct contact with some 
contributors without going through the gatekeepers. The overall process of interviews 
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(from sending the first initial invitation email to the last interview) was conducted 
between July 2015 and February 2016.   
 
The actual duration of interviews themselves varied from forty to eighty-five minutes 
and they were recorded by two methods; computer-based recording software and digital 
recorder to secure two separate copies of each interview in order to avoid any technical 
challenges so the data can be obtained and transcribed. This strategy was helpful 
because, during one of the interviews, the software encountered technical errors of 
which I was only aware at the end of the event. However, the digital recorder served as 
a rescue vehicle for this issue. In addition, there were some poor video calls because 
two of the participants, for instance, were using their mobile phones, instead of their 
PCs, which resulted in unfavourable communication quality. This led to a reliance on 
only using voice calls instead of video conferencing which dismissed non-verbal 
interactions. 
 
At the end of each interview, the respondents were asked to sign and return the consent 
form which had been approved by the Ethical Committee in the College of Arts at the 
University of Glasgow (see Appendix B). Only one of the participants did not return the 
consent form although her verbal consent was recorded at the interview. Her 
contribution has been used throughout the study.  
 
Indeed, all of the participants, with the exception of one female participant, did not ask 
to be anonymous but rather preferred to be identified in the research. (See Appendix C) 
One of the participants requested to take the decision of the identity at the end of 
interview when the participant joked at the end by stating that I have not spoken against 
the King so the anonymity was not needed.  The willingness of the participants to be 
identified could be because all of them already have a strong online presence where all 
their online activities are known and traceable. In addition, the public engagement of the 
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participants and the nature of the research itself might imply the reasons behind their 
wish to use their real names. 
 
When it comes to quoting the participants, it is important to state here that the thesis 
chose to identify the participants by their positions, their names and the year of the 
interview to help the readers to link the contributor into the themes of discussions.  
 
In general, each interview started with an open discussion about the interviewee’s 
background and how they got involved in YouTube activities so that they could get 
gradually into the interview. After that, the interviewer moved to the themes of the 
discussion, framing the questions in a general but yet tailored manner to get deeper into 
the experience of the interviewees. This required incorporating personal, professional 
and cognitive skills that I brought from my personal experience in order to balance the 
content and the process of collecting data through interviews.   
 
Focus Groups 
 
In order to investigate the analytical categories related to the Saudi audience, focus 
group interviews were utilized to uncover the interpretation by the Saudi audience of the 
social world of YouTube based-programming and to explore the complex relationship 
between the content and youth culture.  
        
This method of using focus groups offered a rich and productive way to gain access to 
well-rehearsed public knowledge and highlighted the way in which social exchange has 
reinforced hierarchies especially when it comes to researching young people’s 
experience of their social world (Michell, 1999). Focus groups can be defined (Barbour 
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and Kitzinger 1999) as group discussions that involve some kind of collective activity; 
for instance, viewing videos or discussing a set of questions in order to explore a 
specific set of issues. Methodologically speaking, focus group interviews involve 
gathering together a group of people who share a similar social and cultural background 
to debate and discuss certain issues with the assistance of a moderator (Liamputtong, 
2011).  The goal of focus group research is to draw upon respondents’ attitudes, feelings, 
beliefs, experiences and reactions in a way that would not be feasible using other 
methods and thus focus groups are not natural and spontaneous, but rather are organized 
events (Gibbs, 1997).  
 
The purpose of employing focus groups for this thesis was to probe deeply into the 
young Saudi audience's perspectives and to draw upon their beliefs, thoughts and 
experiences which is not possible using a numeric strategy. This method encouraged 
Saudi youth to tell stories about YouTube content; how they perceived it, how they saw 
it and how they reacted to it.  As was explained previously, the refusal of the Saudi 
authorities to grant the researcher a visit visa encouraged a new way of thinking in 
terms of data collection. Since it was difficult to conduct focus group interviews with 
young Saudis in Saudi Arabia itself, I decided to take advantage of Saudi students in the 
United Kingdom who were sponsored by their government to purse their various levels 
of education.  
 
So, the city of Glasgow in Scotland was chosen to be the location of focus group 
interviews for various reasons including the availability of Saudi students in the city, the 
cultural and the educational significance of the city and the convenient access for me to 
this geographical location.  The focus group interviews took place in two different 
educational settings: Glasgow Caledonian University and Glasgow Mena Trust Centre.  
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In response to determining the number of focus groups interviews, several factors that 
have been drawn from Morgan (2013) shaped the decision. Firstly, the general 
homogeneity of groups meant fewer conflicts between Saudi participants and more 
consistency, which enabled the researcher to anticipate at later stages what would be 
said next in a group.  Being Saudi participants meant making the groups less diverse, 
but it did not produce complete, coherent points of view because of the various factors 
such as age, gender, educational level, cultural orientation and the level of religious 
practice. Secondly, the degree of structure in all interviews was standardized as well as 
a medium level of moderator involvement which decreased the variability of responses 
from group to group.  
 
Morgan, (2013) suggests that three to five focus groups were standard for projects 
because simply having more groups seldom provided more meaningful new insights. 
Based on the above arguments, along with reflecting on the research purpose, research 
plan and the consideration of time and cost, the research conducted seven semi-
structured focus groups interviews of twenty-nine participants in total.   With regard to 
the segmentation, five Saudi-male focus groups and two Saudi-female focus groups 
were used. The number of participants in each group varied but it was very challenging 
to recruit Saudi females for these focus groups. The average number of Saudi-male 
participants for each group was 4.6 whereas the average number of Saudi-female was 3.  
(See appendix D) 
 
The recruitment method used was theoretical sampling. It was guided by key 
characteristics that were considered relevant to the research problems of the Saudi 
audiences. The recruitment strategy of individuals incorporated a set of requirements for 
eligibility to take part in the study, including being a Saudi participant based in Scotland 
with a minimum age of seventeen years. No maximum age was put forward. All 
respondents were required to be familiar with, at least, one example of YouTube based 
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programming but the level of engagement was left unspecific so they did not have to be 
fans of certain shows or certain individuals on YouTube.   
 
The recruitment strategy was initiated by me because I have an extensive social network 
with the Arab community in Scotland because of my engagements with several NGO 
organizations and through his experience as a presenter in the radio community in 
Glasgow. However, the strategy was enhanced via an intermediary who helped me to 
recruit eligible members to take part in the research.  
 
With regard to recruiting the Saudi female participants, the issue of gender is highly 
sensitive in Saudi Arabia therefore the Glasgow based focus groups for Saudi females 
offered a free-er platform to discuss and debate their points of view. However, it was 
difficult to organize the groups and to obtain the sufficient number of participants 
within the groups themselves. The attendance rate was less when compared to Saudi 
male participants and this could be because they were uncomfortable in being part of 
the process. Working with a male researcher might be one of the reasons that 
contributed to this outcome along with other cultural and societal Saudi dimensions.  
All in all, the participants in the focus group interviews were different in their ages, 
occupational levels, and the number of years spent in the UK. The last factor was 
interesting to observe because the longer the participant has stayed in the UK the more 
liberal view he/she holds as the analysis revealed.  
 
With regard to the focus group questions, they were open-ended and leading to allow 
engagement and they were organized around key topics; the popularity of YouTube 
based programming and the pattern of consumption. In addition, the focus groups 
allowed for new themes to emerge throughout the discussion in order to enrich the data 
of the research.  Visual prompts were used except in the first group because of some 
technical issues. This stimulated conversation and discussion amongst the members of 
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the groups. The prompts showed top ten Saudi presenters and YouTube-based 
programming. Snacks and beverages were provided.  
 
Focus group protocol was developed prior to conducting the interviews in order to build 
a road map for the procedure. The interviews started by welcoming the participants and 
providing them with an overview of the research. After that, participants were asked to 
fill in the fact sheet (see Appendix E) and the consent form respectively (see Appendix 
F). All participant’s names were anonymous and their ages have been used to introduce 
them whenever they are quoted throughout the research along with the year of the 
interview. The interviews were moderated by myself and the aim was to facilitate the 
discussion and ensure fair distribution of ideas between all members of the groups 
(Appendix G).  The interviews were recorded by two separate digital recorders to avoid 
any potential technical errors.  Depending on the number of participants in every group, 
the time of interviews varied between thirty-five minutes to ninety-five minutes. The 
focus group method was flexible in the sense that later groups were informed and 
enhanced by the experience of early groups.   
 
 Transcription and Translation 
 
All online interviews with the content creators of YouTube based-programming and 
focus group interviews in Glasgow with their audience were conducted in the Arabic 
language. This meant that the process of post-interview follow up was time-consuming 
and required further efforts to transfer the oral discourse into narrative mode. 
Transcriptions are regarded as the solid rock-bottom empirical data of interview projects 
(Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009) and, therefore, special attention should be paid to this 
process.  
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The interviews were transcribed into the Arabic text by the researcher and this in itself 
was an initial analytical process that enhanced initial thoughts while conducting the 
interviews. The transcriptions were made manually because there is no software that can 
transfer sound files to written format in the Arabic language so far.   
 
Arabic transcriptions were made after each interview to allow me to reflect upon the 
material and to organize initial codes that could be used in the following interviews and 
to construct a general understanding of the research problem. Pauses, emotional 
expressions and repetitions were omitted during the transcription to keep the data 
focused and ready for analysis.  
 
The interviews were conducted and transcribed by myself. It was very significant in 
developing the coding and categories while the research was in process, but also it was 
time-consuming process. Therefore, the translation of Arabic transcripts to English 
language was outsourced online.  The translation of transcripts was done by a 
professional freelance translator via the Upwork platform which is a global freelancing 
platform that connects businesses online.  
 
Importantly, the names of shows, figures, cities, the country of origin and any other 
piece of information that could reveal the identity and the nature of the participants, 
their association and their nationality were deleted before handing the transcripts to the 
freelancer translator. The translations were good in general but I had to revise the 
English version to rectify some minor errors and modify the meanings of some local 
expressions.  
 
It is important to mention here that, although all interviews were conducted in the 
Arabic language, the questions for the semi-structured interviews and focus groups were 
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prepared and written in English but they were delivered to the participants in Arabic.  
To ensure the quality of translated questions, two measures were taken. First, I am a 
bilingual which helped me to ensure the quality of translated questions. Second, this 
was enhanced by a ‘back translation’ technique where the questions were sent to one of 
my friends who is a linguist and professional translator to double check the accuracy of 
the translation before conducting the interviews. 
 
Finally, the process of transforming the Arabic oral discourse to written format carries 
linguistic, cultural and meaning bias.  Being a bilingual researcher and by applying the 
back translation technique, this can serve to reduce bias in the language used in the 
research. In addition, the sense of sensitivity of the researcher has been developed 
throughout the stages of the research which helped in reducing the bias.       
 
 
Data Management and Analysis  
 
In order to organize the overwhelming amount of texts and field notes, a coding 
procedure was developed in order to be able to make sense of data. The ultimate goal 
was to develop a theory which Auerbachian and Silverstein (2003) defined as a 
description of patterns that had been found in the data.  
 
To extract the patterns relating to YouTube based-programming, the first step was to 
apply a filtering strategy to connect the relevant text to the research problem and 
research questions.   This was done by reading all the material line by line in order to 
understand the content, compare transcripts and exclude irrelevant text and 
consequently established memo-writing. Charmaz (2014) describes this process as 
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initial coding where the researcher is open to all theoretical possibilities which could 
emerge from the data.  
 
As the breaking down of the data took place, the next step was to look for repeating 
ideas within and across groups to construct the main themes of YouTube based 
programming in Saudi Arabia. I was going back and forth to restructure and merge 
various themes according to their similarities or differences. This stage was labeled by 
Charmaz (2014) as ‘focused coding’ as the analysis moved towards conceptualizing 
segments of data as a result of active involvement with the material.  
 
After that, theoretical constructs were developed as a result of processing the themes of 
the study. Headings and sub-headings of the research were inspired by the emerging 
themes and theoretical constructs of the analysis.  The research then moved to what 
Auerbachian and Silverstein (2003) describes as theoretical narrative where the 
researcher pulls together all refined data in a coherent written story that pointed out the 
voice and the social world meanings of participants. This was coupled with integrating 
the relevant literature into the theoretical narrative of the research. Using the quotes 
enhanced the interpretation of this research. The theoretical narrative transformed the 
context of YouTube based-programming (the research problem) to the definite 
interpretation of how the Saudi youth redefine their role in the society through their 
participation in YouTube-based programming.   
 
As for quality considerations, the research followed several techniques to enhance the 
value and the effectiveness of the thesis. Firstly, during the process of writing, I used 
the language and the words of the participants to resonate their voices and their life 
experience throughout the discussion. This sensitivity of the theoretical narrative 
offered the reader various insights but it also shaped the narrative scientifically. Second, 
linkage between the raw data and the emerged theoretical constructs was reviewed 
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frequently to ensure that the outcomes explained the meanings of the respondents. Third, 
special attention was paid to the process of data collection methods, the sensitivity in 
dealing with ethical issues of the field-work, the position of the researcher and the 
reflexivity as the research was processing. This also helped to ensure the aligning of the 
research purpose to its design in order to produce a coherent, flexible and good quality 
thesis.  
 
One of the quality criteria used by qualitative researchers is member checking. This 
refers to presenting a written draft, oral report or the analysis for the participants to 
comment on the trustworthiness or authenticity of what has been produced (Braun and 
Clarke, 2013). Nevertheless, the major challenge for applying this criterion was the 
linguistic obstacle. As has been discussed above, the online interviews with content 
creators and the focus group interviews with the audiences in Glasgow were conducted 
in the Arabic language. The processing of the data, coding, labelling, theoretical 
constructs and the theoretical narrative were crafted in English. From the respondents’ 
standpoint, this is resulted in a language barrier that made it difficult for them to 
comment on the analysis and offer the researcher any feedback. The resources available 
for a PhD researcher are limited in nature and it was highly challenging to facilitate this 
technique. According to Thomas (2016), member checking is unlikely to be relevant to 
research focused on theory development and there is little evidence, in general, that it 
improves the research findings.  Thomas also mentioned several problems associated 
such as the low response rate and no substantive change in research findings.   
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Conclusion  
 
This chapter has laid out an overview of the methodological considerations demanded 
by this study. It has presented coherently the relationship between researcher design, 
research methodology, fieldwork implementation and the process of analysis.  
 
It started by explaining briefly the qualitative methodology and highlighting its 
practices, advantages and limitations.  After that, it outlined the process of online semi-
structured interviews with Saudi content creators - arguing about the logic behind ten 
interviews and explaining the procedure involved in theoretical sampling, issues related 
to timeframes and conducting the interviews ethically.   
 
Following this, the process of focus group interviews with Saudi audiences in Glasgow 
was discussed. It showcased the theoretical implementation of seven semi-structured 
focus groups of twenty-nine participants and the procedure of conducting face-to-face 
focus group interviews with Saudi students. The issue of gender is highly sensitive in 
the Saudi context and this was fully explained, suggesting the potential reasons behind 
the low rate of Saudi female participants.  
 
All interviews were conducted in Arabic and were transformed manually by the 
researcher because of the current absence of software that transfers the Arabic voice 
into written formats, but this step served as an initial analytical process for the whole 
procedure. The translation of Arabic text was outsourced to a professional translator 
online and the researcher reviewed them to rectify some minor mistakes and specific 
matters related to local culture.  
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Finally, the process of data management and analysis was examined - highlighting the 
initial coding, focused coding and theoretical construct, before examining the debate 
which has evolved around the issue of quality.   
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Chapter Three: The Public Sphere of Online Video 
 
 Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters have provided the essential theoretical and methodological 
groundwork to pave the way for the analysis of the thesis. This chapter now shifts the 
focus towards engaging with materials drawn from online interviews with content 
makers of YouTube-based programming in Saudi Arabia. This chapter specifically 
focuses on the cultural and political context of YouTube-based programming; it will 
explore the circumstances surrounding the formation of this phenomenon, the 
motivations and issues faced by content makers, and the struggle of female presenters in 
this context.  
 
As the literature review chapter highlighted, the concepts of political authoritarianism 
and politically motivated media outlets (Boyd, 1982; Rinnawi, 2006; and Sakr, 2007) 
are influential because they have shaped the context of the media industry in Saudi 
Arabia.  It should be clear from the previous chapters that these external political factors 
have also led to internal cultural behaviours within media organizations where, for 
instance, the concepts of censorship and self-censorship (Amin, 2002; Khazen, 1999; 
Al-Obaidi, 2007; Sakr, 2003; and Wojcieszak, 2007) became common, defining the 
relationship between media institutions, the state and the individuals within the 
organizations. The following analysis builds upon these concepts and the general 
overview previously provided to explore the cultural and the political context of 
YouTube, and how the youth negotiate their cultural and political aspirations in such a 
restrictive environment.  
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For the sake of clarity, the chapter begins by first briefly introducing all the YouTube-
based programmes and channels employed in this study in order to make sense of them 
in later analysis. Second, it maps out the Saudi cultural landscape to help contextualize 
the YouTube programmes culturally. Third, the analysis explores the formation of 
YouTube-based programmes, highlighting their motivations and other emerging issues 
related to representations. Finally, it pays special attention to females’ participation, one 
of the significant themes to emerge in the analysis.  
  
Introducing YouTube-Based Programmes and Channels 
 
This section aims to introduce the YouTube-based programmes and channels mentioned 
throughout the analysis in order to help the reader engage with the materials and make 
sense of them. The prominent features of each programme or channel will be briefly 
introduced, and the URLs will be provided for ease of access. 
Monopoly film 
Monopoly is one of the first and the most prominent Saudi short films that used 
YouTube as a platform of exhibition in 2011. The 22-minute film provided a public 
critical narrative, which was not the cultural norm in the country back then, regarding 
the housing crisis in Saudi Arabia. Monopoly is a satirical mockumentary highlighting 
the struggle of Saudi youth in purchasing their homes. It indirectly blames influential 
political figures and associated business moguls in Saudi Arabia who control massive 
amounts of real estate that they monopolize, causing housing prices to rise beyond the 
financial grasp of young people. The film gained massive global media attention and it 
has been featured by a number of Arabic and Western media outlets. The film was 
written by Abdulmajeed Alkenani, who is one of the respondents of this study. Alkenani 
later co-founded a popular YouTube channel called SceenTV and he presented one of 
the programmes in the channel. Monopoly can be accessed and watched with English 
subtitles through this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NMvCURQEhpM   
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SceenTV 
SceenTV was established in 2012 and aims to enrich Arab online content. It provides a 
number of entertaining, cultural, educational and cinematic programmes which have 
received more than 152 million views. The channel incorporates a wide range of voices 
and attempts to distinguish itself from other YouTube channels by providing both 
entertaining and factual content. SceenTV can be accessed through this link:  
https://www.youtube.com/user/SceenTV/featured  
 
Quarter to Nine 
This was the first regular Saudi YouTube-based programme by Mohammad Bazaid, 
who is one of the interviewees for this study. Quarter to Nine published its first episode 
on YouTube at the beginning of 2010, and it consisted of three seasons with 18 million 
views. The programme focused on criticizing the content of Saudi newspapers, with the 
last part of each episode devoted to criticizing Saudi classified advertising. Being the 
first Saudi YouTube-based programme, Quarter to Nine became popular amongst the 
audience, and it was the only YouTube-based programme that transferred to a private 
television channel, Rotana, which is owned by Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal. Quarter to 
Nine can be accessed through the following link: 
https://www.youtube.com/user/s7ch/about 
 
Uturn Entertainment 
Uturn is an online entertainment network based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; it provides 
local and professional Arabic video content for Saudi internet users. According to the 
official website, the network was founded in 2010 and has amassed two billion lifetime 
views, with one hundred million views per month. Uturn has evolved over the years, 
expanding its scope to neighbouring Arabic countries with an eye to creating and 
aggregating premium and professional videos to promote Arabic content globally. The 
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network has a wide range of shows including social, religious and educational 
YouTube-based programmes to serve its young audience, mainly within Saudi Arabia 
and the Arabic Gulf countries. Uturn has won a number of regional awards and has been 
featured by various regional and international media outlets.  It can be accessed through 
the following link: https://www.uturn.me/i/about.php 
Importantly, Abdullah Mando, who is one of the interviewees for this study, was the co-
founder and the first CEO of Uturn Entertainment between July 2010 and December 
2012. During his time, the network expanded its scope in terms of production, 
exhibition and online distribution. As Uturn Entertainment expanded and the market 
became more complex, he became the Executive Producer of the network, making him 
responsible for the main YouTube-based programmes of the network such as 
TakkiSeries. In 2014, Mando established Qubba Studio, which focuses on producing 
premium content for both online and traditional media outlets.    
                
TakkiSeries 
Takki is one of the YouTube-based programmes produced by Uturn Entertainment. It 
began in 2012 and amassed almost 49.5 million views. What differentiates Takki from 
the rest of the YouTube-based programmes is that it is drama-oriented rather than being 
a talk show. The first season of TakkiSeries was produced and exhibited exclusively on 
YouTube, whereas the second season was acquired by Orbit Showtime Network (OSN), 
a private television network that operates in the Middle East and North Africa. The first 
season of the YouTube drama consists of fourteen episodes that ranged from ten to 
twenty minutes each. TakkiSeries offered an insight into Saudi youth issues that no 
official television channels had covered at that time. These issues include the struggle of 
women in the workplace, the relationships between males and females in public, the 
pressure placed upon non-Saudi residents who were born and raised in the country, the 
role of religious police at the time, and the drinking parties that some Saudi youth hold 
privately. TakkiSeries was directed by Mohammad Makki, who is one of the 
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interviewees for this study.  The URL of TakkiSeries:  
https://www.youtube.com/user/TakkiSeries/about 
 
Myrkott Production 
Myrkott is a production company that is based in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, with 
thirteen full-time employees. The company focuses on animation and original content 
creation and it has several animated YouTube-based programmes with almost four 
hundred million views. Myrkott also provides original animated content for private non-
YouTube clients such as the state of Qatar, the Kingdom of Sweden and big local and 
international brands. One of the most popular animated YouTube-based programmes is 
Masameer (Nails), which tackles specific Saudi social issues by employing a satirical 
approach. One season of NAILS has been broadcast on Saudi state television. The 
website: http://myrkott.com/ 
Malik Nejer, who is one of the interviewees for this study, is the co-founder and the art 
director of Myrkott studio, and the popular Nails programme was associated with him 
along with the writer Faisal AlAmer. 
 
Tabateek (Small details) 
Tabateek is a cultural programme on YouTube by Safana Sejini, a female Saudi 
presenter. The programme focuses on promoting specific cultural traditions of the 
Western province of Saudi Arabia which is historically known as Hejaz.  At the time of 
writing this piece, I noticed that the episodes have been deleted from YouTube without 
any explanation.   
SargoShow 
This is a Saudi-American drama that was directed by a young Saudi filmmaker, Aymen 
Khoja, who is one of the respondents for this study. The drama series was published on 
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YouTube in 2016 and tackles the issue of stereotypes between Saudis and Americans. 
The intention of the producer was to secure a place on television to exhibit the drama, 
so edited and shortened episodes were published on YouTube as an advertising 
technique. SargoShow can be accessed and watched through this link: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gtY1k1Aborw  
 
8arwsha (Noise) 
This is a comedy-based drama that deals with the social lives and struggles of non-
Saudis, Arab residents in Saudi Arabia. The series started in 2011 and ran for two 
seasons of thirty-four episodes that range between six and eighteen minutes, garnering 
forty-two million views. The focus of the series was on daily life activities, and it 
abstains from dealing with any political or economic issues in Saudi Arabia. The URL 
of 8arwsha: https://www.youtube.com/user/8arwsha/about  
 
DeSTRoYeR 
This YouTube channel focuses on gaming and technology and it produces, in general, 
three videos per week. The channel was established in 2011 and has almost ninety 
million views in total. The URL of DeSTRoYeR: 
https://www.youtube.com/user/ArabGamingNetwork/about 
 
 
             Understanding The Saudi Cultural Context  
 
Having introduced the YouTube-based programmes and channels that will be examined 
in this study, this section now moves on to discuss the Saudi cultural context to set the 
stage clearly for this chapter. This weaving is significant because it situates the analysis 
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in its natural settings and more importantly it avoids assuming that the reader is aware 
of the cultural complexity of Saudi Arabia.    
 
According to Teitelbaum, Ochsenwald and Philby (2016), there are three significant 
factors that influence the cultural and political context in Saudi Arabia: tribalism, 
religion and oil. The cultural setting is Arab and Islam, with the population being 
described traditionally as conservative-religious and family-oriented segments 
consisting of nomads, villagers and townspeople. The Wahhabism doctrine is a cultural 
hegemonic factor that affects the cultural setting, society and many aspects of social life, 
ranging from the public dress code to the role of women in society to the ban of public 
cinema at the time of writing. Wahhabism formed a religious-political alliance with the 
royal family which enables them to have great influence over Saudi society (Buchele, 
2008 and Redissi, 2008). The strict doctrine of Wahabbism is one of the reasons behind 
the slow development of the state and society. 
 
For instance, the first Saudi girls’ school was established in 1956, but wider access to 
education for women only became commonplace in the 1970s (Hamdan, 2005). Gender 
segregation is a general norm when it comes to public and social interactions, with 
restaurants and hotels having separate areas for women. Banks have women-only 
branches and buses are divided into two sections, with the front being for women and 
the back for men (AlMunajjed, 1997). 
 
This monopoly over the Saudi public narrative is maintained in line with the political 
interests of the royal family and the religious institution of the state to construct a 
cultural identity that serves and sustains the cultural and political status quo of the 
regime. This attitude of the authoritarian government has produced Arab public 
opinions that tend to be unrepresentative of what ordinary citizens think or need because 
of the political constraints and the elitist views of those figures who participate in the 
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media with no effect on the political regimes (Saghiyeh (2004) in Lynch, 2006). 
Hamzah (2005) confirms that this misrepresentation implies the absence of authentic 
public opinion, and thus the absence of a transnational Arab public sphere itself.  
 
This political-religious narrative has also shaped the cultural structure in the country. 
For instance, the Saudi cultural critic Professor Al-Ghathami (2005) points out the 
paradox of modernity in the context of Saudi society, theorising it as a static format of 
the conservative society that rejects any changes. He argues that the collective mind of 
society opposes modernity by distorting the characters of theorists and attacking the 
message of modernity itself. Al-Ghathami maintains that key intellectual Saudi figures, 
including himself, are subject to massive political, religious and societal pressures in the 
press and public platforms; they are attacked and accused of secularism and treason 
because of their thoughts regarding modernity, the critical theory and its applications in 
the context of Saudi Arabia during the 1970s and the 1980s. The withdrawal of PhD 
awards, the use of pseudonyms in the press and the closure of culture sections in some 
newspapers are illustrative examples of the cultural struggle between conservatives and 
liberals in Saudi society.   
 
The repression of Saudi intellectuals is also driven politically in order to silence any 
voices that criticise or challenge the political status quo. For example, a Saudi novelist 
named Abdul Rahman Munif, whose work has also been published in English, was 
stripped of his citizenship and banned from the Kingdom because of his critical views 
and publications against the regime (Abukhalil, 2004).  
 
The status of the youth population has also been shaped by the cultural and political 
dominance of the state. The issue of youth marginalization is one of the prominent 
themes that concerns the young, especially following the Arab uprisings in 
neighbouring countries in 2011 (Schlaffer and Kropiunigg, 2011). Increased access to 
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communication methods and the lack of public outdoor activities, along with economic 
challenges, present a dilemma for young people and a challenge for the government.  
 
The advent of social media networks has posed a particular challenge to the 
manipulation abilities of authoritarian regimes, including Saudi Arabia’s. This is 
because social media allows information to be accessed and exchanged, resulting in the 
emergence of new online narratives. Also, it has facilitated the participation of 
grassroots voices in public affairs which had not been widely available to them. This 
concept of the public sphere (Habermas, 1989) has subsequently transformed into multi-
complex layers which have created a specific object of study such as regional sub-
public spheres related to culture, religion, ethnicity or certain segments of society such 
as women or youth (Ayish, 2008).  
 
Finally, the liberal policies of the late King Abdullah (2005-2015), who established, for 
example, a scholarship programme and introduced women widely into the workforce, 
have slightly improved the position of women in the country (Murphy, 2013; and Welsh 
et al, 2014). Nevertheless, this reform has not translated into significant changes as of 
yet. For instance, the Global Gender Gap Report (2016) demonstrates that the status of 
Saudi women has not improved significantly in terms of employability compared to 
Saudi men. The report ranks Saudi Arabia at the bottom of the global list, with the rank 
of 141 out of 144.  
 
To conclude this section, the above contextualisation has aimed to serve as a departure 
point for this chapter in order to help set the stage for the analysis in the next section.  It 
should provide the readers with the required background to position the following 
discussions within these complex political and cultural terrains to provide a solid 
understanding of the research problem.  
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  The Formation of YouTube-Based Programmes 
 
The concept of the public sphere (Habermas, 1989) describes the new social order of 
bourgeois families as a sphere of private people coming together as a public to exchange 
and discuss issues related to political and social concerns. Habermas discusses the 
evolution of the concept from bourgeois families to the institutionalization of public 
spheres and their functions. Arguably, the concept can also be extended to the use of 
public platforms, from public saloons to cafés to media platforms, to hold discussions 
and engage in rational debates about matters of concern for the gathered people. 
 
However, in a non-democratic context, these public platforms might be not accessible to 
citizens and activists due to the nature of governance. For example, Saudi Arabia has 
maintained tight restrictions on the freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly 
(Amnesty International, 2017), which negatively affect both the cultural structure and 
the public sphere activities. The complexity of the Saudi case was further intensified 
when the government implemented sophisticated IT infrastructure to develop 
information technology services (Kaba and Said, 2014), which opened up virtual and 
accessible platforms to the public. As a result, the youth’s use of social media platforms 
in Saudi Arabia has grown dramatically (Ayed, 2013; and Ramsay and Fatani, 2016).  
The literature review chapter also discussed several influential concepts such as the 
political motivation for building media systems and the authoritarianism of the state in 
affecting political and cultural activities in Saudi Arabia (Boyd, 1982; Rinnawi, 2006; 
and Sakr, 2007).  
 
Based on these concepts, the analysis in this chapter investigates the rise of YouTube-
based programmes that create what I argue to be “the public sphere of online video” in 
Saudi Arabia. The Saudi youth seemingly find cyberspace to be the only place to voice 
their concerns due to the lack of platforms that bring the youth together to debate and 
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negotiate their issues publicly. One of the most prominent phenomena that has taken 
place is the unprecedented boom of the YouTube platform (Ramsay and Fatani, 2016), 
which started in 2010. The youth organize themselves to produce YouTube-based 
programmes that reflect their opinions, concerns and views on culture and identity, a 
movement that also results in building a lucrative business for some creatives, as 
Chapter Four will illustrate. 
 
Empirical data show that the emergence of YouTube, as a prestigious mechanism to 
distribute content, was spontaneous; it was never planned for or predicted. In the 
beginning, for example, the platform was not highly appreciated by the youth, as the 
following quote demonstrates: “When YouTube started in the Arabic countries, it was 
not such a platform…It was known as a site for scandals and so its reputation was 
tarnished” (Abdulmajeed Alkenani, co-founder and presenter of SceenTV, 2016).  
 
A potential explanation for this early perception of YouTube might be that blog services 
and online forums, as Al-Saggaf and Williamson, (2004) and Al Nashmi et al. (2010) 
analysed, were more prominent and visible in Saudi Arabia. The most common practice 
for users was to engage with their text services. The blog service was particularly 
interesting for those who had the intellectual ability to produce, engage and offer 
critiques using written formats, but it limited the scale of reach and involvement.  
 
The arrival of the video platform, YouTube, was a dramatic transition, although its 
advantages and benefits were not immediately recognized by Saudis, who took some 
time to adopt it. By reading between the lines of the previous quote, I argue that there 
could be several reasons behind this slow adoption of YouTube. First, the lack of 
original and relevant content available to the public meant that it was filled with 
scandals and other materials that were unlikely to be taken seriously by Saudis. The 
second issue was the lack of an innovative approach by the youth, who initially 
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perceived the platform as a consumption window rather than a production opportunity 
for themselves. Finally, technological advancement was in its early stages and the 
means of productions for individuals were slightly expensive. For instance, one of the 
interviewees highlights that YouTube flourished at a later stage because of the 
availability of technological means. “Technology plays an important role in the 
prosperity of YouTube as the old production technology such as the cameras and 
lighting systems [have been recently replaced with better and cheaper] technology” 
(Aymen Khoja, film producer of SargoShow, 2016). The context implies that this was 
not the case during the early stages.  
 
The advancements in technology and the internet were the most important drivers for 
Saudi youth (Ghannam, 2011) to establish their virtual place for expressing themselves 
and igniting discussions about issues that mattered to them. As advancement in digital 
equipment increased its functionality, barriers to producing content gradually 
disappeared and the youth engaged randomly with the new platform. It took some time 
until the production of high-standard prestigious content for YouTube began in 2011. 
This was the production of Monopoly, the short YouTube film that highlights the 
housing crisis’ impact on the younger generation in Saudi Arabia. According to 
Alkenani:  
 
The big blast happened in the Monopoly film, for which I wrote the script. This 
film showed us how powerful YouTube is as a platform because it reached 
multiple levels. [For instance,] important channels like Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, 
the BBC and American newspapers have spoken about it. In addition, it was 
discussed using a Twitter hashtag, and famous names in the community have 
participated in this hashtag. It was absolutely unbelievable. (Abdulmajeed 
Alkenani, co-founder and presenter on SceenTV, 2016) 
 
Monopoly was not simply an early production for YouTube by Saudi youth, but it 
proposed several trajectories to be critically scrutinized in terms of the creators, the 
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message and the platform. As for the creators, the youth who produced this critical 
societal and political content, are the most important factor to discuss in the context of 
the visually mediated public sphere. They have traditionally been excluded from 
engaging in any form of economic, societal or public policy discussions (Al-Rasheed, 
2008; and Yamani, 2008). However, producing Monopoly, which indirectly mentions 
the role of some members of the royal family and Saudi moguls in causing housing 
shortages across the country due to their control of large proportions of real estate, was 
a political act in itself. This indicates that with this film, they pushed the boundaries and 
posed a challenge to the traditional status quo, which has ignored the Saudi youth for a 
long time. 
 
The youth redefine themselves as a public by igniting discussions about issues related to 
their interests, such as housing shortages and the rising unemployment rate. An 
interesting point to observe here is that this bottom-up professionally generated content 
(Kim, 2012) is employed by the Saudi youth to initiate public awareness and to reach 
Saudi audiences through YouTube. They utilize the new platform to produce a new 
public narrative in Saudi Arabia.   
 
Secondly, the message of Monopoly is rational and critical; it highlights a specific, 
tangible challenge in order to publicize the struggles of the youth. The film ignited a 
massive amount of comments and debates about the issue, as the respondent highlighted 
above, which was not previously possible for the public. It also reflects the high self-
awareness of Saudi producers as they publicize stories that are not told by mainstream 
media in Saudi Arabia, which avoids directing blame towards senior government 
figures for the deficit in housing availability.  
 
In fact, the blame suggested in Monopoly was bound to be controversial in the public 
sphere, as those in power are not normally held accountable in Saudi Arabia. According 
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to Al- Rasheed (2008), the Saudi king has absolute power in Saudi Arabia; this extends 
from appointing the cabinet to legislation to foreign policy, which practically makes 
him responsible for the country in the absence of an elected parliament. Nevertheless, 
the Saudi youth direct their blame at ministers and local councils while praising the king 
and the royal family. It is worth mentioning that non-democratic practices can produce 
such behaviours. The notion of democracy itself is not perceived positively in Saudi 
Arabia by the government or by conservative institutions such as the Council of Senior 
Scholars.  
 
In terms of platforms, YouTube provides a new medium to publicize local issues, which 
in turn triggers huge discussions and debates in wider circles of the youth community. 
The culture of connectivity (Van Dijck, 2013) has made it easy for messages to be 
distributed and debated across different platforms such as Twitter, no matter what 
platform the content was originally produced for. As a result, the connectivity of social 
media has led several prestigious Arabic and Western media outlets to pay attention to 
this societal shift online (Black, 2013; Smith, 2011; and Owens, 2012). This has helped 
some Western outlets get indications about Saudi Arabia, as it is difficult for some of 
them to gain access to Saudi territories. 
 
One of the respondents illustrates how YouTube is very helpful for Saudis in terms of 
offering access to mass youth in the country and offering distribution windows for 
young publishers. He said that “the platform itself is helpful for Saudis. I cannot create 
long films because we do not have cinemas in Saudi Arabia to present our works” 
(Mohammad Makki, director of TakkiSeries and award-winning filmmaker, 2016). 
 
It seems that the initiative of Monopoly has motivated several content creators to 
produce professionally generated content for YouTube in order to reflect and comment 
on the challenges and struggles of Saudi youth. This has been particularly useful as 
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YouTube and other online platforms have been the only place available for them in the 
absence of physical public platforms such as cinemas at the time of writing.  “YouTube 
for me is a cinema as it offers 24 frames per second, and it may be called a small cinema 
or a portable one” (Saeed Baeshen, actor in 8arwsha comedy series, 2016).  
Consequently, the new culture of engaging with society expanded across online 
platforms like YouTube, as more programmes appeared to highlight and present 
different issues from the perspective of Youth. 
 
Motivations and Consequences  
 
The empirical data elucidated that the primary motivation for Saudi youth to produce 
such programmes is to participate in public matters rather than being driven solely by 
financial interests. This stands against the argument of Ramsay and Fatani (2016), who 
demonstrate that commercial interests are the primary reason behind the development of 
YouTube programmes in the country. One of my interviewees highlights the following:  
 
One of the main incentives is that we were doing something that mattered to us. 
The team was already working in [traditional] media [organization], and we were 
able to see certain opportunities. However, due to the complexity and the politics 
of [our] organization; we were unable to do anything. So the programme offered 
us an opportunity to create things that we believe in. (Mohammad Bazaid, 
presenter and co-founder of MadTomato, 2016) 
 
The above quote manifests several thoughts to be analysed in terms of motivation and 
representation. While the respondent and his team were working for a prominent Saudi 
news TV channel prior to launching their YouTube programme, the culture of work in 
the traditional media seemingly did not offer them a great deal of freedom to deliver 
their missions to the Saudi public due to the sensitivity of the environment in which 
they were operating. In this context, the youth found themselves in an inconvenient 
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situation where neither their employers nor the structure of the social system offered 
them the freedom to express their concerns about affairs related to youth and their 
communities. 
 
Another interviewee maintains that his reasons for participating are as follow: “As a 
painter, I wanted to create something that improves people's taste and makes them more 
sceptical, more critical about taboos in society. I want to expose it to a big number of 
people” (Malik Nejer, co-founder and art director of Myrkott Animation Studio, 2016).   
 
While this evidence supports the idea mentioned above, it additionally reveals a deep 
need for creative talents to expose and express their thoughts and ideas publicly, which 
is a human desire. Saudi youth are hungry for public engagement and participation and 
seek a greater role in society. They want to create positive changes and rectify 
inaccurate understandings of certain societal issues from their points of view. Dealing 
with taboos in Saudi society through their programmes can cause a conflict between 
traditional institutions and some liberal Saudi talents. Such conflicts are highly likely to 
arise when it comes to different interpretations of family values, personal freedoms and 
stances on the political regime, as Chapter Five will explore. 
 
Again, the quotation implies a vital shortage of public environments for enabling the 
youth in particular to gather and discuss matters that concern them. The Saudi 
government has to take brave and positive steps to engage more with the youth by 
offering or allowing the private sector to set up platforms and incubators to assemble 
and discuss publicly so they can improve the public spirit of Saudi Arabia instead of 
keeping society under pressure. The youth push the boundaries and overcome 
governmental constraints by utilizing online platforms, which itself might not be 
sufficient to produce real change unless it is backed up with offline activities (Ayish, 
2001). 
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Also, this should not contradict the fact that youth additionally look for any spheres to 
prove themselves (Khalil, 2010), unleash their intellectual energy and leave a legacy 
behind. As Nejer puts it, “As you know, everyone wants to achieve something to be 
remembered for, to prove and satisfy himself and to leave a legacy behind” (Malik 
Nejer, co-founder, and art director of Myrkott Animation Studio, 2016).  
  
In fact, these marginalized voices were unheard until they utilized the platform of 
YouTube to critique government services, the performance of some ministries and some 
societal behaviour. For instance, by adopting and Saudisizing the American format of 
The Daily Show, the youth attract considerable attention and create influence over the 
public sphere narrative, which has traditionally been controlled by official and semi-
official Saudi media organizations; the literature review chapter discussed the work of 
Lynch (2006) in this regard. 
 
Losing an absolute monopoly over the local narrative in the country can be a serious 
concern for the government (Peterson, 2002), which faces genuine societal challenges in 
the wake of falling oil prices. For instance, the wealth of the Kingdom has been used for 
decades to silence the public (Yamani, 2008; and Al-Rasheed, 2008), but as the oil 
crisis of 2015 began to affect public welfare, user generated content producers started 
using online media to question the future of the country in the absence of democratic 
procedures. The reality of this newly coined narrative from youth is introducing new 
customs and culture to the nation. The empirical evidence in this research demonstrates 
that there is no major immediate challenge to the regime, which is similar to the views 
of Ayish (2001) and Kalathil and Boas (2003). However, no one can be certain about 
the future. It primarily depends on how far the youth can go, and on the behaviour of the 
government in the face of this phenomenon. 
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Interestingly, politics and current affairs were not the only topics that flourished on 
YouTube, but culture and the societal arena have also found their position in this 
discourse. For example, “the thing that motivated me to enter the world of YouTube is 
[that I wanted to] talk about our customs, traditions and our local popular phrases” 
(Safana Sejini, presenter and freelancer copywriter, 2016). This niche of contributions 
to culture exemplifies the birth of a new trend in the Saudi virtual public sphere where 
the producer attempts to add value to the public by offering new content, although it 
might be not so popular with the youth. She explains: 
 
We have grown and become accustomed to watching TV for the purpose of [only] 
watching news or soap operas. Few people look for useful things on TV or in 
newspapers. This is [one of the] reasons why we do not react well to the arts, 
cultural events and exhibitions. (Safana Sejini, presenter and freelancer 
copywriter, 2016) 
 
The lack of interest in cultural YouTube programmes might echo the taste of the Saudi 
youth, many of whom have a greater interest in politics and entertainment as a reaction, 
possibly, to the political deprivation in society. The quote also indicates that not enough 
effort has been put by Saudi educators and policy makers into including cultural 
discourse in the education system so as to promote it as one of the essential components 
of society. This analysis indeed matches the findings of Ayish (2012), who states that 
there is little visibility of a cultural studies perspective being integrated into the 
curriculum of twenty Arab universities that were surveyed. 
 
The use of YouTube as a platform to disseminate content that promotes new narratives 
has helped to create a virtual space for the exchange of views amongst the Saudi youth 
online. This, in fact, poses a question about the nature of the targeted audience from 
content creator's point of view. The empirical data explain that some content creators 
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target their audience perfectly, whereas others are not able to predict the metric insights 
of YouTube. Bazaid states that: 
[O]ur target was both males and females but with more focus on males who are 
fresh graduates and fresh employees, 23 years old, and are concerned about 
matters of public interest, caring about local issues that affect them. (Mohammad 
Bazaid, presenter and co-founder of MadTomato, 2016) 
 
As discussed earlier, there is a sharp shortage of civil society institutions that have the 
ability to accommodate youth discussions about public issues. The presenter in the 
above quote was well aware of this shortage and was therefore trying to occupy this 
niche by offering critical messages to catch the interest of his audience. The respondent 
continues, “The metric proved us right and this [segment] was actually our main 
viewers…The reason why we were targeting this specific segment is because we have 
the ability and the capacity to speak to them” (Mohammad Bazaid, presenter and co-
founder of MadTomato, 2016).  
 
The phrase ‘speak to them’ used by the respondent in the above quote deserves deep 
examination. It indicates that the message was sincere, simple and straightforward for 
the right audience, which is comprised of viewers who have suffered from 
marginalization by official bodies in Saudi Arabia (Khalil, 2010). ‘Speak to them’ is 
significantly remarkable as it implies that there is no gap or distance between two 
parties; the presenter is considered part of the youth who understand his segment. The 
presenter speaks their colloquial language with their accent, and more importantly 
discusses common-interest issues related to them.  
 
This could imply that governmental and privately owned media outlets do not have the 
ability or capacity (Lynch, 2006) to hook the young audience and speak to them 
sufficiently. If we link the history of the Saudi media to the contemporary context, then 
it should not surprise observers that television has traditionally positioned itself higher 
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in the hierarchy, where it reports to citizens the protocol news or what those in power 
want to deliver to the public, as Boyd (1982) explains. In contrast, YouTube offers an 
alternative space that positions both senders and receivers equally. The receiver has the 
right to disagree with the content, criticize it and respond either by inserting comments 
or by making a video, a phenomenon that Meikle and Young (2012) theorize as creative 
audience. This is a major change for the youth who were marginalized, and it opens the 
door to various implications for the social and economic future of youth. Another 
interviewee describes introducing a new dimension for their targeted audience:  
 
We wanted to make a show that is very close to the public and reflects the cultural 
variety that exists in Saudi Arabia, where there are many local and expatriates 
who live together in a funny way. (Saeed Baeshen, actor in 8arwsha comedy series, 
2016) 
  
The above discussion inspires several considerations in terms of the credibility of these 
programmes’ messages. The perception of being in an equal position to the content 
creators makes the message seem close to the hearts and minds of the receivers, who 
apparently look for people to talk to them directly. Also, trust can be established easily 
between two parties due to the simplicity and authenticity of the message. This 
authentic message might motivate debate further and enhance the flow of discussion 
amongst the youth. Another point here is that this should, in theory, provide the 
participants with the skills of negotiation and know-how for dealing with diverse 
opinions about a given public matter. Challenges, difficulties, building coherent 
arguments and misunderstandings are all expected to occur during the process of 
discussion, but they are the only way to sharpen the youth’s skills in the absence of 
genuine offline platforms. 
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Empowerment of Youth 
 
The above discussion leads to another dimension to be considered in this context, which 
is the empowerment of youth. The youth spark discussion through YouTube-based 
programmes which lead to a sort of empowerment (Khamis and Vaughn, 2014; and 
Zayani, 2015). Empowerment here could take several shapes and forms. First, a certain 
degree of political influence within youth circles can be gained because pointing out 
societal challenges usually provides creators with an element of authority in the 
community. Secondly, YouTube-based programmes enhance the confidence of creators 
by enabling them to address more public matters that relate to them from their point of 
view. Third, it promotes a culture of ‘speaking up’ through the cameras and therefore 
encourages and empowers ordinary young people to participate in public discourse. 
 
This empowerment carries elements of leadership, where taking the lead and breaking 
societal taboos are the most prominent features of Saudi youth initiative. This aptitude 
for spotting the needs of the youth community and then delivering on them publicly by 
producing related content on YouTube should be a clear message to policy-making 
circles that the youth are becoming an active factor. The lack of organizations that 
support the youth is a concerning sign because it offers no public platforms for Saudis 
to express their thoughts freely. This might engender the conditions for inappropriate 
and unwanted behaviours, such as extremism, to grow in the dark. 
 
In essence, the Saudi youth have never been granted any platforms to share and 
exchange their thoughts with officials or even with other members of the public, but 
rather they took the risk and pushed for it wisely and gently. This might pose challenges 
for the regime, which has long enjoyed a monopoly on interpreting political, economic 
and even religious incidents that matter to society. Losing control over the 
dissemination of information is problematic for authoritarian regimes in general as it 
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gives rise to an alternative narrative that can challenge the stability and even the 
legitimacy of the government. 
 
The self-empowerment of Saudi youth, gained through YouTube-based programmes, 
suggests that they have the ability to cross traditional lines carefully, without annoying 
the royal family. This section found that in closed political regimes such as Saudi 
Arabia, activists employ social media outlets only to criticize medium- and low-level 
state agencies. They usually avoid blaming the head of state or other senior political and 
military figures for shortcomings in the country.  
 
I would argue there are several reasons for such behaviour. First, it is a safe opportunity 
for them to unleash and express their disappointment with the government’s 
performance without being subjected to its rage. Those online activists may know that 
the absolute power of the head of state makes him responsible, in theory, for the 
performance of the government, yet they avoid criticizing him for the sake of their 
personal safety. Second, this provides youth with what this research describes as an 
imagined release, the chance to express their critiques without any fundamental changes 
in public policy. It is essential to mention here that criticizing any level of governmental 
agencies has not been acceptable in the past, but time and technology have changed 
these standards for the younger generation. The argument this research puts forward is 
that any potential future economic and political struggle might empower the youth 
further to raise their standards again. 
 
The following section focuses on the empowerment of Saudi females that was made 
available to them through digital developments including YouTube-based programmes. 
The discussion of females’ empowerment is an extension of the above debate, but I 
choose to place it in a section of its own because it is a prominent issue and its 
emotional resonance comes through in the tone of the respondents.  
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Female empowerment  
 
The struggle of women in different fields is a global issue that extends across cultures 
and societies. However, this issue should not be approached as if it were a single case; 
rather, the historical circumstances of every case has to be taken into consideration 
separately (Afshar, 1993). The specific case of Saudi women is rooted deeply in the 
cultural practices of the country, which has been discussed previously. Sex segregation 
is one of the most striking cultural features in the country, and it has forced Saudi 
women to develop their own private female spheres (Le Renard, 2008). 
 
One of the themes that emerged in this analysis is the empowerment of Saudi female 
presenters who have participated publicly in YouTube-based programmes. It is a 
significant theme, especially if we take into considerations the complexity of Saudi 
culture and the poor participation of women in public spheres (Global Gender Gap 
Report, 2016). This section therefore explores the experiences of women presenters to 
understand how they transitioned from private-female spheres (Le Renard, 2008) to 
public-mixed spheres through the lens of YouTube in Saudi Arabia.  
 
One of the factors that emerged in the previous sections was the lack of women’s 
presence during the formation of YouTube-based programmes. When women involved 
in YouTube were interviewed, this point was made very clear by them and it reflects a 
massive gender gap in the everyday practices of cultural activities in the country. For 
example, one of the interviewees found the lack of women’s input to be significant, 
which motivated her to respond to this gap by participating in YouTube-based 
programmes. The respondent chooses the term “no voice for women” (Anonymous 
female presenter, 2016) to describe her disappointment over the absence of women in 
the public domain or, more accurately, over the cultural obstacles that have prevented 
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their public participation. This presenter is amongst the very few who strives to break 
the male dominance in YouTube-based programmes by presenting her programme 
about Saudi social issues through the lens of women.  
 
I wanted to present the voice of woman on YouTube in a decent way…[My] 
programme critiques social issues from the perspective of women in a funny way. 
[In general], there is no place for women with a hijab on TV with … I wanted to 
[present] in a stylish and smiley way that is not against our customs and 
traditions. (Anonymous female presenter, 2016) 
 
One of the key points in the above quote is her funny and sarcastic approach to tackling 
social issues. Being a comedienne can make her vulnerable to social and cultural 
pressures from sectors that disapprove of females’ public engagement, let alone her 
funny approach. However, what this quote also suggests is that although the legal and 
cultural institutions of the state impose constraints on Saudi women’s public lives, there 
is a margin of freedom that can be employed to challenge the public perception of 
women. The participant found a gap and decided to show leadership by breaking the 
cultural taboos around participating in a cultural activity. However, being a female in a 
male-dominated public sphere inevitably brought its pressures, as she stated that “some 
people may have problems with their thinking about women” (Anonymous female 
presenter, 2016). 
 
It seems that Saudi women face a multi-layered challenge; this is demonstrated by the 
above quotation in light of the specificity of Saudi culture as it was examined at the 
beginning of this chapter. First, it highlights the seriousness of the absence of women’s 
voices in public issues. Secondly, there is the respondent’s emphasis on certain 
vocabulary such as “decent”, “stylish”, “customs” and “their thinking about women”, all 
of which indicate the hidden cultural complexity around the appearance and the 
expected character of women on public screens. The public appearance of Saudi women 
is culturally problematic enough, but this is further exacerbated by the comedic style of 
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her critiques. A third point is the attempt of the participant to respond to what she refers 
to as "women with a hijab" on Saudi television. Kraidy (2013) discusses the policy 
Saudi television reform that led to the employment of some female presenters with 
hijabs. A possible interpretation of the quote could be that the participant meant that 
women who take a comedic approach are excluded from television and she wanted to 
offer a new perspective.  
 
 While this might offer an indication of the general state of Saudi women’s participation 
in public events, it also demonstrates that the Saudi public domain is mainly dominated 
by males, while the role of females is greatly marginalized (Le Renard, 2008; and 
Global Gender Gap Report, 2016) and made less visible. This lack of visibility can be 
related to the influence of Saudi culture, which has its own narrative in terms of gender 
expectations. The policy of segregation in educational institutions (Murphy, 2013) and 
the ban on public social mixing between the genders (AlMunajjed, 1997) can result in 
barriers to communication between young men and women.  
 
Apart from the cultural context of the country, several respondents argued that there 
were other factors that led to the absence of creative women in the production process 
of YouTube programmes, such as the lack of training. “If you are talking about talent, 
the only platform that presents talented and creative people is the theatre, and 
unfortunately the state of the theatre is terrible” (Abdulmajeed Alkenani, co-founder and 
presenter on SceenTV, 2016). This quote describes the lack of opportunities for both 
genders, but it points to the specific difficulty for women to learn and develop their 
production skills. The respondent associated the existence of talent to a strong presence 
of theatre, which can feed into other aspects of cultural activities. The lack of support 
for creative infrastructure has resulted in the shortage of Saudi talents. It can be argued 
that the lack of public support for theatres is responsible, but Saudi theatre itself is not 
to be blamed for this shortage. The poor state of theatre is just a consequence of the 
state of the cultural industry in Saudi Arabia.  
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The poor state of infrastructure and intellectual property regimes (Price, 2009) have 
created an uncertain environment that is full of obstacles and challenges for the Saudi 
youth. As one of the interviewees pointed out, “In terms of production, it is dominated 
by men…[but] it is difficult for men in Saudi Arabia to work in this industry, let alone 
for women” (Abdullah Mando, co-founder and the first CEO of UTURN Entertainment 
Network, 2016). This demonstrates that the previously discussed cultural constraints are 
one reason for the absence of women, but this is coupled with the legal and institutional 
ambiguity (Price, 2009) and the uncertainty of the culture industry, including visual 
productions.   
 
The gender gap caused by cultural, political and legal measures has resulted in a lack of 
understanding between men and women in terms of their consumption needs. For 
instance:  
[T]he percentage of female viewers over forty episodes was 13%, compared to 86% 
male viewers. It shows [that] the nature of our programme has caught the interest 
of more males than females in Saudi Arabia. (Mohammad Bazaid, presenter and 
co-founder of MadTomato, 2016)  
 
Bearing in mind the male dominance of the culture industry, these viewership statistics 
suggest that the lack of female input in the production process may have resulted in 
another gap in the consumption of these programmes. It is difficult to be certain about 
the reason behind these figures, but it would be unfair to suggest that the political nature 
of the programme drove the female audience away, an explanation that reinforces 
inaccurate stereotypes about women, as in the following quotation: 
 
I think that the content of [YouTube] programmes is not for [Saudi] females. Our 
channel contains a variety of programmes but most of them are for men, not to 
mention that the interests of women are different and I think most of them are 
interested in watching [TV] series. (Abdulmajeed Alkenani, co-founder and 
presenter on SceenTV, 2016) 
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This quote is problematic because it is based on the categorization of women as 
consumers of a certain type of dramatic, apolitical content. This can create more 
questions than answers about whether there could be changes if more women got 
involved in YouTube production and whether young Saudi women require certain types 
of content.  
 
Online Reactions  
 
As stated previously, the production aspects of YouTube-based programmes are 
dominated by young Saudi men, with limited visibility for Saudi young women since 
the establishment of this phenomenon in 2010. However, the few Saudi women who 
decided to engage in these public activities in 2012 by moving themselves from the 
private female sphere (Le Renard, 2008) to the public mixed sphere have experienced 
serious challenges and societal pressures from certain parts of the online community.  
 
One of the reactions was the considerable number of male viewers for these 
programmes. For example, one of the interviewees stated that “the statistics of YouTube 
showed us that 49% of [my programme’s] viewers are men, and that was a little 
shocking for me” (Anonymous female presenter, 2016).  
 
Although the presenter was surprised by the overwhelming number of men who 
watched her show, this result matches the analysis in the previous section that outlined 
the dominance of men in both the production and consumption of the programmes. Her 
surprise reflects unspoken gender expectations, but even in a conservative country, 
being a female presenter does not automatically mean that the vast majority of viewers 
will be females, especially considering the public nature of the programme. When asked 
about her interpretation of the high number of male viewers for her show, the 
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respondent said, “[I think] men may be curious to know how women think about some 
of the social issues” (Ibid).  
 
This section argues that such programmes might serve as a catalyst to bridge the gap 
between genders and to bring them closer together under the umbrella of public 
discussion. This is one of the opportunities that online platforms introduce to the lives 
of the youth, and it has since become the online norm on other video platforms such as 
Instagram and Snapchat. The gender paradox in Saudi Arabia has been further fuelled 
by these online platforms because the public offline mixing of genders is very limited 
and often prohibited, but the rules of segregation are bypassed on online platforms, 
where both genders can interact and collaborate with each other.  
 
The second reaction was the strong responses of some parts of the online community 
towards the participation of Saudi women in YouTube in 2012.  For example: 
 There was and still a segment of society that rejects my appearance in the first 
place... and this why they attack me. I reply to them that if you have any comment 
about the content, I will be very glad to consider it. However, if your problem is 
only my appearance, then you are not the targeted segment, and it would be better 
for you to not watch my programme. (Anonymous female participant, 2016) 
 
The strong emotional tone of the presenter highlights the impact on her of this rejection, 
which is related to her gender. This case sheds light on the nature of certain segments of 
Saudi society that subscribe to a certain narrative in terms of women’s roles in the 
public sphere (Al-Ghathami 2005; Buchele, 2008; and Redissi, 2008). In addition, 
ordinary members of the public might comment negatively about the presenter without 
necessarily being motivated ideologically, but because they have been shaped by the 
culture. The same interviewee revealed that “the most painful comments were the ones 
that talked about my appearance like: Hey ugly, hey fat, hey bad, hey elephant” 
(Anonymous female presenter, 2016).  
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The anonymity of commentators fuels such behaviour (Boyd, 2012 and; Lang, 2007). 
While the motivation for such behaviour is uncertain, the context of the incident implies 
that it took place as a result of her public appearances. This segment of the audience 
paid attention to the appearance of the presenter rather than to the message itself, which 
reflects limited and extreme views toward Saudi women. Another female presenter 
experiences the same difficulty: 
 
The attack was very severe especially because my family is a well-known 
one…[and] this attack has caused a lot of disturbance to the family name. This 
happened because some of them used some filthy and inappropriate words. In 
addition, I received many text messages that insulted me. (Safana Sejini, presenter 
and freelancer copywriter, 2016) 
 
Online abuse (Sengupta and Chaudhuri, 2011) has taken the most sensitive form in 
those conservative societies that value the family name and the honour of the name in 
an attempt to mobilize the family and the relatives of the presenter to prevent her from 
participating in the programme. Publicising the private telephone number of the 
presenter to criticize her severely is not only a breach of her privacy, but also shows 
unethical resistance to what should be a right for young Saudi women. The impact of 
the comments was severe enough that both female presenters were about to withdraw 
from engaging in online public platforms to avoid online harassment. 
 
I was about to suspend the programme…since I thought the programme wasn’t 
worth it. I am from a decent family and I have kids so why should I put myself into 
this situation.  (Anonymous female participant, 2016) 
 
The climate of fear and threats presents the danger of a drain of talent, which is already 
scarce, from the newly formed public mixed sphere. Huge societal pressures could be 
faced by family, friends or wider circles of society due to a female’s public participation. 
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The massive online harassment against the families is a powerful deterrent to 
participation, especially in a conservative country where the family and its reputation 
are so important.  
 
The third reaction, surprisingly, is the general liberalism introduced to a certain segment 
of Saudi youth online. Vast societal and cultural changes have occurred in Saudi Arabia, 
particularly upon the young population, over the last decade (Murphy, 2013). These 
changes are partly a result of the enormous numbers of students studying abroad and 
massive non-state television channels owned by liberal members of the Saudi royal 
family and other associated business moguls, which broadcast liberal Arabic and 
American cultural products to the Saudi public (Sakr, Skovgaard-Petersen and Ratta, 
2015). In addition, advances in technology, backed by a strong IT infrastructure (Kaba 
and Said, 2014), have fuelled the pace of societal change. These factors have all resulted 
in introducing a sense of liberalism to the youth population. 
 
One aspect of the media-cultural paradox is that all liberal private television channels 
are based outside the country (Fandy, 2007; and Kraidy, 2013), meaning that they do 
not have to comply with Saudi legislation. Therefore, they produce cultural products 
that are incompatible with Saudi values as the conservative institutions perceive them. 
This explains why several Saudi women presenters can go ‘live’ without wearing hijabs, 
unlike their counterparts in state television (Kraidy, 2013), which is run from within 
Saudi territory. That means the Saudi women need to take a geographical aspect into 
consideration when they get involved in media activities.  
 
However, the various online platforms reveal that some young and influential female 
figures online have actually shown liberal attitudes. For instance, Darin Al Bayed, who 
is the host of a YouTube programme, has also utilized other online platforms to create 
comedic content (Akerman, 2016) from within Saudi Arabia, which led to her having 
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4.2 million followers on Instagram as of January 2018. Some women film their daily 
activities without wearing the hijab, which is a compulsory tradition in the country. In 
addition, they show themselves publicly socializing with their male colleagues, which is 
also not a common Saudi practice. Saudi Arabia is changing gradually and it seems that 
this change is not visible yet to non-Saudi observers. This thesis suggests that this 
change takes two forms: direct and indirect. 
 
In terms of direct change, there is some soft rebellious behaviour by some young 
women online who oppose the current structure of culture, not only in terms of dress 
code but also in their own political and societal views. They usually utilize their 
personal Instagram and Snapchat accounts to disseminate this unspoken rebellion 
culture. Recently, using YouTube as a form of professional production has become less 
common for those figures, as they have migrated to Snapchat and Instagram, which is 
an interesting phenomenon in itself. As for indirect change, a relative culture of 
acceptance is now emerging in Saudi Arabia. Whether the vast majority of the online 
public accept this behaviour or not, there is no option left but to live with this new 
reality that has penetrated an enormous number of smart phone users. Conservative 
figures also utilize online platforms (Matthiesen, 2015; and Mellor and Rinnawi, 2016) 
to disseminate their message and shape the Saudi online and offline spheres. Local 
culture and traditions are still dominant amongst the mainstream in the country. 
 
Finally, the general deficit of female participation supports the academic analysis by 
Ftouni (2012), who states that that Arab women are underrepresented in language and 
society. The author calls for new modes of thinking and knowing that take women’s 
lived experiences as a foundation for knowledge in line with current Arab feminist 
scholarship. Discussing Arab feminism is beyond the scope of this study, but it is vital 
to signal that this line of thought is controversial and it is still in its very early stages in 
Arab countries. 
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            Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter is to answer the first research question, which concerns the role 
of YouTube-based programmes in the cultural and political context of Saudi Arabia. 
The analysis borrows and utilizes some concepts from the literature review, such as the 
political authoritarianism of the regime and the political motivations of media outlets 
(Boyd, 1982; Rinnawi, 2006; and Sakr, 2007), to make sense of the complexity of the 
research problem. However, these concepts are used as departure points for the analysis, 
and not treated as core guidance, to avoid devising theories based on pre-assumptions 
rather than emerging themes. The reason for this is that the study employs grounded 
theory methodology (Charmaz 2014; and Corbin and Strauss, 2015), which requires 
openness to what happens over the course of the research to allow the emergence of 
new patterns of knowledge to address the research problem.   
 
The analysis has focused on those young people who took the initiative to voice their 
concerns and critiques publicly by producing YouTube-based programmes. I have 
labelled this theme as the public sphere of online video in Saudi Arabia. This concept 
demonstrates and explains the gradual change in the attitude of youth towards breaking 
the cultural and political manipulation of the traditional institutions, the state, and its 
associated media investors over the narrative of the Saudi public.   
 
Based on the above analysis, Saudi youth, who seem aware of their political limitations, 
act as agents of change subtly and have the willingness to push the political boundary to 
where no one had gone before; a case in point is the film Monopoly, which subtly 
criticizes both business moguls and officials for creating the housing crises by 
monopolizing the Saudi real estate sector.     
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The rise of this new socio-political culture, which bypasses the governmental monopoly 
over the interpretation of information, is one of the main dimensions of the idea of the 
public sphere of online video. The authoritarian regime has lost its cultural hegemony 
over society, regardless of how heavily it invests in order to dominate the mediascape 
(Kraidy, 2013; and Sakr, Skovgaard-Petersen and Ratta, 2015). This seems to have 
pushed for a margin of freedom that shapes the public discourse, which can be 
translated into a new form of relationships between the authorities and young people.  
 
However, this chapter has cautiously avoided exaggerating the impact of this change on 
the socio-political structure of the country; it is unlikely to lead to a radical political 
transformation in the political system of Saudi Arabia because of the political-religious 
framework of the governance. This is in line with Ayish (2001) of the relationship 
between online-offline activities and change. It also stands against the notion of digital 
determinism, which has been strongly criticized by a number of researchers such as 
Fuchs (2012) and Zayani (2015).  
  
This technology and its applications, namely YouTube-based programmes, can bring a 
sense of political and cultural liberalism to the online community, but it does not 
necessarily produce constructive democratic practices for the society offline. This 
chapter has argued that this online liberalism has served as a window of release to those 
young people who have suffered from cultural and political exclusion by the state. 
 
Another essential finding relating to the coined concept of the public sphere of online 
video is the impact of Saudi youth on participatory culture in its broader sense. Despite 
the poor cultural infrastructure – for instance the ban on cinemas and the lack of support 
for theatres, funds and training – young people have continued experimenting with their 
programmes until they reached the stage where they could offer premium content that 
attracts Saudi audiences online. The self-reliance of young people to produce public 
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goods highlights a massive deficit in the Saudi cultural policy, if there is any, in dealing 
with this massive cultural gap. The state and the private sector lag behind some of these 
ambitious and progressive young people and there is a need for a political decision to 
consider establishing the Saudi cultural industry in order to accommodate and capitalize 
on local talent. This also has a massive potential to create economic value because of 
the significance of the Saudi media market in the region. Such a suggestion can fit in 
with the controversial plan of Saudi Vision 2030, which aims to diversify the Saudi 
economy away from oil, but this might invite clashes and confrontations with different 
segments of society.  
 
The discussion has also revealed that the ordinary young people who became YouTube-
based programme makers have become what Turner (2010) describes as online 
celebrities.  Some of the individuals who were involved in the production of YouTube-
based programmes gained fame, influence and financial benefits, focusing on 
commercializing their outputs and allowing themselves to be driven by market forces, 
as I shall argue in the next chapter. Their function has changed over time in response to 
various factors. Consequently, this has motivated some of them to move from being 
online critics who represent critical voices to being less politically critical in order to 
pursue commercial gains. For instance, the online Women2Drive campaign of 2011 
(Almahmoud, 2015) was not called for by new online celebrities, but by offline activists 
or ordinary internet users who felt less constrained by the financial calculations. 
 
In terms of the participation of women, the analysis found that the activities of 
YouTube-based programmes are dominated by Saudi men with very limited presence of 
Saudi women. It also revealed that the online discrimination against women presenters 
in 2012 is clear, and it is solely based on the gender of the presenters. These findings 
echo the outcomes of the Global Gender Gap Report (2016), which raises concerns 
about the opportunities and access available to Saudi women in society. Saudi women 
face a number of pressures because of general political and cultural repressions but, 
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more importantly, because of the challenge of gender roles and expectations in their 
country.  
 
However, this examination suggests that Saudi women do have the power to push for a 
cultural shift, for instance by challenging the cultural status quo and presenting on 
YouTube. Although the reaction was severe at the beginning, it has imposed a new 
reality on the online cultural landscape and consequently it has become less 
controversial over time.   
 
The experience of YouTube-based programmes has indicated that Saudi Arabia’s online 
world is changing dramatically with more young people participating in cyberspace. 
This has resulted in introducing new forms of culture, content and media flows. It has 
helped to develop an alternative platform for young people, but the impact on offline 
activities may need a longer time to be realized. 
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Chapter Four:  Business Dynamics in the Saudi YouTube 
Market 
 
            Introduction  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, YouTube-based programmes in Saudi Arabia are 
primarily inspired by political and cultural aspirations as the youth employ the platform 
to voice their opinions over various local issues.  The industry’s growth, however, has 
triggered business-oriented thinking amongst a number of producers, and this is one of 
the themes that emerges profoundly throughout the analysis process.  
 
This chapter addresses the second research question, which focuses on exploring the 
business models created and utilized by producers of professionally generated content in 
Saudi Arabia between 2010 and 2016.  By focusing on the perspectives of young 
producers, this chapter eschews an investigation of the economics of YouTube itself and 
its monetization strategies, such as participating user-partners (Balnaves et al, 2009). 
Instead, it focuses on how Saudi producers monetize the platform to serve their interests 
without engaging directly with YouTube.  
 
Chapter One discussed a number of influential concepts such as the two-sided market 
(Farchy, 2009); the unsustainability of YouTube’s business model (Wasko and Erickson, 
2009); digital discords (McDonald, 2009); and professionally generated content (Kim, 
2012). Although these concepts, generally speaking, theorize the media economics of 
the platform itself, they can also provide useful departure points for the analysis in this 
chapter. I intend to engage with these concepts to theorize the specific business models 
created by individual Saudi producers.  
 
 
120 
 
 The chapter begins by providing an overview of the political economy of media in the 
Saudi context in order to help realize its complexity. Second, it explores the 
development of YouTube market, conceptualizing it with three categories: Abstract, 
Concrete and Innovative. The categories are examined in the context of revenue, the 
attitude of YouTube Google Inc., human capital and market behaviour. Finally, it 
explores the relationships between advertising and YouTube-based programmes at the 
three conceptualized stages to provide an understanding of the behaviour of advertising, 
which is a crucial force in the economics of YouTube-based programming in Saudi 
Arabia.   
 
 
           Understanding the Political Economy of Saudi Media   
 
With its oil-based economy, Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest exporter of petroleum; 
the sector accounts for almost 87 percent of the nation’s revenue. In 2014, it became the 
nineteenth largest economy in the world with its nominal GDP of approximately $750 
billion (McKinney Global Institute, 2015). According to Askari (1990), the oil policy is 
determined at the highest level of government where the King, the Crown Prince and 
the Second Deputy are the ultimate decision makers. Saudi oil policy is motivated by 
broad political and economic considerations as opposed to technical factors.   
  
The oil-based economy enables the state to act as the main financial source for public 
and private sectors, and enables the government to exert its hegemony on different areas 
of influence, including the national, regional and even international media industries. 
The political motivation for the Saudi state (Kraidy, 2013) to use the media as a public 
policy arm dates back to King Faisal (1964-1975), who invested in building new radio 
stations to counter Egyptian republican radio attacks against the Saudi royal family. 
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King Faisal employed oil-based revenue to create a global Islamic narrative that 
appealed to audiences both inside and outside the kingdom (Boyd, 1982) to counter the 
radical nationalist, Socialist and Communist movements that threatened the Saudi royal 
family at the time. 
 
Political motivations were also behind the establishment of regional media influence to 
advance the Saudi narrative, especially in the aftermath of the Gulf War (1990-91), 
when Arab public opinion was generally in favour of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. For 
instance, Saddam Hussein used to utilize the Iraqi oil revenue to finance newspapers 
and magazines from Cairo to London to Paris to counter Saudi dominance over Arab 
media. Also, a number of journalists and media personnel were on Saddam's payroll 
(AbuKhalil, 2004; and Fandy, 2007).  
 
In response to this situation, the first free-to-air Pan-Arab television station – Middle 
East Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) – was launched in London in 1991 by Walid al-
Ibrahim (Sakr, 2001), the brother-in-law of Saudi Arabia’s late King Fahd (1982-2005), 
with the objectives of promoting modernity and getting rid of what he strangely and 
hyperbolically described as a Taliban mentality (AlSaied, 2015). Other free-to-air Pan-
Arab televisions and newspapers financed through proxy forces such as individual 
members of the royal family or associated businessmen continue to influence the media 
scenes in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East.   
 
The opposition, however, came from Qatar. As Fandy (2007) explains, the regional 
rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar and the consistent media attacks by Al Jazeera, 
which is based in Qatar, against the Saudi royal family caused the MBC network to 
launch an all-news Pan-Arab channel called Al-Arabiya TV in 2003, prior to the war 
against Iraq. 
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Yamani (2008) argues that one of the main priorities for the Saudi royal family is to 
maintain the dominant position of their historical narrative by incorporating and 
accommodating rival voices, thus utilizing the oil money.   The media serve as an 
instrument to exert and expand the influence of the royal family nationally and 
regionally, excluding critical narratives such as the strategic dependence of the 
Kingdom on the USA, and the rift in the royal family.  
 
This behaviour results in media ownership and concentration issues (Djankof et al, 2003) 
because the Saudi government monopolizes the national media and dominates the 
regional media scene indirectly through private Pan-Arab media outlets. This behaviour 
affects the narrative and the structure of Saudi media and results in several challenges, 
including a lack of authentic representation and the exclusion of input from the youth.  
  
However, as this chapter highlights, Saudi Arabia’s digital infrastructure and internet 
growth (Internet Live Stats, 2016) have enabled young Saudis to develop a new 
production system that bypasses the monopoly of traditional media establishments. This 
enables the youth to generate their own revenue by instituting new business models and 
forming new relationships with the country’s advertising industry.   
 
The previous section has briefly touched upon the political economy of Saudi media to 
highlight the role of the state in media, which has resulted in its having a complete 
monopoly over national media and great control over regional media industries 
including television, and relationship with the advertisement industry. With this in mind, 
the next section discusses how professionally generated content producers (Kim, 2012) 
negotiate their commercial interests in such a media environment.  
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            Business in the YouTube Market 
 
The original motivation for the content creators in 2010 was to express themselves and 
voice their opinions. As Mohammad Bazaid explains, “[we] were doing the programme 
out of fashion and out of interest; and [we] were not driven by any financial motivations” 
(Mohammad Bazaid, presenter and co-founder of MadTomato, 2016). However, the 
growth of the content and digital advancements facilitated new business opportunities 
that the young producers were unaware of at the time. According to Doyle (2002), the 
opportunities associated with internet growth always have a marked effect on the nature 
of media players and their products. Therefore, as this chapter argues, YouTube-based 
programmes developed to create a YouTube-based market, with new players and new 
cultural products emerging in the Saudi media scene. The audio-visual sectors, in 
general, have significant roles in creating employment and wealth, and it is widely 
recognized that they play an important cultural role (Doyle, 2012).  
 
The increased popularity of certain programmes, with millions of viewers and 
subscribers (Ramsay and Fatani, 2016), has created a new set of economic conditions 
for creative young content creators in Saudi Arabia. This analysis shows that the 
process of building a YouTube-based market was complex and consisted of various 
stages. This chapter conceptualizes the development of the YouTube market in three 
main stages: Abstract, Concrete and Innovative. Each stage has unique characteristics 
and a different timeframe, and each contributed various economic dimensions to the 
emergent YouTube market.  
 
The Abstract Business Stage 
For many respondents, the first stage was based on simplicity and experimentation, and 
it took place between 2010 and 2011. The availability of YouTube as a distribution 
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mechanism for content creators to publish their original content stimulated a quick 
adaptation to gain certain societal advantages for their programmes. This stage was also 
marked by a lack of professional awareness of a business model concept and its 
applications for revenue generation. For Mohammad Bazaid, “[The business model] 
was not fully clear [for us at the beginning] and [we] were not aware of it in a 
professional way” (Mohammad Bazaid, presenter and co-founder of MadTomato, 2016). 
This demonstrates the struggle of the content creators to capitalize on their content and 
transform it into sustainable financial enterprises. There may be several reasons for this: 
First, familiarity with the concept of digital business culture was seemingly limited 
amongst the new players in 2010. Second, the legal framework and infrastructure (Price, 
2009) that are supposed to help and guide new players in the YouTube market were 
undeveloped at that time. Third, those in power were slow or unwilling to invest in the 
emerging business culture, probably because the wide reach of YouTube-based 
programming is critical and was seen to work against the interests of the state. 
Nevertheless, Saudi content creators were quick to respond to such challenges, 
establishing their own strategy to turn the unexpected mass audience into a commodity 
in order to reap financial advantages. According to Abdullah Mando, some YouTube- 
based programmes developed their basic business model naturally:   
 
It is a very simple model that is based on viewership. We create content that is extremely 
relevant to audiences, which can generate a lot of views, and then [we] embed the 
advertisements within the content only; because we do not have control over the platform. 
Basically, we sell based on 1.000 viewers. (Abdullah Mando, co-founder and the first 
CEO of UTURN Entertainment Network, 2016)  
 
This interest in transforming local cultural goods into business operations shows the 
attempts of content creators to create a model that capitalized on their content. It is 
noticeable that these digital practices were new to content creators and had not existed 
before.  
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This practice presented a policy dilemma that acted against the interests of YouTube 
(Google Inc.) itself in terms of advertising guidelines. Although Saudi content creators 
struggled to convince brands to advertise their products in YouTube-based programmes 
at that stage, when they succeeded, the use of advertising was not in line with 
YouTube’s advertising policy, and this created some conflicts. 
 
This leads to another pattern associated with the Abstract business stage, which is the 
absence of YouTube (Google Inc.) in the emerging Saudi YouTube market. For 
instance, “[YouTube did not] monetize the Middle East for the first two years” 
(Abdullah Mando, co-founder and the first CEO of UTURN Entertainment Network, 
2016) and “[YouTube] did not pay enough attention to the region [at the time] and it 
was underdeveloped” (Mohammad Bazaid, presenter and co-founder of MadTomato, 
2016).  
 
As a result, this climate of uncertainty extended opportunities for content creators to 
prosper and to increase their locally relevant products in the market. The absence of 
YouTube policy at the Abstract stage ignited further developments in the newly 
emerging YouTube market, where limited revenue started moving into the programmes. 
There is a potential difficulty for global companies such as YouTube when they expand 
their services to unregulated markets in the Middle East; such moves might lead to 
controversial relationships with authoritarian governments, for instance, over the notion 
of freedom of expression (Schmidt and Cohen, 2013).   
 
A third important characteristic of the abstract business stage is the significance of 
networking practices in the Saudi YouTube-based programme business. To illustrate:  
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In 2010, I had a meeting with my friend, the director, and we literally said that we wanted 
to make a specific product for YouTube, and then began to create some simple products. 
We also produced films for YouTube that had a wonderful impact on people, and the 
surprise for us was that they became so popular so fast. (Abdulmajeed Alkenani, co-
founder and presenter of SceenTV, 2016)  
 
Based on similar accounts in other interviews, it is evident that in the emerging Saudi 
YouTube market, the extensive use of like-minded friends as human capital for initial 
business operations was prevalent during the Abstract stage. The dependence on friends 
at this stage could be a result of existing trust within certain social segments; it is most 
logical to rely on a trusted companion because of the sensitive aspects of the cultural 
goods and the new nature of the content.  
 
This type of relationship conveys several features in terms of team size and the chain of 
production. It brings together a small number of talents who are friends, volunteers and 
passionate about the new experience. These semi-mature teams go through a brief 
videomaking production process based on trial and error. The small-scale nature of this 
activity enables content creators to learn more about the process. In addition, the 
experience helps them to develop an instinct for the type of content to be produced in 
the Saudi context. The roles are blurred and there are no clear distinctions within the 
team, where each member might be responsible for several activities. 
 
Another important feature of the Abstract business stage is the rise of the new stars’ 
concept within the Saudi YouTube market. As one interviewee says, “the idea of stars 
in Saudi Arabia was exclusive to singers and to actors, but the idea of making stars of 
the presenters was very new because of that breakthrough in 2010” (Anonymous female 
presenter, 2016). This matches the interesting analysis done by Turner (2010), who 
conceptualizes the transformation of ordinary people into media figures or stars through 
media establishments or technology as the ‘demotic turn’. Turner’s concept is clearly 
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applicable to Saudi YouTube-based programmes because it shows the emergence of a 
new class as a result of interactions between ordinary people and YouTube.  
 
This implies that YouTube-based programmes rely on the charisma of individual 
YouTube figures rather than on collective professional work. Successful presenters, for 
instance, build a fan base by capitalizing on the novelty of the programmes and the lack 
of competitors. This is because, as one interviewee explains, “at the beginning, any 
content was acceptable” (Anonymous female presenter, 2016). The abnormal conditions 
of the new market, where any content by any presenter can go viral, is an interesting 
aspect to be documented. The financial risk is limited because digital advances reduce 
the cost of production equipment (Doyle, 2002) and the producers employ a simple 
approach. 
 
The previous section has conceptualized the Abstract stage (2010-2011) of the evolution 
of YouTube-based programmes in Saudi Arabia. This stage has four main 
characteristics. First, the notion of the business model was not robust at that time, and 
the monetization process was based on experimenting and a trial and error approach. 
Second, YouTube was absent and no set of regulations including advertising and 
monetization policy was imposed on Saudi content creators. Third, the production 
process was based on private networking between trusted friends, and the production 
roles were vague and unclear. Finally, this stage saw the emergence of online stars as a 
significant practise that could capitalize upon the newly established market. The next 
section explores the second stage of the Saudi YouTube market’s history and looks at 
how it differs from the Abstract stage.  
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             The Concrete Business Stage 
 
The unprecedented growth of Saudi YouTube-based programming in terms of the 
number of programmes and views (Ramsay and Fatani, 2016) has made it a very 
significant phenomenon for observers. This growth took place in a very sensitive 
political climate in the region, as waves of revolutions affected several Arab regimes, 
which ignited a huge rise in the consumption of digital media across the Arab countries 
(Ghannam, 2011).  During this period, Saudi Arabia remained stable, and the 
combination of that stability and the growth of YouTube prepared the market for the 
second phase, which I conceptualize as the Concrete Business stage.  
   
The time frame for this second stage is 2012-2013, when the behaviour of both content 
creators and advertisers became more mature. Several insights appeared at this stage in 
terms of business model development. First, for Mohammad Bazaid, commercial 
sponsorship in this context is a significant key to the programmes’ prosperity:   
 
The model of sponsorship is completely new [for YouTube programmes], not only for us, 
but even for companies in Saudi Arabia… [For example,] the overall revenue we 
received in [our three] seasons from sponsorships was about [100–110k GBP] and I 
assure you this is now attainable for just one season for a successful programme. 
(Mohammad Bazaid, presenter and co-founder of MadTomato, 2016) 
 
This business model improved the cash flow, and the business became more valuable 
for young content creators than at the previous stage. Advertisers appreciated the appeal 
of local content to a targeted young audience, who had been difficult to approach 
through unattractive traditional TV channels (Lynch, 2006). The cash flow in turn 
contributed to developments in the market by increasing the number of programmes 
available to audiences and also by improving the quality of output. The sophistication of 
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the programmes attracted the attention of audiences, as Chapter Six will examine in 
detail, and created further appeal for the content.  
 
As a result, new strategies such as product placement and branding content emerged, 
enhancing the practice of the business models. Abdulmajeed Alkenani states that:  
 
[Content creators] provide [brands] with product placement and branding content. Also, 
[they] provide ad samples in the introduction. These are the three forms we deal with on 
Sceen channel…We [developed significant] relationships with many [telecommunication] 
brands in the country. (Abdulmajeed Alkenani, co-founder and presenter of SceenTV, 
2016)  
 
The business expanded, which led to the improvement of the infrastructure, such as the 
construction of new studios. This growth caused higher demand for human capital to 
fulfil the newly emerged roles: “We have six full-time employees and many assistants” 
(Alkenani). More importantly, the cognitive perception of business model progressed 
robustly at this stage. For instance, “we have managed to create our business model 
after a period of confusion” (Malik Nejer, co-founder, and art director of Myrkott 
Animation Studio, 2016).  
 
This progress required content creators to develop their business skills and relationships 
with recognizable brands and advertising agencies, taking into account the accumulated 
experience they had built and their understanding of the needs of the young audience. 
This expansion in quality and quantity enabled some content creators to team up with 
international brands. For instance, “I have a partnership with the Machinima network” 
(Ahmed Aref, presenter of DeSTRoYeR, 2016). Brands found opportunities to reach 
niche youth segments through partnerships with content creators. Chapter One 
illustrated the concept of two-sided market as explained by Farchy (2009), and the 
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business development in the Concrete stage offers an interesting example of this 
concept within the Saudi context.    
 
Second, as revenue grew rapidly, a very significant move took place when investors 
became involved in the YouTube market. The entry of professional production houses, 
also called ‘networks’ by Saudis, especially for YouTube, brought positivity to the 
market but also challenged some content creators who had started during the Abstract 
stage. This is summarised by one of the interviewees, who states that the “market 
switched to a supply and demand concept where some [advertisers]…pay more and 
others pay less” (Abdullah Mando, co-founder and the first CEO of UTURN 
Entertainment Network, 2016). 
 
 The strategies of these new entrants relied on introducing new programmes to market, 
but more importantly acquiring certain programmes. For example, “several networks 
such as UTURN Entertainment and Telvaz 11 contacted me to join them” (Ahmed Aref, 
presenter of DeSTRoYeR, 2016) and “for the SargoShow series, I had some offers of 
acquisition” (Aymen Khoja, film producer of SargoShow, 2016). 
 
This may reflect the intent of some investors to acquire emerging and established 
YouTube-based programmes in order to take advantage of their growing market status 
for potential economic returns. However, in such a non-democratic context it is also 
possible that some of the investors who were keen to consolidate influential 
programmes were driven by political motivations, wishing to gain control of the 
editorial policies of YouTube-based programmes and soften their critical tones. This 
interpretation is supported by the analysis of the Saudi traditional media context 
discussed in Chapter One (Al-Rasheed, 2008; Boyd, 1982; and Kraidy, 2013) in relation 
to the government's attempt to control media narrative through private proxies.  
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The strong financial hold of networks attracted various content creators to initiate 
creative ideas for YouTube. As a result, networks started to be perceived as incubators 
for some talents and as recognizable brands for online programmes. This can be seen in 
the account of Mohammad Makki, who points out that: 
 
We contacted some media production houses like UTURN Entertainment and Telvaz11, 
which are dedicated to producing content for YouTube, in order to look for opportunities 
to cooperate with them. If they like our pilot episode, then they might sign a contract with 
us. (Mohammad Makki, director of TakkiSeries and award-winning filmmaker, 2016)  
 
It seems that the strategy of the investors succeeded in consolidating some influential 
YouTube programmes and it initiated new directions for online content; for instance, 
producing programmes that speak to Saudi women – something that was unavailable 
before. This arguably created new business opportunities for women. As one female 
participant points out, “I became a part of UTURN network. My relationship with them 
is one of partnership” (Anonymous female participant, 2016). It can be argued that this 
behaviour between investors and content creators impacted the YouTube market 
positively, helping to institutionalize it more professionally by, for example, signing 
agreements between parties and setting standards for productions. This provides insight 
on the concept of professionally generated content (Kim, 2012) through the lens of 
Saudi YouTube.  
 
Another aspect that emerged with the involvement of the networks was that they 
increased competition in the market. This competition stimulated a sense of diversity 
and pluralism in production and consumption activities. Abdullah Mando, who had been 
the first CEO of the influential UTURN Entertainment Network, perhaps best illustrates 
how the competition in the market developed from its inception: 
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We do not have many key players in Saudi Arabia. In my opinion, the biggest company in 
terms of impact and leadership used to be UTURN Entertainment but today it is Telfaz11, 
which has been leading since 2013 or so… UTURN Entertainment was always leading 
the market in terms of originality and new content. So every month we had something new 
that shifted the market in terms of content online… Telfaz11 [was] slower than UTURN 
Entertainment, but in the long run they became capable of developing a unique identity 
for themselves, more controversial, more aggressive, and more liberal in some sense, and 
most importantly, constant improvement of quality. (Abdullah Mando, co-founder and the 
first CEO of UTURN Entertainment Network, 2016)  
 
This highlights the development of competition within the market. It indicates the need 
for consistent change in order to meet audience demands and tastes, which may 
represent unsustainable ground for producers (Wasko and Erickson, 2009). However, 
this competition was not always healthy:  
 
Sa7i [network’s] behaviour is hostile as they want to compete aggressively with everyone 
in the market. They have created for the first time an unhealthy rivalry. Before their 
emergence, the market was friendly and more transparent. UTURN and Telfaz11 were 
cooperating together on projects. When Sa7i came on board, they had a bad impact. 
(Abdullah Mando, co-founder and the first CEO of UTURN Entertainment Network, 
2016) 
 
The above quote provides an account of the commercial struggles which some investors 
caused between 2012 and 2013. Although competition can be credited with discovering 
and nurturing new talents for YouTube-based programmes, it also introduced a negative 
spirit regarding institutional co-operation between different networks. This hostile 
behaviour may well have been driven by the need to acquire talents from other 
competitors and it might raise a question about the impact of this strategy by Sa7i 
network upon the development of YouTube-based programmes.  
 
In addition, however, these new entrants also had a negative impact on individual 
players in the market who were not associated with any network, because simple 
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programmes based on individuals were no longer able to compete with the new 
networks in terms of financial capital and the quality of output. For Abdulmajeed 
Alkenani, this unhealthy competition shook the market in two extreme ways: 
 
At the end of 2012, the YouTube market witnessed the powerful role of capital and that’s 
been a distraction. A giant market revolution occurred. Some YouTube producers have 
raised their prices and suddenly there is less content and some people could not continue 
as the experience is still new. (Abdulmajeed Alkenani, co-founder and presenter of 
SceenTV, 2016) 
 
Consequently, this shakeup in market contributed to the disappearance of several small 
programme makers who did not have the financial power to sustain content production 
because the networks set high new standards.  Arguably, this stage illustrates the 
gradual transfer of YouTube programmes from user-generated content to 
professionally-generated content (Kim, 2012) because of the hard intervention of 
networks in this emergent market. This has had a profound effect on the structure of the 
market because less content production creates a sense of concentration (Doyle, 2002) 
for content, and therefore the prices have gone up. A quasi-monopoly emerged because 
of the limited number of professional content providers for YouTube programmes in 
Saudi Arabi. The high barrier of entry has prevented individuals from competing with 
networks and a number of individuals have been unable to continue in the current 
market unless they join the new content providers – the networks. UGC has not 
disappeared but it began serving a different purpose. PGC became more appealing to 
audiences and the new logarithmic policy of YouTube that categorized content as Most 
Viewed (Wasko and Erickson, 2009; and Davidson and et al, 2010) has played a 
critical role in increasing the audience.    
 
Third, the boom and the noticeable development of the Saudi market caused YouTube 
to start paying attention to it, perhaps to stay in control and to maximize the potential 
financial return. YouTube (Google Inc.) started to build relationships with Saudi content 
creators for the first time. A number of interviewees highlight that “Google contacted us 
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and strengthened their relationship with us and … [all] Saudi YouTube programmes … 
and explained to us how to generate revenue out of viewers” (Mohammad Bazaid, 
presenter and co-founder of MadTomato, 2016) and “[YouTube] regulated the 
platform … they were keen to sign partnership agreements [with us]” (Abdullah Mando, 
co-founder and the first CEO of UTURN Entertainment Network, 2016).   
 
The strategy of YouTube is to identify the players in the market in order to build 
relationships with them. Although this move attempts to serve the interests of both 
parties, it is more in favour of YouTube because the content creators outsource revenues 
by facilitating the platform rather than relying on YouTube monetization itself, which is 
less lucrative for producers. By doing this, YouTube monetized the Saudi market and 
began regulating this previously unregulated entity. It ensured that the platform was 
under its control by imposing its rules and agreements with Saudi producers. This 
resulted in the enforcement certain policies that made some producers feels 
uncomfortable.  For instance:   
 
[YouTube] forces us to use [our ads] less…YouTube accepts [advertisements] as long as 
the [they] are indirect. If you use explicit advertisements such as “this show is sponsored 
by” or have a break in the middle for ads, then YouTube will take the video down. 
(Abdullah Mando, co-founder and the first CEO of UTURN Entertainment Network, 
2016) 
 
YouTube serves its own interests, but this stimulated some producers to respond by 
developing a new strategy, which will be explained later in the third stage. This 
partnership made the process of generating revenue for Saudis very challenging and it 
became difficult to generate revenue in the same way (Mando). 
     
In terms of human capital at this stage, and according to the interviewees, most of the 
content creators were not fully committed to YouTube programmes as some of them 
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were either full-time students or employees.  It seems the disappearance of some 
programmes following the networks’ intervention resulted in the re-aggregation of 
human capital within the market. It caused the downfall of some people and the rise of 
others, and increased the influence of some popular stars.  
 
The shift from voluntary roles to paid professional positions started to intensify the 
dynamics of the business; one participant declares that “my [financial] percentage is 30% 
and 70% for the UTURN network” (Anonymous female participant, 2016), and this is 
found again in the accounts of several interviewees, such as Mohammad Makki, who 
explains the financial agreement between himself as a director and between one of the 
networks. He states that “UTURN Entertainment was paying me for every single 
episode in advance, and they would get their profits by securing sponsorships 
[themselves]” (Mohammad Makki, director of TakkiSeries and award-winning 
filmmaker, 2016).  
 
Although the concept of personal networking to facilitate the production of content was 
still essential at this stage, the perception of total relying on friends declined; it was 
being replaced by higher professional standards.  
 
The dilemma that Saudi YouTube producers face is the challenge of recruiting talented 
people with professional experience in media activities, as the discussion in Chapter 
Three maintained. This dilemma is felt in several conversations throughout the 
fieldwork. This is how one of the contributors sees it:  
 
The definition of talent should be reconsidered and it should have an education- and 
knowledge-related base. Unfortunately, we have no institutes that teach arts in Saudi 
Arabia. I think [talent] should have a knowledge base and it should not depend on their 
experience. (Abdulmajeed Alkenani, co-founder and presenter of SceenTV, 2016) 
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As a result, the mode of production was transformed into professional phases such as 
the pre-production, production and post-production processes. This can be seen in the 
following contribution of one of the respondents, who describes her relationship with 
the network as mutual agreement wherein “I write and present, and the network is 
responsible for the business of photography, production, distribution and marketing” 
(Anonymous female participant, 2016). This reflects that the chain of production, at the 
Concrete stage, adopted a structured approach compared to the way things were handled 
during the Abstract stage. In addition, the production teams became much bigger with 
clearer roles, as the following quote illustrates:  
 
I am the creative manager of the channel. Also, I’m the person who prepares and 
introduces a programme called Luqaimat [Bites]. The main responsibilities of the 
creative manager are to present the ideas, develop them into new ideas, and put the idea 
into an entertaining technical form. In addition, I am responsible for the innovation part. 
(Abdulmajeed Alkenani, co-founder and presenter of SceenTV, 2016) 
 
This is how these roles developed; however, some of them are slightly loose and vague. 
The taste of both content creators and audiences set the bar higher and the market 
entered a cycle where only attractive and high-quality content would be widely 
consumed. As one of the interviewees indicates, the audience became very selective.   
 
This section has investigated the second stage of the development of the YouTube 
market in Saudi Arabia, which I conceptualize as the Concrete stage. This stage covers 
the period from 2012 to 2013. The Concrete stage has a number of distinctive features. 
First, the concept and the application of the business model become robust as the 
producers developed a number of strategies to capitalize on their content, such as 
sponsorship, branding content and product placement. Second, YouTube intervened in 
the market, following the unprecedented growth and its previous absence, to impose its 
policies and rules upon the Saudi producers to safeguard the interests of the platform. 
Third, this stage was marked by the heavy intervention of investors, who established 
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houses of production known locally as networks. This had massive impact upon the 
market, and most of the individual producers were replaced by market rules. Finally, the 
concept of personal networking remained important, but more professional posts 
emerged in the market as the production process became professionalized and 
standardized.  
 
             The Innovative Business Stage 
 
This third stage features significant developments in terms of market structure and 
business model applications. The time frame for this stage is between 2014 and 2016.  
The first feature of this stage is the shift for some producers from being YouTube-based 
content creators to being content developers for various platforms. The constraints of 
YouTube upon content creators inspired some of them to think bigger and to move 
beyond YouTube as an exclusive platform for distribution. 
 
Malik Nejer summarizes it by explaining that “Myrkott is a developer. We develop 
ideas, content and intellectual property. We… have an in-house studio where we can 
create the content” (Malik Nejer, co-founder and art director of Myrkott Animation 
Studio, 2016).   
 
This section finds that the professional presence of the animation studio, Myrkott, 
creates a positive sphere by maintaining high production standards. Several 
interviewees cite Myrkott as an excellent standard for the Saudi market.  
 
This shift indicates that some creative studios entered a new area of business where they 
could compete with other established content and advertising agencies. Malik explains 
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that “because we [run] at full capacity, we sometimes develop content and send it 
abroad to Singapore or Jordan to be produced” (Malik Nejer, co-founder and art director 
of Myrkott Animation Studio, 2016).  
 
This demonstrates how content creators can take advantage of global culture and turn it 
into valuable local cultural and business assets. The creative process is in a state of flux 
as Myrkott embarks on merchandising their cartoon characters, thus conveying both 
business and cultural values: 
 
We are now in process of merchandizing our cartoon characters … it is not simple. We 
need to license our intellectual property to people who will manufacture and distribute it 
for us. We need to find a third party. (Malik Nejer, co-founder and art director of Myrkott 
Animation Studio, 2016) 
 
This highlights the difficulties that spread across all aspects of the business when no 
official support is offered to the content creators, let alone any easing of the restrictive 
and bureaucratic environment in which they operate. It illustrates the logistic obstacles 
that the market inventors face without any serious guidance or support. It opens several 
potential scenarios such as co-operating with their counterparts in different countries or 
simply continuing the process of being risk-takers in such an unpredictable context.  
 
The second feature of the Innovative Business stage is the shift towards becoming 
advertising solution companies as a response to the challenges listed above. This is 
summarized by the first CEO of UTURN Entertainment Network, who indicates that 
this strategy was a response to the lack of revenue made from YouTube, following the 
restrictions YouTube placed upon Saudi content creators:  
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What UTURN is doing now, along with others, is to become adverting solution 
companies. This means that instead of simply embedding the advertising into the content, 
they are actually creating the ad itself for the client using the same content production 
process. (Abdullah Mando, co-founder and the first CEO of UTURN Entertainment 
Network, 2016) 
 
This move by a number of networks offers additional business opportunities to young 
content creators and to the market as a whole. It poses a problematic cultural point in 
terms of the sustainability of producing meaningful content (Andrejevic, 2009) for the 
platform of YouTube. However, some content creators have decided to leave the market 
of YouTube-based programmes and focus on establishing original content-oriented 
business According to Abdullah Mando: 
 
So, the model changed from being content creators to advertising solution companies…I 
[moved to Qubba studios to] focus on [producing] premium content… to invest in 
storytelling; to produce content that we can export globally. UTURN Entertainment does 
produce freemium content that is available freely online. (Abdullah Mando, co-founder 
and the first CEO of UTURN Entertainment Network, 2016) 
 
The basis for this change is the desire to create more sustainable business opportunities 
for content creators, capitalizing on their online influence.  For example, some Saudi 
YouTube presenters take their new social capital and attempt to create their own 
businesses, such as Mohammad Bazaid, who remarks: 
  
Most people in [our YouTube programme] established the Mad Tomato Company ... It 
specializes in producing content for online as well as social media marketing campaigns. 
We additionally work offline on any kind of creative content including content, copyright, 
development and conceptualizing. (Mohammad Bazaid, presenter and co-founder of 
MadTomato, 2016) 
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It can be seen then that one of the consequences of market complexity is the orientation 
of some individuals and networks to expand the scope of their work by creating 
premium content for various platforms instead of being limited to YouTube.  It could be 
argued that the experience gained through the previous stages has helped those content 
creators to spot the niche for Saudi content, either online or on television, and take a 
lead in filling those neglected gaps.  
 
Another strategy utilized by networks that produce YouTube-based programmes is to 
not only create original content, but also to act as distribution windows for other 
YouTube-based programmes that are produced independently. As Abdulmajeed 
Alkenani puts it:  
 
Our plan is to make Sceen TV a platform for various contents. Many of our programmes 
come to us via creators who present their ideas for a specific price … and so we allow 
them to produce their own programmes and use our platform officially. (Abdulmajeed 
Alkenani, co-founder and presenter of SceenTV, 2016) 
 
This echoes the shift in the networks towards maximizing the benefits of their YouTube 
network by diversifying their revenue options. This reflects the powerful position of 
those networks as well as their popularity in the field, enabling them to attract original 
content for their network. For Aymen Khoja, this opens up more opportunities for Saudi 
content creators. “The distribution windows in Saudi, like Sa7i and Telfaz11, are very 
smart, as they are not [only] producers but distributors [too]” (Aymen Khoja, film 
producer of SargoShow, 2016).  
 
The impact of networks has reached a critical point in aggregating and diffusing local 
content. They dominate the scene and quietly kill independently produced programmes. 
It could be argued that this step is imperative to advance the market and raise standards. 
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However, this might have occurred in a manner that is not positive for new local content 
creators as the networks acquire the most successful programmes and, interestingly, 
control most of the advertising revenue.  
 
Another innovative vehicle to generate income is what this thesis conceptualizes as a go 
to ads strategy, which has two forms. As the concept indicates, this strategy relies on 
recognizing the key advertising players and approaching them to initiate a win-win 
business deal. This technique is used by one of the Saudi content creators, who argues 
that “we found the media buying unit which is responsible for buying slots on TVs for 
advertisers and we dealt with them” (Malik Nejer, co-founder and art director of 
Myrkott Animation Studio, 2016).  
 
This quote is very thought-provoking. First, this could not have happened without the 
confidence of the content creators in their cultural products. It reflects confidence in 
terms of the quality standard of the animation programmes and their ability to deliver 
messages to an audience. Second, it highlights the prominent rise of some YouTube-
based programmes and their strong presence within the Saudi cultural landscape online. 
Third, this increase could have complicated the relationships between the ad agencies 
and traditional national and Pan-Arab TV stations on one hand and the young content 
creators on the other hand, which echoes the discussion of Van Dijck (2013). The 
monopolized Saudi advertising market, which is described by one of the interviewees, 
Abdulmajeed Alkenani, as exclusively open to certain corporations and people, could 
have behaved in a way that supported the traditional alliance between television 
networks and advertisement agencies, to the exclusion of the new digital players. 
 
It is essential to keep in mind that the visibility of YouTube-based programming 
facilitates a direct contact between content creators and commercial brands without the 
need for an intermediary. Malik Nejer explains his strategy for overcoming the 
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intermediary so his company could attract big brands to advertise their products through 
his own cultural productions.  In his account:  
 
The media buying units behave like a broker between TVs and advertisers and they 
usually get around 7.8% for the deal. We offer the unit, the broker, 30% if he can bring 
me the advertiser, the Ford Company, instead of bringing that to Pan-Arab TV. (Malik 
Nejer, co-founder and art director of Myrkott Animation Studio, 2016) 
 
The economic logistics behind offering the media buying unit such a high rate is 
described as follows:   
 
We generate lots of revenue because as an operational company we are more efficient … 
we do not have broadcast costs, [multiple] studios, or big number of employees like the 
TV. I am a small business. So I can offer this media buying unit [this percentage]. (Nejer) 
 
The second form of the go to ads strategy is explained below;  
 
Using the restaurant[s] where we go and filming inside, [the presenter eats the main 
dishes and rate them with his friend] to market the restaurants. (Abdulmajeed Alkenani, 
co-founder and presenter of SceenTV, 2016) 
 
Apart from the credibility of rating the menus at the fancy restaurants that they film at, 
this model reflects another example of Saudi producers’ innovative approach in 
securing another steam of revenue. He continues, “we started with a free episode or two 
to make the programme more popular and to foster demand” (Ibid).  
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With regards to the human capital at the Innovative Business stage, the boom of the 
Saudi YouTube-based market expanded the business sphere, creating various job 
opportunities (Doyle, 2012) and a new culture in digital business. This reflects an 
ongoing process of negotiation between many different parties in order to expand and 
sustain the new business, as acknowledged by Bazaid:  
 
Mad Tomato started with four employees and it currently has twelve full-time employees. 
We work with big brands where we organize several events in terms of content. We also 
work with around thirty local clients (business to business), marketing their brands on 
social media. (Mohammad Bazaid, presenter and co-founder of MadTomato, 2016) 
 
In comparison with previous stages, the market became more mature and stable for both 
creators and audience during the Innovation stage. This widened the options for 
audiences as quality becomes very competitive. According to one of the interviewees, 
“the audience have started to filter the content and they do not accept any content except 
excellent [content]” (Anonymous female participant, 2016). This suggests that the huge 
amount of content aimed at the Saudi market during the previous two stages, 2010-2011 
and 2012-2013, had improved the artistic expectation of the audience over a relatively 
short timeframe.  
 
This section has theorized the development of the YouTube market in Saudi Arabia 
between 2014 and 2016, conceptualizing it as the Innovative Business stage. A number 
of characteristics are associated with this stage. First, the concept of the business model 
fully developed when the content creators secured revenue through various strategies. 
Furthermore, some of the content creators proved capable of moving from being content 
creators for YouTube exclusively to being content creators for other platforms by 
creating new business opportunities. Finally, the human capital for the market became 
more professionalized and standardized, including, for example, the introduction of 
contracts between parties.  
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The first part of this chapter theorized the development of the YouTube market in Saudi 
Arabia by conceptualizing it into three stages with different characteristics associated 
with every stage. The Abstract Stage (2010-2011), the Concrete Stage (2012-2013) and 
the Innovative Business Stage (2014-2016) covered different timeframes with different 
distinctive features. In the literature review chapter, a number of studies were examined 
concerning the economics of YouTube itself (Farchy, 2009; Hang, 2008; and Wasko 
and Erickson, 2009), the complex relationship between YouTube, television and 
copyrights (McDonald, 2009; and Van Dijck, 2013) and the institutionalizing of 
YouTube (Kim, 2012). These concepts are very useful, but their angles of analysis 
focus on the actual platform and its relation to television, paying little attention to the 
users. When they do, they tend to focus on UGC users with very brief discussions 
dedicated to PGC users. The above analysis fills the gap in Arabic and global online 
media studies by building and utilizing on the concepts drawn from the literature, 
thereby offering fresh perspectives on professionally generated content on YouTube 
through the Saudi experience. 
 
In the following part, I intend to build upon the above analysis of the Saudi YouTube 
market to explore the behaviour of advertisers towards YouTube-based programming. 
The next part explores the behaviour of advertising agencies towards YouTube-based 
programmes throughout the three stages.  
 
The Behaviour of Advertising Agencies in the Saudi YouTube-based       
Market 
 
The previous section offered a comprehensive empirical analysis to help understand the 
evolution of the business dynamics in the Saudi YouTube-based market. Although the 
above debate embedded elements of commercial brands’ attitudes towards YouTube-
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based programmes, the central focus was on the business development of the 
programmes and the players’ reactions to several emerging forces in the market.   
 
The advertising agencies in the Saudi YouTube-based market act as a catalyst to 
advance the market financially and professionally.  Based on the above 
conceptualizations of business stages (Abstract, Concrete, and Innovative) this section 
briefly follows the behaviour of advertising agencies throughout the evolution of the 
market. 
 
Advertising Patterns at the Abstract Business Stage 
 
At the Abstract stage (2010-2011), the market was in trial and error mode and so the 
presence of advertisers was limited. Bazaid highlights that “the advertisers were 
unfamiliar with this new platform and they were scared to invest money in this new 
window” (Mohammad Bazaid, presenter and co-founder of MadTomato, 2016).  
 
The reticence of brands to investigate in this new platform was marked at this stage. The 
lack of professionalism of the content creators at this stage could have impeded the 
brands from engaging actively with the newly emerged platforms in Saudi Arabia.  
 
The market was comparatively young and the culture of online advertising was 
seemingly not attractive to some commercial brands in the country. Nevertheless, the 
huge boom in YouTube-based programmes and their significant influence stimulated a 
change in advertisers’ attitudes, as the following analysis will demonstrate.  
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  Advertising Patterns at the Concrete Business Stage 
 
By 2012, the growing recognition of YouTube-based programmes resulted in mass 
young audiences. This encouraged some commercial brands to recognize the platform 
as a potential window for business. This recognition grew gradually and investment in 
the content of YouTube was on the rise. In spite of improvements, there were still 
reservations about advertising; as Bazaid argues, “we sell influence and this one of the 
things that some brands do not realize” (Mohammad Bazaid, presenter and co-founder 
of MadTomato, 2016).  
 
The mention of ‘influence’ highlights a very explicit indication that audience 
behaviours change, switching to online consumption as viewers are influenced by 
YouTube celebrities (Turner, 2010). This change pushes advertising agencies and 
commercial brands to follow the audiences and interact with them online.  
 
The slow adaptation, at this stage, could be due to the lack of logic in the pricing policy 
employed by content creators. For example, one of the respondents indicates that the 
price of advertising on social media platforms depends, in the first place, on the number 
of views, and then on the continuity of the show. This, however, contradicts another 
interviewee: 
 
The number of viewers is not the only measurement to be taken into consideration 
because it is better sometimes for a brand to look for online content whose audience 
would be interested in its product rather than go to a massive general audience. 
(Mohammad Bazaid, presenter and co-founder of MadTomato, 2016) 
 
One main theme that this quote introduces is the fragmentation of the audience as a 
result of the development of YouTube-based programming. This fragmentation raises 
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some doubts about the practicality of reaching and accessing a mass audience. This can 
offer measurable and efficient opportunities for advertisers to approach their potential or 
actual targets by taking advantage of the engagement metrics of YouTube. The business 
of advertising on YouTube-based programming flourished in the third stage, when 
fragmentation was perceived as an opportunity to reach specific local targets, as the 
following section maintains.  
 
Advertising Patterns at the Innovative Business Stage 
 
Between 2014 and 2016, a very notable shift occurred in the mode of advertising in 
favour of YouTube-based programming. Several content creators offer explanations for 
this change as they perceive it. One of the interviewees is critical: 
 
[Brands] realize that no one watches their ads even if they pay millions. The audience 
uses the [airtime slot of] ads on TV to go to the bathroom or [they] mute [the sound]. It 
becomes similar to traditional pop-up ads on the internet. Yet TV requires very high 
[expenditure], and the question here is: is it effective? (Malik Nejer, co-founder and art 
director of Myrkott Animation Studio, 2016) 
 
While this quotation carries its own bias because of the personal interest of the content 
creator, it does suggest that audiences show less interest in watching advertising on 
television than online.  
 
This suggests that online advertising had become, at this stage, an integral part of the 
content on YouTube. It reflects that the adverts on YouTube-based programmes are 
seen as a promising option for commercial brands to reach target audiences. The brands 
were slow to embrace digital advertising, but once they became comfortable and aware 
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of its significant influence, they altered their attitude towards online video because of its 
effective functionality and its high-end content. Malik Nejer continues advocating for 
online advertising over traditional advertising because:  
 
YouTube is more effective because, for instance, I can offer Ford a targeted ad for 
unmarried 22-year-old males who are interested in watching cars. I can be as specific as 
this. I can target certain middle-class neighbourhoods in Riyadh. There was some 
resistance at the beginning but then as the interesting and professional content appeared, 
the image changed.  Some YouTube channels become prestigious. (Nejer)  
 
This development enables the brands to ensure that their products are associated with 
prestigious content so they can invest in professionally generated content (Kim, 2012). 
However, knowledge gaps emerge as a challenge for brands in terms of the message to 
be delivered to young audiences. This period from 2014-2016 brought multi-level 
challenges for brands. The first challenge related to the feasibility of online video 
advertisements in the Saudi market, which has been addressed above. The second 
challenge was about how to craft a message that would be received positively by the 
targeted audience, and what the content of such a message should be.  
 
This investigation reveals that some brands are unqualified to deal with the second 
challenge and therefore approached the content creators to initiate cooperative projects. 
For instance, “I received a call from the Ford Company requesting us to create ads using 
the language of people on Twitter … We are assisting brands” (Malik Nejer, co-founder 
and art director of Myrkott Animation Studio, 2016).  
 
First of all, this emphasises the previous discussion regarding the shift of some content 
creators to become advertising solution businesses. Second, it shows a clear gap in 
terms of knowledge-dealing, where some brands acknowledge implicitly that they lag 
behind in terms of how to approach the audience using digital methods. Third, this 
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could imply a serious shortage of local advertising personnel not only within the 
YouTube-based programmes market, but also in the media advertising industry as a 
whole.  
 
For instance, Kraidy (2012) highlights that the historical and contemporary influence of 
Lebanese human resources in Saudi media institutions existed for several reasons, an 
important one being the lack of technical skills among Saudi media human resources. 
The rise of the new Saudi creators who are technically literate, media-oriented, 
understand the local culture and speak in the local accent have caused a new 
commercial calculation for the entire Saudi media scene, both digital and traditional.  
 
A final point before concluding this section is to introduce a significant example that 
echoes the above debate and, more importantly, affirms the shift towards online video 
advertising. According to Malik Nejer: 
 
Nescafe launched a new product called Nescafe Arabiana Coffee. They wanted us to 
[promote it purely by using] YouTube. We produced an animated show specifically for 
the product and this is where we created the animated cups story [for them] … We did 
two seasons for them; six episodes per season, and now we are preparing for the third 
season in Ramadan. (Malik Nejer, co-founder and art director of Myrkott Animation 
Studio, 2016) 
 
The trust that the Nescafe brand showed, first in YouTube itself as the only vehicle to 
promote its product in Saudi Arabia, and second in hiring local Saudi content creators to 
produce and distribute the episodes, represents a phenomenal shift.   
 
This behaviour brings the brands closer to audiences because they create entertaining 
animated show that attracts young consumers and build positive feelings towards their 
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product.  In addition, the timing of the show is significant, as Ramadan is traditionally 
known for being the season to produce exclusive media content (Kraidy and Khalil, 
2009). Brands benefit from this season across the Arab world, and at the heart of it is 
Saudi Arabia, which owns influential Pan-Arab TV stations (Kraidy, 2013; and Sakr, 
Skovgaard-Petersen and Ratta, 2015). Consequently, the shift in the attitude of the 
brand towards YouTube empowers local content creators and initiates a competitive 
culture amongst them which is beneficial for the general state of the YouTube market.  
 
 
            Conclusion 
 
This chapter has offered empirical analysis of the YouTube-based programmes market 
in Saudi Arabia during the period from 2010-2016 by building upon several concepts 
derived from the literature review such as those examined by Farchy (2009), Wasko and 
Erickson (2009) and Kim (2012). These concepts are very useful, however, but their 
angles of analysis focus on the actual platform and its relation to television, paying little 
attention to the users. When they do, they tend to focus on UGC users with very brief 
discussions dedicated to PGC users. The above analysis fills that gap by building on the 
concepts drawn from the literature, offering fresh perspectives on professionally 
generated content on YouTube through the Saudi lens.  
 
The first section conceptualized the three stages of the business evolution of the Saudi 
YouTube-based market in order to trace its development. The debate has been framed in 
the context of revenue, the attitude of YouTube (Google Inc.), human capital and 
market behaviour.   
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In the second section, the investigation shed light on advertising as one of the crucial 
forces that improves market conditions. It highlighted the relationships between 
YouTube-based programmes and advertising through the three different conceptualized 
stages of Abstract, Concrete and Innovative Business. The behaviour of advertisers 
varied throughout these stages, ranging from suspicion and lack of trust to accepting the 
new reality and finally to engaging actively with Saudi YouTube-based programmes as 
the content progressed rapidly.  
 
It would be interesting to briefly borrow the analysis of Picard (2011), who suggests 
that each industry has its life cycle which consists of various stages, namely 
introductory, growth, maturation and decline.   
 
The establishment of Saudi YouTube programmes was out of the ordinary, and they 
evolved around various complicated political, cultural, societal and economic conditions 
that are rarely found in other countries. The popularity of the programmes stems from 
the gap found in the content of Saudi television, which is subject to political constraints 
and therefore faces a challenge in attracting young audiences. A decline period for 
YouTube might occur if there is a change in the main driver for YouTube, which is the 
nature and the content of television. A serious policy change in Saudi television in terms 
of its coverage and its editorial policy might affect YouTube in Saudi Arabia and switch 
it from its current status into a normal digital platform. The YouTube market has shifted 
through the years and has been a stabilized market since 2016. The rise of original, local 
and relevant content will attract more viewers to YouTube as long as traditional TV 
stations fail to attract young Saudi audiences.   
 
Predictions for the future might be difficult to propose for such a conservative country 
located in the Middle East, a region that is in such a state of flux. One potential point is 
that the YouTube market in Saudi Arabia might be disturbed by Instagram and Snap 
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Chat, which already attract a large number of brands for advertising, but these platforms 
might be subject to the same circumstances as YouTube.  
 
Finally, the analysis has revealed that YouTube-based programmes have opened new 
doors for Saudi content creators in terms of income, but more importantly in terms of 
cultural change. Those programmes have all contributed to the liberalization of Saudi 
youth online.  
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Chapter Five: The Saudi Government’s Reactions to 
YouTube-based Programming: The Content Makers’ 
Perspective 
 
            Introduction  
 
The analyses in Chapters Three and Four concerned the cultural and business dynamics 
introduced into Saudi Arabia’s online sphere by YouTube-based programmes. This 
chapter now seeks to extend the discussion into another area of investigation, focusing 
on the attitude of the state towards some programmes that contain critical political and 
cultural content.  
 
It answers the third research question, which concerns the relationship between the 
Saudi government and YouTube-based programming. Understanding the Saudi 
government’s reactions is central to the debate and controversies surrounding the 
relationship between content creators and the state.  This chapter aims to provide a solid 
understanding of the dynamic of YouTube-based programmes in a non-democratic 
context to examine whether social media, and specifically YouTube platforms, can 
affect the behaviour of the state and the regulatory structure.  
 
The literature review illustrated the integrated relationship between the state and media, 
as discussed in Rinnawi (2006), Boyd (1982) and Kraidy (2012). A number of concepts 
emerged throughout the literature review, such as the political motivation behind 
utilizing media output in Saudi Arabia and the concertation of media ownership. 
Keeping this in mind, I intend to explore the complex relationship between Saudi 
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content creators and the government to see whether or not authoritarian rule also 
extends to online activities.  
 
This chapter starts by discussion the Saudi power structure to set the stage for the 
chapter’s analysis. Second, it explores the regulatory context of YouTube-based 
programmes to see whether the online programmes operate within a constructive 
regulatory framework and what the attitude of the content creators to this is. After that, 
it moves on to investigate the Saudi government’s reactions to the content and the 
strategies that have been employed to deal with the programmes, as the content makers 
perceive them.  
 
            Understanding The Saudi Power Structure Landscape 
 
The basic law adopted in 1922 declares that Saudi Arabia is a monarchy ruled by the 
sons and the grandsons of Ibn Saud, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia. The country 
has no officially organized political parties, and the King appoints the Cabinet and the 
Consultative Council, which is the equivalent to the Parliament in other countries 
(Background note Saudi Arabia, 2011; and MarketLine, 2016). Accordingly, the King, 
maintains full control of the state without any separation of powers.   
 
The founding Ibn Saud King had several sons and the succession was passed down with 
them on his death in 1953 (Kechichian, 2001). The current octogenarian King Salman, 
who is the son of Ibn Saud, assumed the throne in January 2015; he could be the last son 
to hold this position because of the recent appointment in June 2017 of his young son 
Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (born in 1985) as a Crown Prince. The appointment of 
Mohammad Bin Salman is the first political move to enable the grandsons of Ibn Saud 
to occupy such senior positions since the modern foundation of Saudi Arabia, which 
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reflects a shift in the power transition within the royal family whose various potential 
implications domestically, regionally and internationally have yet to be observed.  
 
Al-Rasheed (2008) attempts to analyse the contemporary Saudi political transformation 
by arguing that the Saudi Kings were always keen to ensure that the country was under 
their rule and that they held this authority publicly. They also distributed some posts and 
privileges for political reasons, for example to silence brothers and to exile dissident 
princes. For example, King Faisal (1964-75) ensured his supremacy over the state by 
weakening all potential threats to his authority.  
 
Al-Rasheed argues that this later established what she conceptualizes as states within 
the state, whereby various princes built up their economic and military might and came 
to serve as balance forces to the power. This was seen during the reign of King Fahad 
(1982-2005) as time and experience allowed for the influential emergence of certain 
princes who all had a vested interest in publicly maintaining the positive image and 
authority of the King.  
  
This fragmentation and configuration of power introduced complexity into the decision-
making process and produced some contradictory policies and actions from within the 
state itself – especially in the absence of transparent measures. The contradictory 
policies are derived from the personal interests of the various senior princes as well as 
their divided ideology over liberal and conservative approaches.  
  
Peterson (2002) maintains that the royal family’s control over the political sphere and 
its upper hand over the distribution of oil income enable some of its members to abuse 
national trust and to enjoy more privileges than the ordinary citizens. For example, the 
Al Saud family produces the most senior members of the government, including the 
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King, the Crown Prince, the Deputy Crown Prince and the Minister for Defence. 
Younger members of the royal family tend to be more liberal, but they are guaranteed a 
certain standard of life as well as some public posts even if they lack the skills, 
experience and discipline.  
 
The increasing royal privileges and the ban on political participation makes some 
Saudis (Ibid) feel that the royal family is a burden on the state, but the vast funds and 
the religious use of Wahhabism enable the government to bypass the social unrest that 
manifests in various events. This authoritarian model of governance results in a stable 
state, but it slows development because of the bans on political parties, freedom of 
speech and freedom of assembly. 
 
Finally, it is important to point out that the Saudi political structure has recently been in 
a state of flux. This was especially true when the current King enabled his son – the 
current Crown Prince to collect an endless number of public titles such as Deputy Prime 
Minister, Minister of Defence and leader of the Economic Council in the Kingdom. This 
new concentration of power in his hands has stripped power from the other young 
princes who inherited their posts from their fathers, and therefore we can see the gradual 
disappearance of the ‘states within the state’ concept described by Al-Rasheed (2008). 
The current Crown Prince, Mohammad Bin Salman, depends on the royal power of his 
father to concentrate this power in his hands. This affects the structure of the Saudi 
media industry in that some of its parts were sponsored by different princes.  
 
           The Regulatory State of YouTube-Based Programming 
 
The Saudi media system is based on governmental licensing, which regulates media 
outlets and the actions of journalists to create a press that supports the policies of the 
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state (Duffy, 2014). This results in a restrictive media environment (World Press 
Freedom Index, 2016) in which no media outlets, such as television, radio and 
newspapers, can be launched from within Saudi territory without the permission of the 
state. The concept of licensing prevails because it positions the state – the Ministry of 
Culture and Information – as an intermediary responsible for approving any media 
activities, including online media, in order to purify the culture before it is permitted to 
be circulated to the public (Green and Karolides, 2005). 
 
However, the rapid and widespread growth of YouTube-based programmes as a means 
of electronic information transmission creates the possibility of free movement for 
information and the interpretation of news without being regulated by the Ministry of 
Culture and Information, which introduces a degree of complexity in analysing online 
programmes in the restrictive media environment of Saudi Arabia.  
 
The YouTube-based programmes were launched spontaneously, as was explored in 
Chapter Four, but they were able to attract the attention of young audiences and to gain 
momentum (BBC Middle East, 2016) because of the bold and different nature of the 
content compared to that of traditional television programming. The programmes went 
through experimental stages and they developed quickly to become more fragmented; 
for example, there came to be talk show programmes that comment on the coverage of 
Saudi newspapers and TV broadcasts, and dramas that reflect the struggles of the Saudi 
youth.   
 
The growth of the content and the programmes, which are produced by youth for youth, 
pose a regulatory conundrum: the youth are breaking away from the monopoly of 
traditional media that operates as a part of Saudi public policy (Hammond, 2007).   
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When the interviewees were asked about the regulatory state of their programmes, they 
articulated various contradictory and different views. For instance, the first indicates 
that “you produce YouTube [programmes] and you do not know who your reference 
point is and to which governmental department you belong” (Mohammad Bazaid, 
presenter and co-founder of MadTomato, 2016). However, the second interviewee 
reveals a slightly different point of view: 
 
Of course [YouTube is regulated] but not actively There is general media regulation, but 
a law to organize internet content was about to be issued… I think it’s difficult since the 
internet is like the sea and the process of its arrangement is difficult. (Abdulmajeed 
Alkenani, co-founder and presenter of SceenTV, 2016) 
 
The third interviewee offers yet another suggestion regarding the regulatory state of 
YouTube: “I do not think the Ministry of Information is interested in regulating [our 
YouTube programmes] because they perceive it as a healthy situation [for society]” 
(Malik Nejer, co-founder and art director of Myrkott Animation Studio, 2016).  
 
These views indicate the uncertainty and the ambiguity around the legality of these 
online programmes as the content creators are unable to offer coherent and 
comprehensive interpretations of the regulatory status of their work. This regulative 
flexibility of the Saudi government, given its record in dominating the media (Boyd, 
1982; and Sakr, 2007), the Saudi government’s regulative flexibility is surprising, 
allowing as it does the dissemination of creative and critical ideas on the YouTube 
platform.   
 
This thesis speculates that there are three potential explanations behind the flexibility of 
the state in relation to YouTube-based programmes. First, it might be the case that the 
Saudi state does not perceive the phenomenon as a serious challenge to the established 
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system of information – national radio, television and newspapers – all of which are 
controlled. Instead, it conceives them as a new extension of other platforms like blogs 
or social networks sites, which might have little effect offline. Second, while the public 
use of the internet might pose some potential challenges to the regime (Kalathil and 
Boas, 2003), the possibility of the production of critical political content against the 
royal family or other key figures is unlikely because the programmes are produced 
within the Saudi territories, where producers have to take this into consideration; in 
other words, the government may expect the content creators to practice self-censorship. 
Third, authoritarian governments including Saudi Arabia’s control the physical 
components of the internet and ICT infrastructure, which means they have total control 
over the nation’s network domain in case they need to react to any critical content 
(Schmidt and Cohen, 2013).  
 
In moving towards youth perspectives, the main theme that emerges from the above 
quotes is the centrality of the Saudi authority in the thoughts of Saudi content creators; 
they are aware that they are bypassing the traditional regulatory gatekeeper that should, 
in theory, authorize their content. The vocabulary used by the interviewees, such as 
reference point, indicates the social power of the state over the culture of production; in 
a subtle way, the producers do not exclude the state factor from their calculations. This 
is embedded with meanings about the wider socio-political culture and the dynamics of 
interactions between authority and the youth. What is clear is that the notion of the state 
is still essential when it comes to investigating YouTube-based programmes in non-
democratic practices in Saudi Arabia.   
 
The quotes also reveal the content creators’ political awareness regarding the difficulty 
that the government can face in governing and regulating global, decentralized 
platforms such as YouTube. Young people, therefore, understand the politics of their 
production and they allow themselves to fall under the general media regulations in the 
country, but by taking another approach that pushes the cultural, legal and political 
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constraints in attempts to express their values. The content creators also build on their 
day-to-day experience to speculate and read the political context of their programmes. 
For instance, one of the interviewees suggests that the Ministry of Culture and 
Information has deliberately left the field of YouTube and other social media platforms 
as a window for youth to express themselves. However, this also helps the state to learn 
about the needs of the youth segment. While this assumption represents the personal 
view of the interviewee, it signals his ability to read the developments of the 
phenomenon and, more importantly, to realize the margin of freedom that producers can 
have or probably create for themselves in this context.   
 
Another point that emerges from these three quotes is the struggle of youth to embark 
on their online programmes without going through the bureaucratic process of obtaining 
permission to film in public, for which legal permission is required (KFTB, 2017.) 
Young people find themselves, apparently, in a middle ground where their programmes 
do not fit neatly within the category of traditional media outlets that need licenses.  
  
The production of online programmes requires physical places and tools such as studios, 
lighting, cameras and editing laboratories to produce and circulate content within the 
public domain of Saudi Arabia. Filming in public is not authorized without permission, 
which makes such activities a logistical struggle. Saudi filmmakers, for instance, need 
to work around the rules to shoot films in Saudi Arabia (Aftab, 2016).  
 
This thesis argues that this shift in the cultural behaviour of youth towards the media 
regulatory body is a significant and subtle move that might require a considerable 
change in the practice of Saudi media regulations, especially with the influential rise of 
digital penetration and convergence. YouTube-based programming and filmmaking 
should introduce subsequent relaxation and modernization to Saudi media regulations if 
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the regulatory body seeks to evolve in a way that is relative to the digital norms and 
cultures. 
  
Although the legal uncertainty has some advantages related to establishing the online 
programmes as discussed above, the general political culture has overshadowed the 
practices of some content creators who seek to obtain permission for their programmes 
to avoid any risk associated with producing content. For example, “I had verbal 
approval from the Ministry of Culture and Information” (Safana Sejini, presenter and 
freelancer copywriter, 2016).   
 
This quote affirms the above analysis in relation to the centrality of authority in the 
practices of the Saudi youth, where some of them attempt to gain permission in order to 
hopefully avoid any potential threats from the state. Such an attempt is indicative of a 
cautious culture when it comes to participating in public events.  
 
The legal uncertainty and the centrality of authority have implications that shape the 
process and mechanisms of production for YouTube-based programmes. This thesis 
suggests two typologies to describe the outcomes which have emerged from this legal-
authority paradox. The typologies are the culture of connections and the culture of 
exploration.  
 
The culture of connections describes a situation in which some content creators seek 
permission for their YouTube-based programmes by relying on their personal networks 
in order to cover themselves in the absence of a clear regulatory framework. For 
instance, the quote above reflects this culture as the interviewee has sought verbal 
approval for her programme, which is a problematic and unofficial mechanism to rely 
on.  
 
 
162 
 
The culture of exploration applies to content creators who establish their YouTube-
based programmes without any attempt to seek permission to produce and circulate the 
content. Instead, they are more explorative, spontaneous and keen to be part of the 
developing culture of YouTube-based programmes.  
 
These typologies show that the uncertain behaviour of the Ministry of Culture and 
Information, in terms of the regulations, creates multiple views and practices among the 
Saudi content creators. However, the flexibility of the regulatory situation helps in 
disseminating and circulating online content that offers a new perspective which differs 
from that of traditional media outlets. These circumstances lead content creators to be 
cautious about their content, and subsequently they apply a form of self-regulation 
which is examined in the next section.  
 
  Self-Regulation as A Response to The Uncertainty 
 
The uncertain legal situation around YouTube-based programmes has prevailed for 
some time and content creators have interpreted the situation differently. The main 
theme that emerges here is self-regulation as a response to the uncertainty.  
 
This uncertainty is received maturely by a wide range of content creators who are 
apparently sensible, reasonable and sensitive in addressing societal and cultural issues 
in the country. They are aware of the political climate and the complexity of religion 
and culture in the context of Saudi Arabia. Such an understanding is evident in the 
following quote from Mando: “we understand the culture [and] we understand the 
country” (Abdullah Mando, co-founder and the first CEO of UTURN Entertainment 
Network, 2016).   
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As Mando suggests, this sense of having a localized model, whereby young people 
blend foreign platforms with indigenous and sensible Saudi content, informs the 
character of the programmes, opening a new window for the flow of information and 
providing new interpretations for Saudi youth online. The closed Saudi system of 
information (Duffy, 2014) becomes partly decentralised because of the bottom-up 
production approach of YouTube programmes.  
 
The quote signals the significance for content creators of being insiders who understand 
the sensitivity around certain taboos which, therefore, should enable them to address 
such matters responsibly. This gives them the advantage of being able to push the 
boundaries insightfully as their programmes reflect the lives of young people and they 
can read the reactions of the audience promptly. It can be argued that their programmes 
can be more influential than those of other international outlets that target the Saudi and 
Arab audience (Mellor, 2013) but which lack cultural relativity. The idea that the 
content creators understand the culture and the country matches the analysis in Chapter 
Four, which illustrated the propensity of creators to be critical of the middle and low 
levels of official agencies but not certainly of the higher levels of authority such as the 
King.  
 
This cultural sensitivity leads the content creators to apply the strategy of self-
censorship (Amin, 2002; and Khazen, 1999) in order to avoid unexpected consequences 
with societal and religious institutions or with the state. Abdullah Mando explains the 
rationale as to how his policy was developed: 
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[F]or Uturn Entertainment, we have our own internal policy that [determines] the type of 
content that we can create and [the] type of content that we cannot create; [and] how 
women appear in our content. (Abdullah Mando, co-founder and the first CEO of 
UTURN Entertainment Network, 2016) 
 
The strategy of self-censorship represents advanced, professional and restrained 
thinking on the part of the content creators, especially as there are no institutions to 
educate and equip the youth with the knowledge and skill-sets needed for media 
activities or to inform the editorial aspects of the programmes. The content creators 
overcome the logistical obstacles, showing creativity and leadership skills in their 
productions. However, it can be suggested that the culture of political fear (Amnesty 
International, 2017) encourages the content creators to naturally apply self-censorship 
and to be sensitive of the political and cultural complexity.  
 
This thesis argues that this notion of self-regulation, also known by euphemisms such as 
“internal filters” (Schmidt and Cohen, 2013), helps the online programmes to survive 
and expands the scale and scope of the newly established market, which has enabled the 
programmes to become such a popular phenomenon with audiences. This safe strategy, 
along with the popularity of YouTube-based programmes, increases the interest in this 
field and motivates new entrants to engage with this phenomenon, thereby widening the 
scale and the scope of the industry.   
 
The strategy of self-regulation means taking into consideration the cultural specificity of 
the Saudi setting in order to be able to sustain audience appeal. For example, as Mando 
puts it: 
 
[F]or our policy, we are very conservative in every sense, socially and religiously. So, 
although we believe we are pushing the boundaries somewhere, we always try to 
investigate how much we can do that. (Abdullah Mando, co-founder and the first CEO of 
UTURN Entertainment Network, 2016) 
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This careful and conservative approach, especially at the beginning of the YouTube-
based programme phenomenon, highlights the pragmatic strategy of limiting 
sensationalism to avoid upsetting certain powerful factions of Saudi society. Therefore, 
the self-censorship strategy enhances the development of YouTube-based programmes, 
including human resources and self-regulating skills, which results in a more solid 
presence for content creators. This thesis argues that by being aware of their culture and 
context, content creators are able to push the boundaries in certain directions, and this 
reflects a hidden political act intended to provoke societal and cultural changes. They 
acknowledge that there is a legal vacuum for YouTube in Saudi Arabia and, therefore, 
they see certain available opportunities which enable them to broadcast how they 
perceive their local society and culture.  
 
This self-regulation suggests that the Saudi content creators, who take every necessary 
step to avoid serious political controversy, employ this strategy to shield their business 
interests and to maintain the work flow of their productions. Gaining influence in 
society may be part of the agenda, but arguably it is not as essential as the commercial 
element (Ramsay and Fatani, 2016). 
 
Self-regulation can be interpreted differently by different content creators because they 
rely on their instinct and judgement, which are not always accurate. According to 
Bazaid, “I used my own common sense which, thank God, never let me down in the 
previous years” (Mohammad Bazaid, presenter and co-founder of MadTomato, 2016).  
Another example can be found in Nejer’s account: “we have our own intuition and [the 
team] always discuss our ideas before implementing them” (Malik Nejer, co-founder 
and art director of Myrkott Animation Studio, 2016).  
 
The common sense approach that several interviewees describe can help the content 
creators to continue producing acceptable critical content, but it is equally important to 
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observe that a misjudgement could trigger official censure because of the difference in 
the criteria of evaluation. The self-censorship strategy might serve the content creators 
sometimes, but questions could be raised about the sustainability of this strategy. In the 
absence of clear guidelines, Saudi content creators are risk-takers who do not know 
what potential consequences they might face. 
 
However, this thesis finds a general consensus amongst content creators when it comes 
to the interpretation of common sense that they apply to their content on YouTube. The 
content creators express contradictory views about the regulatory state of YouTube in 
Saudi Arabia, but they have clear stances on their limitations because of their 
understanding of the country and the culture. One of the interviewees defines the 
common sense as follows:  
 
Things that are not good to talk about using your real name…Common sense means you 
cannot talk about the King in any way, whether on YouTube or Twitter. It also means that 
you need to be aware of the public climate. For instance, there is currently a military 
operation in Yemen and it is not wise to speak against it or criticize it. (Mohammad 
Bazaid, presenter and co-founder of MadTomato, 2016) 
 
In general, this quote outlines the nexus between the public and the government in 
Saudi Arabia where the citizens, including YouTube content creators, are aware of their 
limitations and the areas that are off limits. This evidence enhances the analysis in 
Chapter Three, which suggested that the royal family has the power and, arguably, 
prestige in the eyes of the public, and that people do not direct their criticisms toward 
senior figures such as the King. Alternatively, they blame and criticise middle and low 
levels of authority for the shortcomings in the country. Whether it is driven by 
admiration for the King and the royal family or by fear of imprisonment, targeting 
senior officials is a taboo in Saudi Arabia. If it is possible to use YouTube-based 
programmes as a mirror to make sense of society, then those red lines are reflective of 
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the socio-political culture in the country that is common, not only amongst YouTube 
presenters but for the public as well.  
 
The military operation in Yemen is another taboo cited in the above quote as something 
that must not be criticized in the media. According to the Saudi narrative, the purpose of 
the 2015 Saudi intervention in Yemen was to restore the legitimate president of Yemen 
following a coup by an Iranian-backed group known as the Houthi militia. What is 
striking here is that content creators are very aware of how sensitive the regime is 
regarding this matter. Nevertheless, going to war without the approval of the public 
(because of the lack of an elected Parliament) but not accepting any sort of criticism 
reflects quite an extreme ideology. This has also been echoed in previous chapters when 
it has been stated that YouTube-based programmes offer a sense of liberalism to young 
people, but that they are very limited and controlled when it comes to national security 
issues such as the war in Yemen.  
 
Another interpretation of the meaning of self-regulation is introduced here: 
 
The red lines for us were not to attack any person online; you can critique but do not 
make it personal. We do not do anything that would harm the individual or the public. We 
have to be specifically respectful of the leaders of the country. (Abdullah Mando, co-
founder and the first CEO of UTURN Entertainment Network, 2016) 
 
Another interpretation is offered by another interviewee, who highlights that “we have 
red lines that we cannot cross like religion, religious figures, famous political figures 
and sexual matters” (Anonymous female participant, 2016).   
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Apart from showing respect and giving prestige to the leaders of the country, some 
producers develop guidelines to position themselves as professional content creators of 
YouTube (Kim, 2012) who seek to add value to the public by producing reasonable 
content that promotes harmony in society. They are willing to critique various societal 
issues, but in a manner that does not ignite negative consequences for communities. 
This shows that some producers are keen on focusing on ideas rather than making 
things personal, which reflects maturity and advanced editorial skill sets.  
 
Another developed editorial line for some YouTube-based programmes, as inspired by 
the American programme The Daily Show, is to critique, for instance, the council and 
similar public services based on news that has been reported by official newspapers in 
Saudi Arabia: “we make our content based on what is available in public. For example, 
in 3al6ayer [programme], the content we produce is based on published official 
newspapers. So our sources are already regulated” (Abdullah Mando, co-founder, and 
the first CEO of UTURN Entertainment Network, 2016).   
 
This technique is also reported by another participant. When they process the news and 
make humorous criticisms of low- and middle-level government agencies, the content 
creators shield themselves by using news that is already published and available in 
regional and national newspapers. Relying on regulated materials for the content of their 
programmes is a creative regulatory approach for the online programmes.  
 
The recycling of content, where the regulated written formats of newspapers have been 
transformed into visual and humorous content for YouTube, is another aspect of a self-
censorship approach by content creators. This enables them to produce novel and 
critical messages by transforming the content into a new medium and using simple 
language in order to target new audiences. One of the interviewees establishes a link 
between this type of programme and the newspaper industry in the country: “[self-
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censorship] applies for newspaper industry as well, where the editors use their own 
judgment as they craft the news” (Mohammad Bazaid, presenter and co-founder of 
MadTomato, 2016).  
 
According to his view, both newspapers and YouTube-based programmes share a 
certain degree of independence that allows them to make bolder comments and analysis 
relating to local issues related to the communities. The issue of judgement and self-
regulation continues to yield a variety of interpretations for content creators because it is 
not always possible to understand or predict the changeable mood of the authority. One 
of the aspects that is worth pointing out is that the editors-in-chief of Saudi newspapers 
usually enjoy good connections with the state because they are appointed and removed 
by the Ministry of Culture and Information (Sakr, 2006). Whilst it would be difficult to 
determine whether the CEOs of firms that produce YouTube-based programmes have 
any connections with the state or whether the government tries to influence or contain 
them, it still vital for them to realize the sensitivity of their context. 
 
In the next section, the thesis explores the behaviour and the reactions of the Saudi 
government towards the content of YouTube-based programming through the lens and 
experiences of content makers themselves. 
 
            Saudi Government Reactions 
 
The above analysis discussed issues related to the legality of YouTube-based 
programmes and how the Saudi content creators have reacted to this uncertainty by 
employing the strategy of self-regulation. This section now moves to explore how the 
Saudi government reacts to certain controversial content from the perspective of content 
creators themselves. 
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One could ask whether the decentralized network of the internet is governable by any 
state in the first place (Schmidt and Cohen, 2013). This thesis acknowledges that the 
government’s investment in digital and information technology infrastructure (Kaba and 
Said, 2014) has resulted in a great deal of connectivity and has also paved the path 
towards online growth and activism. The State owns the hardware components of the 
internet infrastructure and the Internet Service Provider of the country (ISP), which 
enables the authority, in theory, to control or halt the service, as happened in several 
neighbouring countries, such as Egypt, during the Revolution of 2011 (Arthur, 2011).  
 
Having said that, it could be asked why the state has not issued clear legalisation on the 
local practices of online activities, especially since this growth took place during the 
time of the uprisings in the Middle East. It can be argued that tightening its hand over 
the online sphere would invite unwanted international criticism. The state might have 
felt that although those YouTube-based programmes deal critically with issues, they do 
not constitute a threat to the Saudi throne, and hence it allowed a margin of freedom for 
young people.  
 
 
  Hard Measures Towards YouTube-Based Programmes 
 
The empirical analysis shows that the attitude of the Saudi government towards 
YouTube-based programming is unpredictable, varying in response to different types of 
content and different timeframes. For example, one YouTube presenter was imprisoned 
because of his programme’s coverage of poverty in the country, which has a massive 
amount of oil reserves (The Observer, 2011), but I have been unable to recruit him for 
this research. The imprisonment of this presenter reflects an aggressive response from 
the government to the coverage of issues that highlight shortcomings or poor 
governance.  
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In contrast, some participants state that the attitude of the government is relaxed and 
that this climate has encouraged them to produce more cultural goods. For example, 
“we have not received any complaint or criticism from any official entity regarding the 
nature of [our] content” (Anonymous female presenter, 2016).   
 
This is echoed by another interviewee who states that they were never subjected to any 
censorship from the government: 
 
We never received any official pressure or comments against us or the content, and we 
never removed any content because someone told us to do so. All we received was the 
advice of friends and family and their points of view. (Abdullah Mando, co-founder and 
the first CEO of UTURN Entertainment Network, 2016) 
 
Those quotes provoke several thoughts which need to be examined critically in terms of 
the relationship between the content creators and the government. This relatively 
relaxed attitude of the government represents an empirical insight which was not 
expected prior to this research. The image of Saudi Arabia in international media outlets, 
seemingly, is not associated with positive sentiments and its record on human rights is 
quite poor (Amnesty International, 2017).  
 
Yet the above quotes, which reflect the views of the production companies, not 
individual producers, describe a positive attitude from officials towards the content. 
YouTube can be accessed and it has never been blocked, which implies a certain degree 
of trust and prospect for the evolving market (see Chapter Three).  
 
This is what some content creators experience and it would be difficult to determine the 
core policy of the state if, indeed, it has any policy at all on this issue. One could ask 
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what makes some YouTube presenters subject to detention, especially at the beginning 
of the phenomenon, when covering poverty in the Kingdom, while other presenters are 
not subjected to the same treatment. It might be that the decision to imprison is subject 
to several factors such as the nature of the topic, the tone and the angle of coverage, the 
timeframe and its context, the novelty of the message and the method.   
 
Another potential motivation for the state, arguably, to allow YouTube-based 
programmes was discussed in Chapter Three. The lack of external activities is one of 
the drivers that encouraged young people to go online. As a result, it can be suggested 
that blocking this new window would cause anger and disappointment amongst the 
online communities, which are dominated by the youth.   
 
In addition, giving young people a chance to take the lead in creating a new online order 
and new business windows offers a micro-economic case study for online platforms in 
Saudi Arabia, which not only benefits the content creators but also contributes to 
limited job creation and attracts capital flow for young people. It is essential that this be 
considered given the rise in the unemployment rate in the country (Murphy, 2013). One 
of the advantages of letting the content creators do their work is that it plants the seeds 
for a national entertainment industry, which has a very humble infrastructure and lacks 
professional human resources, as discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
However, having mentioned the relaxed attitude, other interviewees suggest different 
views. One of the directors explains that one of the episodes of an online soap opera that 
depicts the religious police was banned. The authority mistakenly assumed that the 
episode had attempted to attack the role of the religious police and hence they blocked 
the episode before subsequently unblocking it. Mohammad Makki explains the 
circumstances surrounding the incident:  
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The authority blocked the episode without any notice and they did not contact the 
producer…nor the distributor, prior to the ban.  We were frightened that the issue might 
escalate but thankfully no one approached us. (Mohammad Makki, director of 
TakkiSeries and award-winning filmmaker, 2016) 
 
This quote indicates that the state is aware of the content of YouTube-based 
programmes and that they observe the influential contributions without imposing any 
regulations. However, the state is willing to intervene heavily without any notification 
or communication with those who invest considerable time and resources to create the 
content. It seems that state intervention is a possibility for content that is thought to 
contradict Saudi standards and norms, which is another vague and undefined notion.   
The block was possibly facilitated by the state’s monopoly, which enables it to control 
the internet and the entry point of data to the country through its ISP, and hence it does 
not require any communication with a third party to block local pages. This attitude 
delivers a clear message that the state is able to intervene whenever they think it is 
necessary to do so in order to protect the interest of the Saudi state and society from its 
point of view. 
  
Makki’s quote also reveals the deep anxiety and frustration felt by those who were 
involved in this episode; they feared that they could have been subjected to the state’s 
revenge for depicting the religious police negatively, especially in the aftermath of the 
previously discussed arrest one of the YouTube presenters. Nevertheless, no action was 
taken against them and they were not even approached because of this content.  
  
It has been explained previously that one YouTube presenter was arrested because he 
spoke about the poverty in the country, twisting the motto used by the late King 
Abdullah. However, in the incident described by Makki, the authorities were shown to 
have used another measure, which was to block the episode, and did not approach the 
cast or creators. It is not clear what criteria of evolution the state uses to determine its 
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reactions to controversial content. This behaviour reinforces the power of the state and 
highlights that the liberality brought in by social media platforms is not able to 
undermine the structure of governing (Ayish, 2001; and Kalathil and Boas, 2003), and 
that the state remains the most powerful actor in society.  
 
In addition, the attitude of the state in relation to YouTube-based programmes is also 
subject to various diplomatic interactions with Arabic embassies. One of the 
participants notes that:  
 
[The] producer of [our] programme received a letter from the Office of the Minister of 
the Interior [stating] that one of our episodes had an offence [towards Egypt] …due to its 
presenting an Egyptian character in a particular way. That happened after the Egyptian 
Consul made a complaint against us… We did not mean that, and we deleted the episode 
as we respect the laws and regulations. (Saeed Baeshen, actor in 8arwsha comedy series, 
2016) 
 
This extract suggests the complex dynamics that the content creators of YouTube-based 
programmes have to adapt to and to deal with during their engagement with content 
creation: for example, the lack of legal and regulatory systems, the unpredictable 
behaviour of the state itself and the unpredicted complaint by a diplomatic party such as 
the Egyptian Consul.   
 
Following this official warning, the content creators deleted the episode themselves; it 
was not deleted by the authorities. This warning and the content creators’ reaction to it 
illustrates a third pressure faced by content creators. Deleting the episode is one of the 
tangible consequences of this pressure, but the non-tangible effects are arguably more 
severe for the creators. For instance, apart from the expected climate of fear and 
frustration they experience, this security might limit their creative approach and their 
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freedom to choose or produce challenging content. The more constraints and obstacles 
they face, the more time they need to advance their progress.  
 
The section has explored how the Saudi government has responded differently to 
different content with no clear regulation strategy available to the public. The behaviour 
of the state is unpredictable and the content creators cannot be certain whether they 
have crossed lines or not. What emerges from the analysis is that the state imposed three 
different measures to respond to three different types of content. The measures are 
imprisonment, blocking the unwanted episode and sending letters from the Ministry of 
the Interior (equivalent to the Home Office) to notify the content creators that their 
material was inappropriate.  
 
Soft Measures Towards YouTube-Based Programmes 
 
The aim of this section is to analyse another theme that emerges in relation to the Saudi 
government’s reactions to YouTube-based programmes. While the previous section 
discussed hard measures imposed against certain types of content, this section explores 
the theme of soft measures applied by the state to contain the programmes.     
 
The concept of ‘states within the state’ in Saudi Arabia (Al-Rasheed, 2008) indicates 
the powerful influence of some senior princes on public policy in the absence of a 
written constitution and the lack of clear regulations under the absolute monarchy 
system. Consequently, the concept of ‘state’ in this context does not connote a steadfast 
meaning for this analysis because the nature of the Saudi governing structure, while 
obviously granting the King absolute power, also distributes influence amongst different 
bodies such as the Royal Court, the Ministry of the Interior, the National Guard and the 
Ministry of Culture and Information, each of which represents various interests for 
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different members of the royal family. In addition, there is the closeness of certain 
princes to the King; for instance, his son is given a massive amount of influence over 
public life. Each of these government bodies has a circle of influence, and each can 
intervene in public life, which makes it difficult to be certain about which entity, for 
example, imprisoned the presenter or blocked the episode of TakkiSeries.   
 
Within Saudi Arabia’s complex power system, the Ministry of the Interior is 
traditionally responsible for dealing with internal affairs that affect security and the 
harmony of society (MOI, 2017). The previous section also mentioned the role of the 
Ministry of the Interior in facilitating the complaint and warning the content creators 
about the potential diplomatic tensions that could result from the discussed episode of 
8arwsha. This shows the centrality of the Ministry in getting involved and guarding 
society (from its point of view), especially taking into account that the Minister of the 
Interior, Muhammad bin Nayef (MBN), was the Crown Prince between 2015 and 2017, 
when he was replaced by Mohammad Bin Salman, the son of the current King. 
 
This indeed suggests that the YouTube-based programmes are not solely simple cultural 
goods, but rather they have been perceived from a security perspective by those in 
power. Such security concerns are always an issue for non-democratic governments in 
the Middle East, shaping the growth and development of the country (Fandy, 2007).  
 
The heavy intervention of the state, especially at the beginning of the YouTube 
phenomenon, reflects the huge influence of young content creators who utilize this 
platform to express their views, critiques, aspirations and hopes for their community 
and country. This is a development that has not necessarily threatened the state, but it 
has at least caught its attention and raised some concerns about any potential 
applications in the youth community.  
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The government’s soft intervention takes different forms in order to indirectly influence 
content creators. For example, one of the influential princes of the royal family made a 
visit to the headquarters of UTURN Entertainment, one of the production houses 
making YouTube-based programmes in Saudi Arabia. According to Mando:  
 
Because UTURN Entertainment has a big impact, we were told that [Prince Mutaib bin 
Abdullah] was interested to see what the youth thinks and talks about, the concerns of the 
youth and the [their] needs, and also if he could support us in any way. (Abdullah Mando, 
co-founder and the first CEO of UTURN Entertainment Network, 2016) 
 
There are several critical findings to be highlighted here. First, the prince, seemingly, 
was very keen on visiting the content creators to get closer to them and to listen to their 
aspirations. This section argues that this visit was an attempt to contain the young 
programme makers, shaping their work and opening up channels with them. The visit 
could also be interpreted as a vehicle to contain the creative classes and shape them to 
restrain young people from engaging in any unwanted content by offering support and 
advice to them. 
 
Secondly, the visit from the prince, who was the son of the late King Abdullah at the 
time of the visit in 2012, reinforces the previous analysis of the complexity of Saudi 
power structures. Common sense suggests that the visit, if needed, should have been 
conducted by a related state agency or ministry such as the Ministry of Culture and 
Information, not by the prince who happens to be in charge of the National Guard.  
Being the son of the King granted him an enormous amount of influence over society 
and therefore this is one of the potential explanations for his engagement with the firm.  
 
This also shows a positive and good gesture from one member of the royal family 
towards young people and their contributions to the public sphere. The fact that he was 
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eager to get closer to them and to understand them is suggestive of a reformist step 
apparently based on personal preference and agenda rather than a structured and 
constitutionalized framework. When the producer involved was asked about the 
arrangement of the visit, he replied: 
 
The visit was requested by us. I and the co-founder of the company met the prince before 
privately [at a certain event] and our request was based on a recommendation by one of 
his advisors. When the prince visited us, we had a very nice chat and I was surprised how 
approachable and humble the prince was. (Abdullah Mando, co-founder and the first 
CEO of UTURN Entertainment Network, 2016) 
 
The quote provides further evidence that the visit was made to contain and shape the 
content of YouTube-based programmes. This visit was made in 2012, which is within 
the period of 2011-2013 when the content was highly critical and the political situation 
in surrounding Arab countries was dramatic. The stage from 2014-2016 was marked by 
less critical content and the growth of soft news in YouTube-based programmes, and 
consequently the state’s intervention almost ceased.   
 
It is unclear whether the critical level of the programmes was softened spontaneously or 
as a result of other factors, but this thesis suggests that the behaviour of the government 
towards the content and YouTube content creators might have contributed to this shift 
where the content has been framed by the State and it becomes less critical than before.  
In addition, another factor which could have contributed to this new shift was the 
recruitment of those presenters by commercial television to be part of their programmes, 
as analysed in Chapter Four. The system of television production also took in some 
content creators and pushed them to adhere to the editorial policy of television stations.  
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More evidence regarding soft measures was highlighted by one of the directors of the 
YouTube soap opera TakkiSeries:  
 
 As filmmakers in Jeddah we have good relationships with the Ministry of Culture and 
Information and they are very cooperative… There is a monthly meeting with the 
representatives of the Ministry where they discuss with us issues related to our needs… 
This was not the case four years ago. (Mohammad Makki, director of TakkiSeries and 
award-winning filmmaker, 2016) 
 
The quote shows how the prominent influence of filmmaking and YouTube-based 
programmes has attracted the attention of the authorities and encouraged them to deal 
with the emerging new cultural phenomenon by organizing activities, offering technical 
and logistical support and maximizing the benefit of Saudi content creators, which 
consequently shapes Saudi business and culture.   
 
This attitude differs from the previous one, which was apparently based on political and 
security considerations, whereas this currently focuses on technical and business aspects 
to promote and facilitate the creativity of Saudi filmmakers even though the cinema is 
not allowed in the country. Not all filmmakers engage with YouTube activities; most of 
them prefer to participate in international film festivals to showcase their work and gain 
global recognition (Simon, 2016).   
 
Finally, this containing behaviour of the state highlights that the authorities are very 
keen to set up direct communication channels with influential content creators to shape 
their direction instead of relying completely on traditional censorship mechanisms 
discussed by Wojcieszak (2007) and Gehlbach and Sonin (2014). This behaviour 
arguably results in severe self-censorship of content. This analysis meets the view of 
Zayani (2015), who suggests that non-democratic governments tolerate the internet and 
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the free flow of information as long as it does not challenge the regime. By containing 
the content creators through various hard and soft measures, the state ensures that the 
content does not pose serious a challenge to its authority.   
 
             Conclusion  
 
This analysis has answered the research question that focuses on the relationship 
between the Saudi government and YouTube-based programmes, and the reactions of 
the government to critical content. 
 
It began by exploring the regulatory framework of YouTube-based programmes, 
highlighting that the programmes operate in an uncertain regularity context, which 
could make them subject to the caprices of the government. This leads them to develop 
a self-regulation strategy that is sensitive to the political and cultural specificity of Saudi 
Arabia. It then discussed the attitude of the government towards the critical content. 
This chapter has conceptualized the mechanisms developed by the state to control the 
programmes as a containing strategy. This concept has resulted in two emergent themes: 
hard measures (imprisonment, blocking the discussed episode and sending notification 
letters) and soft measures (a prince’s visit to a production house and periodic meetings 
between representatives of the Ministry of Culture and Information and filmmakers).  
 
The chapter found that the legal vacuum in which the programmes operate has two 
implications. First, the uncertainty has left room for varying interpretations, and this has 
served as a catalyst to boost the quality and the quantity of programmes without the 
content creators seeking the media licensing required for content produced within Saudi 
Arabia. The government’s apparently relaxed attitude is surprising for a state that is 
well known for its restrictive media environment (Amnesty International, 2017). On the 
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other hand, the ambiguity has left content creators vulnerable to the state’s reactions and 
its interpretation of the critical content because they do not know whether they have 
crossed lines or not.  
 
The content creators took advantage of the poor regulation system and the state as the 
Ministry of Culture and Information seemingly allowed the phenomenon to grow, 
which is a positive sign. Relaxing the rules and decentralizing the system might be 
promising signs for the future of content creators, but more observation is needed to 
monitor the development.  
 
However, the positive behaviour of the state has its limitations. As might be expected, it 
shows little tolerance for critical content; for example, content that addresses poverty in 
the wealthy country. The main finding here is that the Saudi government does not allow 
any cultural or political interpretations that oppose the official narrative or incite public 
anger, such as investigations of poverty or criticism of the war on Yemen. This is highly 
problematic because it offers no clear system of evaluation for the content creators, 
while the state maintains absolute power over public life.    
 
The reaction of the Saudi government has been subject to various factors, including the 
nature of content, the context and the timeframe of YouTube-based programmes. The 
hard measures taken, such as imprisonment and blocking content, can exacerbate the 
culture of fear amongst the content creators, causing them to avoid critical political 
content and apply self-censorship, as revealed in the analysis. This finding is consistent 
with the argument of Freedman (2008), who states that censorship is seen as one of the 
hallmarks of authoritarian regimes; where media content is subject to formal and 
informal pressures from governments, pressure groups and corporations which seek to 
minimize materials which might be perceived as damaging to the regime’s agenda.  
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The chapter argues that the perception of YouTube-based programmes or social media 
platforms in general as alternative channels with which to promote democracy and 
freedom is quite misleading. For Saudi content creators, their work has had limited 
effective outcomes, and it has had little considerable effect on the public life of youth.  
Because the state is capable of intervening and blocking any unwanted material, the 
lack of clear regulations has not meant that Saudi content creators are able to work with 
total editorial freedom. 
 
It seems that claims related to voicing alternative opinions or democratising youth 
might only apply to soft news and entertainment-related content, not to the critical 
political and cultural content that is produced by recognized groups such as the content 
creators of YouTube. The programmes have not critically affected the regulatory and 
political structure of the country. The internet might present alternative voices for 
individuals online, but this is different from the case of the recognized work of 
YouTube-based programmes.  
 
Finally, the Saudi social media field suffers from the massive ambiguity that results in 
its having no clear and agreed interpretations of what is acceptable or unacceptable 
practice for individuals. The Saudi state is the most powerful actor in society and it 
seems there is no sign of any radical media changes, even in the wake of the 
introduction of the Saudi Vision 2030 plan, which was mentioned previously. The 
content creators need to take into account the sensitivity of the state regarding certain 
issues, or alternatively they can focus on humour and entertainment content to avoid the 
direct intervention of the government.  
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Chapter Six: The Audience Perspective on YouTube-Based 
Programming 
 
            Introduction 
 
The thesis now shifts its focus towards the audience by drawing upon the findings of 
semi-structured focus group interviews in order to understand the young audience 
member's perspectives. This chapter seeks to address the fourth research question, 
which considers the reasons behind the popularity of YouTube-based programming 
amongst the Saudi audience.   
 
The field of audience research has historically received little attention in Arab academia 
and it has mainly theorized the Arab audience as a passive group that is subject to 
Western media outlets (Mellor, 2013 and Livingstone, 2015). Chapter One discussed 
the conceptual developments of the audience; for instance, the contributions of Webster 
(1998), Alasuutari (1999), Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998) and Meikle and Young 
(2012) help in theorizing the analysis of focus group interviews in terms of the 
interactive nature of the young audience. The literature review also demonstrated the 
state of Arab audience research (Boyd, 1982; Sakr, 2007; and Kraidy, 2008) to highlight 
the political and logistical difficulties associated with conducting this type of research.   
 
The chapter explores two main themes which emerged from the focus group interviews 
with Saudi audience members; these themes will be conceptualized as representative 
choices and the localism of YouTube-based programming. Each theme contains two 
categories to be analysed and investigated.  
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The first section analyses the theme of representative choices provided by YouTube-
based programming. Its two categories are meaningful diversity and the content’s 
temporal order. The second section investigates the localism of YouTube-based 
programming as a significant force in drawing the audience’s attention to the 
programmes. This theme also has two categories: cultural relativity and technological 
novelty.  
 
The analysis draws on the audience’s beliefs, thoughts and experiences, which cannot 
be meaningfully represented using a statistical approach. The focus group interview 
method encourages young people to tell stories about YouTube content, how they 
perceive it, how they see it and how they react to it. Chapter Two outlined in detail the 
process of conducting focus group interviews and carrying out transcription, translation 
and analysis. I conducted seven semi-structured focus group interviews with 29 
participants in total. As for the segmentation, there were five Saudi male focus groups 
and two Saudi female focus groups. 
 
The focus group respondents were required to be familiar with at least one Saudi 
YouTube-based programme in order to be able to draw upon their personal experience 
and engage in the debate about the research problem. As the empirical data shows, a 
large number of the participants were easily able to name several YouTube-based 
programmes and discuss them passionately and controversially. However, a very small 
minority of participants were able to name only one local YouTube programme, and 
this was particularly common among the female respondents.  
 
 Several sources from business literature (Al-Arabiya, 2012; Smith, 2013; and Kerr, 
2014) highlight the large number of YouTube views from within Saudi Arabia, which 
makes the country the biggest per capita consumer of YouTube in the world. The 
academic literature – for example, (Zayani, 2012 and Mellor, 2013) – shows the lack of 
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in-depth qualitative research aimed at understanding the Arab audience and the 
dynamics of the Arab media landscape as that audience perceives it. This chapter seeks 
to respond to that gap in order to contribute to the development of the literature, using 
the Saudi YouTube audience as a case study. 
  
 
            The Representative Choices of YouTube-Based Programming 
 
Representative choice is one of the main themes that emerged out of the discussions 
with the focus group participants. It is an overarching theme dealing with the 
meaningful diversity of content and the audience’s temporal control over that content, 
options which had not previously been available within the Saudi media context. 
 
The analysis agrees with Lynch (2006) that the choices of television content do not 
meet the demands of the audience, particularly compared with YouTube-based 
programmes, which provide audiences with representative choices. For instance, 
YouTube programmes highlight social issues that relate to young people such as 
employment, housing, gender issues, technology and comedy (Ramsay and Fatani, 
2016).  
 
The first section explores the programmes’ diversity, outlining the wide range of critical 
political, cultural, societal and entertainment programmes available to the youth 
audience. These programmes, especially during 2011-2012, were unique in their 
willingness to break the norms of local media productions by highlighting what had 
been traditionally known as taboos.  
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The second section presents the temporal order available to the Saudi audience because 
of the technological features of the platform. It shows the attitude of the audience that 
favours YouTube programmes over television. It explores a new trend relating to the 
relationship between the content and viewers’ perceptions of time spent watching the 
content.  
 
The Meaningful Diversity of the Programmes as an Aspect of Representative Choices 
 
In this first section, the vast majority of the participants were familiar with a number of 
YouTube-based programmes, and the findings of these interviews show that some of 
them can be considered fans of the programmes and even of the presenters or actors. 
For instance, a number of respondents were able to offer accounts of their favourite 
YouTube programmes: 
 
I like Sa7i channel because it has a variety of programmes related to youth. For example, 
social programmes tackle issues that the citizens suffer form. This presents the problem in 
a funny way that may relieve people. (44-year-old male PhD student, 2016) 
 
SceenTV is a special [YouTube Channel] for me because it produces scientific 
programmes and documentaries. It is my favourite because of its diversity and its 
purposeful content with light comedy. (31-year-old male university student, 2016) 
 
  
I watch YouTube on a daily basis and the first Saudi YouTube channel that I look for is 
UpToDate by Faisal Alsaif. It is a technological channel that offers technological content 
where it reviews mobiles and the new technology in the world, especially the CES 
exhibition in Los Angeles. (26-year-old male teaching assistant in a Saudi university, 
2016) 
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These quotes are notable because they showcase the ability of the participants to offer a 
great deal of detail about the content and nature of the programmes. Some viewers can 
be regarded as fans, which reinforces the shift in young audience’s tastes towards online 
representative programmes and away from traditional TV shows, especially in 
authoritarian contexts where the mainstream media is subject to tight censorship 
(Wojcieszak, 2007; and Al-Obaidi, 2007) which can affect the quality of the output 
(Lynch, 2006).   
 
This shift is made evident by the participants’ emphasis that they are always connected 
to YouTube, which implies the centrality of the platform for them. What is unique here 
is not only the association of YouTube with the youth segment, but their deep 
engagement with local programmes that address their concerns and aspirations. 
According to one participant, “the presenters are close to our age, and they face the 
same problems we face. Their way of thinking is similar to ours. They speak on our 
behalf” (18-year-old male university student, 2016).  
 
In a country where the young citizens lack access to public cinema and theatres, 
YouTube-based programmes could be seen as a catalyst to establish some form of a 
domestic entertainment industry for the audience. Nevertheless, YouTube offers greater 
freedom in terms of what can be said and how it can be said (Strangelove, 2011), 
bypassing the state and privately owned media outlets. The high engagement of the 
respondents indicates that the appeal of YouTube programmes is prominent. It reflects 
the need of young audiences for locally relevant content that is produced by people who 
understand their culture, speak their language and are aware of their needs and struggles.    
 
The participants reveal their closeness to specific YouTube figures by mentioning, for 
example, the name of YouTube presenter Faisal Alsaif. This established relationship 
between the sender and the receiver is a positive indicator that builds the fan bases of 
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certain shows. It enhances the analysis of Chapter Three, which highlighted the 
influence and privilege that YouTube presenters can have in their communities, which 
echoes Turner’s (2010) analysis of the emergence of new online starts. This content by 
Saudi youth for Saudi youth represents a major shift in the media landscape, driving the 
interest of the audience unprecedentedly and widening their media consumption options.   
 
The diversity of YouTube-based programming has important implications for the way 
Saudis consume media. Some of the participants indicate that: 
 
I feel that the TV channels have been replaced by YouTube as on the TV you have to wait 
for the programme whereas on YouTube you have many choices and you choose what you 
want to watch. (18-year-old male university student, 2016) 
 
Another respondent highlights that: “YouTube is better as I can control the time and the 
place of watching and these are the most important [features]” (19-year-old female 
university student, 2016). Another interviewee states that: 
 
 I have abandoned TV… [YouTube] contains all the content I follow so it becomes my 
primary reference since all people present on YouTube and all the programmes can be 
easily uploaded to it. (33-year-old male PhD student, 2016) 
 
These were some of the respondents who expressed their preference for watching 
YouTube programmes rather than TV shows and therefore sought to engage more 
actively with online platforms. While this behaviour represents the new global trend 
among young audiences (Lange, 2007; and Burgess and Green, 2009), these comments 
suggest further insights when read within the context of Saudi Arabia.  
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The above quotes emphasise the notion of choice that YouTube delivers for the 
audience, but television is also capable of delivering various choices. What these 
comments demonstrate is that YouTube-based programmes produce representative 
choices which engage with young people and echo their concerns, aspirations and hopes, 
unlike the mainstream media outlets that are owned by the Saudi state or its associated 
investors (Kraidy, 2013; and Sakr, Skovgaard-Petersen and Ratta, 2015). What can be 
understood from these comments is that the choices offered by television were not 
valued highly by the youth audience.  
 
Addressing issues that are related to young audiences in Saudi Arabia is a central notion 
that drives massive traffic for these programmes, but more importantly the competitive 
environment has increased the quantity of programmes and therefore delivered more 
genuine choice for viewers online. Here, the notion of choice means more diverse and 
relevant programmes for the youth; innovative and brave ideas that shed light upon 
some taboos in Saudi society; introducing new online figures and presenters (Turner, 
2010); and new modes of production (Doyle, 2012). The nature of the content and its 
diversity has empowered the audience to choose their programmes, especially in the 
early days of YouTube in Saudi Arabia from 2010 to 2012, when the quantity of 
programming was expanding.  
   
The notion of choice can reflect an unspoken desire for freedom and change amongst 
young Saudi audiences. The online choice of cultural products resonates with the youth 
audience, suggesting that they enjoy the sense of pluralism offered to them by 
YouTube-based programming. This has implications for Saudi policy makers regarding 
the needs and aspirations of their young citizens to create and participate in a culture of 
pluralism in the country, especially during the economic challenges that face the Saudi 
government in the wake of the oil price decline of 2015 onwards.  
 
 
 
190 
 
Another dimension relating to the concept of representative choices is the 
differentiation of the participants between YouTube-based networks and YouTube-
based programmes. This acknowledgement by audiences suggests an advanced level of 
awareness and engagement because they are able to distinguish between individual 
YouTube programmes, which are produced on their own, and YouTube channels that 
consisted of several programmes that are produced by production corporations or teams 
in a similar way to television.  
  
One of the respondents differentiates between a YouTube channel that produces a 
number of programmes and another independent programme that operates 
individually:  
 
I watch Sa7i channel continuously and another programme called 8arwasha [drama 
series] if you come across it. It is a comedy and satire that I am really into. (25-year-old 
male university student, 2016) 
 
Another participant names a number of programmes for one of the channels:  
 
Sa7i channel offers a wide range of programmes. For example, they have Free Kick and 
Broadcast Show … There are also other individual programmes that offer specific 
content like learning English or Islamic preaching. I think people move between these 
programmes and channels. (26-year-old male university student, 2016) 
 
These statements tell us something about the respondents’ closeness to YouTube 
content as they were able to explain their preferences by, for example, identifying 
certain channels and their various programmes. This shows a greater level of 
engagement because reveals an understanding of the difference between YouTube-
based channels and YouTube-based programmes. YouTube-based channels have more 
developed and advanced modes of production, but more importantly they reflect the 
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sophisticated level of audiences who are well aware of this unspoken subtle 
development. This further enhances the centrality of YouTube’s content amongst the 
Saudi online public.  
 
Nevertheless, the focus group interviews reveal that the vast majority of those with 
limited interest in YouTube-based programmes are the female participants. They are 
aware of the general concepts and practices of YouTube’s content, but it is difficult for 
them, for instance, to name several programmes or channels. In most cases, they are 
able to name one programme or the names of a few presenters, unlike their male 
counterparts, who tend to be more engaged with YouTube-based programmes in general.  
Here are some quotes from across the focus groups that demonstrate the above issues:  
 
Our taste is different from the taste of the children, as the quality of some videos is not 
that elegant and their focus is only on comedy and laughing. They want to make people 
laugh by any means, which may be hackneyed so I don’t watch them. (31-year-old female 
PhD student, 2016) 
 
 I rarely watch YouTube-based programmes. I [only] watch them if one of my friends has 
sent me a link and asked me to watch it. (20-year-old female university student, 2016) 
 
It depends on the topic. I follow the programmes on YouTube if I have free time. (23-year-
old female university student, 2016) 
 
The general impression from these comments is that the Saudi female participants are 
less drawn to the vibe of YouTube-based programming and that it is not their priority to 
invest their time extensively in watching and following the most recent episodes of 
YouTube-based programmes. This view is shared by several women from different ages 
and backgrounds and this deserves more examination.  
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The first quote above suggests that the participant perceives YouTube-based 
programmes as being suitable only for a younger segment (e.g. children), which differs 
from the perceptions of other participants. Her comment presents a personal judgement 
which professes lack of interest and a limited level of enthusiasm for the programmes 
by linking them to poor quality and the absence of value for her. She positions her 
stance as being representative of women by saying ‘our taste’ to differentiate the 
interests of Saudi women from those of Saudi men.  
 
One potential explanation for Saudi women’s lack of interest is the absence of Saudi 
females in the production process of YouTube-based programming, which is dominated 
by men, as Chapter Three pointed out. This lack of female input may have contributed 
to female viewers’ disinterest because the taste and mode of men’s productions might 
not be capable of delivering content that interests female viewers; in short, the 
programmes’ content may be too male-oriented.   
 
It seems that the struggle for young people in Saudi Arabia has two dimensions: first, 
the exclusion of the Saudi youth in general from the decision-making process, and 
secondly the particular struggle of young women in the country (Global Gender Gap 
Report, 2016). This has culturally affected the production and the consumption patterns 
of Saudi women when it comes to YouTube-based programmes. This section argues 
that the continued absence of women in the process of production has resulted in their 
limited interest as an audience. Chapter Three demonstrated the challenges that some 
Saudi female presenters faced socially and culturally, which can serve as a catalyst for 
limiting female participation either as producers or consumers.  
 
So far, the above analysis has examined one aspect of the representative choices theme 
by exploring the diversity of YouTube-based programmes as an attractive feature for 
the youth audience. This representative choice is reflected in the programmes that relate 
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to the everyday lives and concerns of the Saudi youth. The section has also 
differentiated between individual-centric programmes and genre-centric programmes. It 
also highlighted the stance of women as an audience and their views regarding 
YouTube-based programming.   
 
In the following section, the analysis will consider another aspect of representative 
choices, the temporal control of the young Saudi audience, before moving on to shed 
light upon the duration of online consumption for Saudis.  
 
 
 Temporal Control as an Aspect of Representative Choices 
 
This thesis affirms that when engaging and interacting with YouTube-based 
programmes, the interconnectivity features of social media platforms play a significant 
role in spreading and sharing content. The audience does not exclusively watch the 
content via the platform of YouTube itself, but through the various connected platforms 
that allow the sharing and exchanging of the content online.  
 
The following quotes from interviewees explain their behaviour in relation to the 
consumption of Saudi content on YouTube: 
 
I usually watch the content using my phone and sometimes when I log into my Instagram 
account, I may click the links I find. In addition, I receive the links via WhatsApp and this 
is easier than watching on the computer, especially when I’m on my way to my university. 
(18-year-old male university student, 2016) 
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I watch the new episodes via [YouTube] channels that I have subscribed to and I watch 
the videos suggested by YouTube…[using] my laptop…and my iPad. (33-year-old male 
university student, 2016) 
 
In front of me, I have my laptop while I work on my … project and at the same time the 
TV is behind my back. In addition, my iPad is next to me to be able to watch the videos on 
YouTube. (31-year-old male university student, 2016) 
 
These comments represent various devices and methods for watching the Saudi online 
content. In the last quote, the respondent describes the position of the television as being 
“behind my back”, which reflects that the priority of TV comes behind the platform of 
YouTube for some young Saudi consumers. This also represents the rhetorical position 
that television has not succeeded in getting the attention of Saudi young audiences 
(Lynch, 2006). This behaviour of leaving the television set in the background is not 
exclusive to Saudi audiences; it matches global studies that address the position of 
television in the everyday lives of audience members. For instance, while TV still plays 
important roles in people lives, some audiences reinforce the belief that watching 
television itself is less worthy of their time than other pursuits (Boyle and Kelly 2012).  
 
In the Saudi case, however, television seems less important for the youth audience 
because of the lack of content to attract them, and not because the medium itself is 
inherently less worthy of their time. In fact, the findings in the following section 
highlight that Saudi audiences watch online content longer than what several studies 
suggest when it comes to youth consumption patterns, so the issue of time investment 
for the Saudi youth is not of major significance. As a result, the lack of attractive TV 
content (Lynch, 2006) for young audiences can enhance the notion of this thesis that the 
Saudi youth favour Saudi YouTube content over Saudi mainstream television content. 
Their preference for YouTube over television is not because of a lack of time, but rather 
because of the failure of television to keep up with the aspirations, needs and interests 
of young Saudi audiences.  
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While the above quotes highlight the different devices used to access content online (e.g. 
laptops, iPads), the first comment draws attention to the easy connectivity of content 
which was made available following the technological development of smartphones and 
applications (Leurs, 2015). The content is made to fit the standard YouTube platform 
but the quote highlights that the content or the link can be shared through various 
platforms and applications, such as Instagram and WhatsApp. This sharable feature is 
one of the main factors that has made the content of Saudi YouTube very popular and 
appealing, along with those factors that were analysed in Chapter Three about concerns 
of youth participation in the public sphere and representation issues.  
 
One point that was often mentioned across all different focus groups is the considerable 
amount of time that the audience invests in watching local content on YouTube. While 
the different respondents were not in agreement upon certain dimensions that relate to 
the content itself, the findings show that there was a tendency among the vast majority 
of them to agree on the preferred length of the content of YouTube. The vast majority of 
respondents assert that ten minutes on average is an acceptable duration for an episode. 
For instance: 
 
Ten minutes and less is appropriate but I watched a Saudi YouTube-based programme 
whose episodes lasted between eighteen and twenty minutes and it was very nice. (17-
year-old male university student, 2016) 
 
 For comedy and social programs, [I think] ten minutes’ video is excellent. (18-year-old 
male university student, 2016) 
 
[T]en minutes is good for me. More than this would be boring. (26-year-old male 
university student, 2016) 
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These excerpts signify interesting findings as they show the willingness of young 
audiences to follow programmes and watch content on YouTube for considerably 
longer periods of time than several commercial and academic studies have suggested, 
for instance, Newman (2010). It also shows the correlation between the content and the 
perception of time online; the audience is willing to spend longer on YouTube for 
specific genres. The thesis argues that the Saudi case has unique characteristics and 
circumstances that make it different from what other studies have shown.  
 
This tendency towards the pattern of longer periods of consumption on YouTube might 
have several explanations. First, the amount of time available to the young audience is a 
significant driver that acts as a catalyst for the growth of online consumption. Khalil 
(2010) points out that the issue of Al-faragh – an Arabic term which means free time or 
leisure time available to young citizens – is prominent amongst young Saudi citizens. 
The Saudi population is relatively young, with 65% of the population between 15 and 
54 years old (World FactBook, 2016), and this further enhances the growth of online 
consumption.   
 
Secondly, the lack of outdoor activities and social spaces available to young citizens in 
the country has pushed them towards online space to replace the lack of offline spaces. 
For example, the ban on cinema halls, at the time of writing, provides the content 
creators with tremendous opportunities to establish their presence in the online 
community. However, this factor seems to also be one of the main drivers for this huge 
consumption, as the audience engages with content that speaks to them, as analysed in 
Chapter Three.  
 
A third potential explanation for this trend of comparatively long viewing times is the 
economic advancement of the country because of the previous high price of oil at the 
time when the YouTube boom took place (2011-2014). This enhanced the infrastructure 
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of the telecommunication sector and increased the public expenditure that reinforced the 
welfare system (McKinsey Global Institute, 2015) and therefore made access to 
technology, for instance, electronic devices, much easier, more convenient and readily 
available for the majority of the young audience.  
 
This relatively long-watching trend is notable especially in the context of online media 
studies because it indicates the need for a new approach and a new way of thinking to 
deal with Saudi YouTube content. This thesis concerns the Saudi experience and it can 
be difficult to generalize its findings and apply them to other countries. Arguably, the 
political, societal and cultural climate of Saudi Arabia is behind the complexity of 
YouTube-based programmes’ production and consumption in the country.   
 
When discussing some of the meanings surrounding this relatively long viewing 
behaviour, the participants provide more clarification about the relationship between the 
duration and the nature of the content: “Fifteen to twenty minutes is enough for the 
content the interests me like [YouTube programmes that focus on] automobiles” (23-
year-old male university student, 2016).  
 
This comment demonstrates that viewers would be willing to watch long content as long 
as it addresses their interests and needs. Niche content is prominent in this context 
because it is aimed at those who are willing to invest their time to follow the content 
they desire. Examples that arose from the focus group discussions included automobiles, 
technological products and gaming videos that offer up-to-date information and content 
by utilizing YouTube and other platforms such as Twitter.   
 
There is a new trend among viewers of leaning towards more specialized YouTube-
based programmes such as those mentioned above. These programmes are generally, 
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but not always, less broadly appealing than the social experiment or talk show-based 
YouTube programmes, but this is a sign of the maturity of the YouTube market in Saudi 
Arabia.    
 
Another dimension of the relationship between the duration and the nature of content is 
highlighted by one of the respondents: 
 
It differs according to the type of the programme. Ten minutes is good for sports or 
political programmes but for the [soap opera] series, you need twenty minutes at least. 
(18-year-old male university student, 2016) 
 
The quote can also come under the umbrella of niche content, but it implies that 
entertainment content, especially the online series, is perceived positively by a member 
of the audience and that the content of such series is considered interesting enough to 
merit a longer viewing duration. 
 
According to the interviewees then, the above discussion represents a new trend among 
Saudi audiences of watching YouTube content for relatively long periods, with an 
average of ten minutes for each episode. Depending on the nature of the content, some 
respondents suggested that, in certain circumstances, they watch a longer format of 
fifteen to twenty minutes of Saudi YouTube-based programmes. This thesis argues that 
the Saudi audience is hungry to consume authentic content that gives voice to their 
hopes, aspirations and struggles.  
 
Nevertheless, there were some minorities in the focus group interviews who expressed 
their preference that episodes not exceed ten minutes. Their main argument was that the 
long format can cause boredom: “Most programmes are in this range [ten minutes] but I 
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do not think they would attract the audience if they made it longer” (20-year-old male 
university student, 2016); “Ten minutes but the conversation should not fill the whole 
video. The video should be divided into parts like comedy, conversations and interviews” 
(17-year-old male university student, 2016). 
 
What is remarkable here is that those participants were not disagreeing about the 
acceptability of the ten-minute format, but rather about the notion of exceeding this 
limit. In any case, this represents a strong appetite among the Saudi audience as they 
regard the ten-minute format as standard and acceptable.   
 
These findings have highlighted the new cultural behaviour of consuming YouTube-
based programmes which contain local and relevant content for young people in Saudi 
Arabia. This feeds into their needs and interests, which have evolved out of the 
complexity of Saudi society.   
 
It would be interesting for future studies to determine whether this behaviour has been 
temporarily adopted by the Saudi audience because of the novelty of the YouTube-
based programming phenomenon. In any case, the traditional and online media in Saudi 
Arabia are always unique and different from any other country’s because of the 
uniqueness of the political, religious and cultural system of Saudi Arabia.   
 
This discussion has analysed two aspects of the representative choice theme of 
YouTube-based programmes: the meaningful diversity of the content and the temporal 
order. The next section explores another theme that emerged from the discussion with 
Saudi participants. 
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           The Localism of YouTube-Based Programmes 
 
This part now seeks to explore another emerging theme that was prominent throughout 
the discussions with the study participants. This theme is conceptualized as the localism 
of YouTube-based programmes, which is a significant aspect that drives the interest of 
the audience in the programmes. The theme of localism consists of two categories: 
cultural relativity and technological novelty.  
 
Cultural relativity can be explained, in this context, as the delivery of content to the 
targeted audience by employing the popular Saudi way of chatting. The use of simple, 
colloquial language conveys mutuality; the producers do not position themselves in a 
hierarchy above the viewers, but appear close and familiar to the audience. The 
language, the accent, the body language and the local jokes against officials are 
illustrative examples that bind the producers and the consumers together, especially if 
we take into consideration the representative choices of the programmes, as explored 
above. This has resulted in the existence of programmes that cover issues related to 
young people and deliver them through the mechanism of cultural relativity.   
 
Technological novelty means the producers utilize high-end technology to design and 
operate the programmes with highly technical features. It includes the use of the art of 
direction, for instance, to produce locally based dramatic scenes that the audience is not 
familiar with in order to expose it at the local level of television.   
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  Cultural Relativity and Technological Novelty 
 
The findings illustrate that what makes the content unique is its ability to reflect the life 
and experience of ordinary young citizens who feel they are being spoken to directly by 
the cultural products of YouTube:   
 
I have never missed any episodes of the Masameer [Nails] programme; he presents 
[social] incidents clearly whereas other ordinary series do not usually reflect the real 
state of society. This programme translates the details of society. For the tone, this might 
be the only programme that represents… exactly the Najd [region] and the central 
regions. (32-year-old male PhD student, 2016) 
 
This comment brings to mind several thoughts and ideas which shed light upon why 
such content is attractive and popular with the Saudi youth.  To start, the authenticity of 
these programmes’ messages and their willingness to provide an unfiltered examination 
of the needs and the reality of the Saudi youth is a main driver for their unprecedented 
success. It is essential to take into account the chronological context of the YouTube-
based programming phenomenon from 2011 onwards, when the state-owned media and 
commercial media outlets alike were mainly focusing on protocol news and imported 
entertainment programmes (Ghareeb, 2000) which mainly ignored the local needs of 
Saudi youth. YouTube-based programmes were therefore able to fill this gap and offer 
the marginalized audience fresh and representative cultural products that presented an 
understanding of their struggle for the first time. This established a new cultural norm 
and novel structure for the hierarchy of content-making, where the content is produced 
by Saudi youth for Saudi youth (Khalil, 2010), undermining the traditional existence of 
a gatekeeper in traditional media corporations. This new culture of production took 
advantage of low entry to the market and the editorial freedom to craft messages in 
2011, which, as the respondent describes, means being able to translate the details of 
society. In addition, the respondent is able to prioritize the programmes and distinguish 
between them according to his preferences.  
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The respondent also highlights the significance of the tone, which overcomes any 
cultural and social barriers and makes the content attractive and engaging. The content 
creators’ engagement with and understanding of their audience is evident in their 
language and accent, and this provides the local content with additional advantages and 
more traffic. The audience in this context are attracted to content that reflects their 
accent, colloquialisms, jokes and local social gestures, and which is in line with what 
young people say online as well as offline. This thesis argues that the high degree of 
familiarity between the content and the audience builds connections and limits the level 
of estrangement and mistrust between the senders and the receivers, which has resulted 
in audiences seeing the programmes as being more credible than those on television. 
This high level of familiarity is illustrated by the ability of the respondent to 
demonstrate the nature of the accent of his favourite programme and connect it to a 
certain geographical area in Saudi Arabia.  
 
This mirrors the findings of Chapter Four, which described the coordination between 
big commercial brands and the content creators of YouTube-based programmes; the 
brands invested in the content creators’ expertise and knowledge in order to reach 
specific demographics for advertising purposes, a significant move that bypassed the 
traditional advertising agencies that had been mostly run by non-Saudis (Kraidy, 2012) 
who lacked that specific cultural understanding that appeals to both advertisers and 
audiences. 
 
In discussing the tone of the programmes, some respondents pointed to the significant 
role of satire in driving the programmes’ strong appeal. This introduces new norms in 
relation to content creation. 
 
I focus on the programmes that criticize in a funny way and sometimes even in a 
ridiculous way. I especially prefer the social criticism, but it is occasionally silly despite 
its humour. (32-year-old male PhD student, 2016)  
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Several respondents highlighted repeatedly throughout the focus groups that Saudi 
entertainment is one of the essential components they are interested in watching on 
YouTube. The satirical nature of the programmes fulfils this need for the audience and 
it offers them a novel and creative approach in its criticism of the political and societal 
status quo. In addition, this comment reveals the critical skills of the respondent, who 
was able to distinguish between humour and what he describes as “silly” content. This 
demonstrates that the viewer is active and critically engaged when perceiving the 
content. When one respondent was asked about his interpretation of social criticism, this 
was his response: 
 
Saudi society is very conservative from my point of view. [Broadcasting] what is 
unusual… is wrong and not good, such as the issue of women driving cars. There is a 
programme which intentionally talks about the [controversial] issues of society… In 
addition, there is social criticism of bad behaviour, corruption of certain corporations 
and corruption of some of the government agencies [which is positive]. (32-year-old male 
PhD student, 2016) 
 
The respondent draws a line between criticism that focuses on the personal behaviour of 
young people and criticism that is directed towards the official behaviour of certain 
government agencies. While there is a tendency towards accepting the criticism of 
government services, this comment shows conservative views when it comes to one of 
the most controversial cultural issues of Saudi society at the time of writing: women 
being able to drive vehicles. There were other respondents who had more liberal views 
on this issue, but this in general highlights the critical skills of the audience in accepting 
or refusing the messages of YouTube-based programmes. The viewers frequently 
engage and discuss the YouTube content within their social circles, as will be examined 
later.  
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So satire and entertainment in a broader sense are important features that attract the 
young Saudi audience. This can be further illustrated by the following views of the 
respondents: 
 
I think some of those programmes mirror the social reality of Saudi Arabia in a funny 
way. Additionally, they link us to other funny people in Instagram and social media. (21-
year-old male university student, 2016) 
 
I have enough lectures and philosophy all day [at university] so I do not want someone to 
give me lectures but rather I want to watch funny things. (21-year-old male university 
student, 2016) 
 
Chapter Three showed the lack of entertainment activities such as cinemas in Saudi 
Arabia and how this was one of the main drivers for the growth of entertainment-
oriented YouTube-based programmes. The above quotes confirm the hunger of the 
young Saudi audience for local and relevant entertainment content to watch instead of 
consuming non-Saudi content either on television or YouTube.  
 
While another respondent reinforced the importance of familiarity and the tone, he also 
suggested a further reason for the popularity of YouTube-based programming:  
 
[I always watch them because of] the way they transfer the information to the viewer, the 
way they speak and their professional photography, which plays an important role [for 
me]. Also, the high quality of the videos… Khambalah uses 4K technology for their 
videos. The quality of this technology attracts me. (18-year-old male university student, 
2016) 
 
The high-end output of some programmes is a fourth factor that catches the attention of 
the audience and this has become an increasingly significant factor, especially for the 
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young, tech-savvy audience. For the audience, visual attraction is as important as the 
content itself and this raises the standards of production and consumption for YouTube 
programmes. This means the taste of the audience would be difficult to satisfy if a 
production embraced lower standards than, for instance, 4K resolution. This also adds a 
layer of complexity for content creators who cannot afford this sophisticated mode of 
production. This finding reflects the analysis in Chapter Four, which explored that 
YouTube production recently shifted from individual-based programmes to corporation-
based programmes for several reasons, including the high investment of corporations in 
the content and technology to such an extent that it became difficult for individuals to 
cope with the pace of change in the emerging market between 2010 and 2013.   
 
The respondents were keen to expand on the essential role of high-end production 
values on YouTube by discussing the impact of technical aspects such as filming and 
direction: 
 
[T]he art of direction is important but also the cameras themselves because they started 
using very high-end cameras for shooting in order to produce sophisticated content. (26-
year-old male university student, 2016) 
 
The technological and cinematic mode of YouTube-based programming plays an 
essential role in keeping the audience interested and alert for the episodes. This shows 
the high level of technology expected by the respondents to satisfy them and make the 
content attractive and appealing to them. What is significant to observe here is how the 
market of YouTube-based programming has evolved and developed in such a non-
supportive environment in Saudi Arabia; both the creators and the audiences have 
shown, to a great degree, their ability to progress greatly over a short period of time and 
overcome logistical and societal barriers. 
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This quick development can be attributed to the exposure of the audience to various 
national and foreign media outlets via traditional television, which improved their 
critical skills and knowledge as an audience. This reinforces the notion of the viewers’ 
high awareness of the production values of YouTube-based programmes. The producers 
of YouTube-based programmes were able to read these developments and increase the 
standards of production over a short period of time.   
 
This high-end production of YouTube-based programmes has stimulated creativity and 
provided some audience members with practical learning opportunities. One of the 
participants articulated this:  
 
I am about to launch a scientific programme on YouTube and I want to have a strong 
background regarding the nature of direction and photography in order to be sure that 
the technical level of my programme is not below the level of the present programmes. 
(26-year-old male university student, 2016) 
 
This can be seen as one of the indirect consequences for a certain segment of the 
audience that shows interest in this phenomenon. It shows the complex relationship 
between the creators and the audience, wherein the latter can sometimes easily move to 
play the role of the former. The slogan of YouTube – Broadcast yourself – bridges the 
gap between the makers and the viewers, which in the Saudi context helps young people 
to participate and contribute to the public discussion and democratise the community to 
a certain degree. Another indirect result is the abundance of programmes which have 
been stimulated in the first place by the pioneers who started this new trend.  
 
The abundance of programmes is very significant because it helps develop the market of 
YouTube in Saudi Arabia. From the outset, as has been discussed earlier, the 
phenomenon of YouTube-based programmes has addressed a niche and certain needs of 
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the youth. However, within this niche there are several sub-niche themes that remain 
unaddressed as the vast majority of programmes focus on comedy, talk shows and 
pranks. This is an opportunity for some audiences to fill in these sub-niche themes, such 
as scientific programmes, in order to contribute to the development of this market.  
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate how common these new 
programmes are that have been stimulated by the existing programmes, it certainly 
feeds into the creativity of both the producers and consumers of YouTube-based 
programming by stimulating new thoughts and practices for young Saudi citizens. This 
phenomenon is described by Miekle and Young (2012) as the “creative audience” to 
mark the shift of some audiences from being a passive force to being creative or 
arguably, as Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998) describe it, a “diffused audience”.  
 
The focus group respondents noted that the engagement of content creators with the 
Saudi audience is another key factor behind the popularity of the programmes. For 
instance: 
 
[T]hey [Telvaz11 network] recruit the Saudi youth. If anyone has the talent, they would 
call him and bring him in to participate in their YouTube programmes. They are really 
doing a great job. Anyone who became famous because of Snapchat or another platform, 
they would bring him or her into their programme to work with them. (26-year-old male 
university student, 2016) 
 
The outsourcing strategy of some YouTube-based corporations seems to be of interest 
to those who want to use the platform of YouTube to earn some fame (Turner, 2010). 
The audience, particularly the young, would be delighted to be called upon to 
participate in online programmes, especially when this invitation comes from a well-
known Saudi YouTube-based corporation such as Telvaz11. This simplicity and 
flexibility can reinforce the familiarity, which has been discussed above, between the 
creators and the audience. It offers those young talents a new opportunity to showcase 
their creativity publically and consequently increase the traffic for Telvaz11.   
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Nevertheless, this outsourcing strategy can lead to a lack of human resources for the 
business of YouTube and the urgent need for creative personnel to contribute to their 
growing activities. This can be linked to the analysis in Chapter Four, in which several 
content creators mentioned the challenge they face in finding and recruiting talent for 
the business of content-making because of the lack of infrastructure and the lack of 
official support in the country. It is important to be careful when dealing with certain 
concepts mentioned in the above quote such as talent and famous figures. The 
respondent’s understanding of those terms can vary from other interpretations as they 
do not provide a solid framework to investigate their meaning. As noted in Chapter Four, 
the shortage in human resources was more serious in the early stage of the YouTube-
based programmes between 2011 and 2013, but the market was later able to adapt to the 
circumstances and develop their own mechanisms to keep production flowing with 
some difficulties in terms of scheduling and regularity.  
 
What is interesting to notice in considering the above quote is the connectivity between 
various social media platforms in searching for talent. This notion is problematic 
because each platform has different characteristics and features that determine and 
shape the way they present content; what works well for one platform might not be 
suitable for another. Another factor that contributes to the popularity of YouTube-based 
programmes is the integration between the online programmes and official figures, 
particularly in the context of sport:  
 
Free kick is an interesting programme and I have been watching it since the beginning 
because they have very good access to senior people in Saudi football clubs. (21-year-old 
male university student, 2016) 
 
This seems to be a powerful strategy that adds value to YouTube productions. It 
provides the audience with the impression that some of the YouTube-based programmes 
are not immature, but rather a reliable media window that can feature and interview 
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high profile figures. This integration between YouTube programmes and officials in 
Saudi football clubs is phenomenal for several reasons. First, it indicates the growing 
influence of YouTube programmes, which allows them access to popular figures in the 
Saudi sports industry. Second, it implies that these senior figures recognize YouTube-
based programmes as a channel to reach their audience or fans. Third, it offers authority 
and prestige, as well as editorial freedom for the programme and its presenter to cover 
certain issues related to Saudi sport, which means it can deliver unique content to the 
audience. Finally, this cultural product can be highly valuable for the audience because 
of the distinctiveness of its content and more importantly because of the catch-up 
advantage of the YouTube platform. This could pose serious competition for sport 
programmes on television.  
 
The transformation of the sport programme Free Kick highlights the rapid development 
of some programmes over a short span of time and how their creativity and insight can 
drive and enhance competition, not only with other YouTube-based programmes, but 
even with some traditional television programmes which broadcast in the same genre. 
This is possibly one of the reasons that mainstream media outlets are keen on recruiting 
and holding onto some YouTube presenters even though their television expertise is 
very limited. Consequently, this can raise the issue of what the audience thinks of 
YouTube presenters who moved to television.  
 
 
           Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the perspective of the audience in 
relation to YouTube-based programming in Saudi Arabia.  It was devised to answer the 
research question that is concerned with the popularity of the programmes from the 
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audience’s point of view. Two main themes emerged from the discussion: the 
representative choices and the localism of YouTube-based programming. Every theme 
consists of concepts that emerged from the input of the participants.   
The theme of representative choices was constructed of two categories: meaningful 
diversity and temporal control. The discussion revealed that YouTube-based 
programmes identified a gap in the Saudi media landscape where the mainstream outlets 
were ignoring the aspirations and the needs of young audiences (Lynch, 2006). 
YouTube-based programmes responded to this gap by offering the audience 
representative choices as opposed to the unrepresentative choices of Saudi television 
stations owned by the state or associated with royal family members.  
 
The findings showed that Saudi audiences wanted tailored content that responded to 
their everyday lives and issues such as housing, employment and political critiques in 
the form of entertainment, which YouTube-based programmes were able to provide. 
This indicates that the youth audience is creative and active (Meikle and Young, 2012) 
in seeking to interpret, search, refine, redefine and recreate new critical interpretations 
for the content.  
 
The findings also confirmed the adjustment of viewing habits among the young Saudi 
audience, which seems to be in line with the global trend (Boyle and Kelly, 2012); 
however, the argument here is that the Saudi context has a different motivation. It 
argues that the migration of the youth audience towards online and especially YouTube-
based programmes was not solely driven by technological advances, but rather by the 
political and cultural constraints on the narrative of Saudi television. The audience in 
the authoritarian context looks for another authentic representative narrative to ascribe 
themselves to.  
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Another interesting finding was the influence of gender on the consumption of 
YouTube-based programmes. The female participants in this study showed little interest 
in following and consuming these programmes. This could raise issues related to the 
nature of the content preferred by them and whether the increased participation of Saudi 
women in the production process could result in different consequences. Saudi women 
represent approximately half of the Saudi population; however, according to the Global 
Gender Gap Report (2016), the unemployment rate and lack of access to public 
opportunities amongst educated women are high. These findings certainly confirm the 
state of women in Saudi society, and they also indicate that not enough attention is paid 
to the aspirations of Saudi women.  
 
The chapter argued that while YouTube-based programmes offer marginalized Saudi 
producers a sense of liberty to voice their demands, the voices of Saudi women are still 
marginalized and excluded from the mainstream of both the production and 
consumption aspects of the programmes. The absence of regulation, the cultural 
expectations for women, the conservative nature of Saudi society and the traditional 
dominance of men are serious concerns that add complexity to the issue of women in 
this context. A possible solution is to not wait for any form of societal or political 
intervention, but rather continue the push for changes for Saudi women by Saudi 
women. This can happen by engaging in the online phenomenon and bringing new ideas 
and concepts that start to bridge the gap, at least, online.  
 
As for the second theme, the localism of programmes, cultural relativity and 
technological novelty are the two main concepts that have been constructed in the above 
analysis. There are important lessons to be learned through the exploration of this theme. 
The authenticity of the message and its reflection of real daily Saudi interactions and 
discussions is highly valued by the participants of the study, and it has been a main 
driver for the growth of the audience.  
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If the theme of representative choices explains the scale of the object of the analysis, 
then the theme of localism illustrates the scope and the depth of our understanding of 
this phenomenon. The audience finds YouTube-based programmes attractive, amongst 
other factors, because of the closeness of the programmes to them. The spoken dialect, 
the spontaneity of presenters, the facial expressions and the nature of jokes have all built 
familiarity and bonds between the participants and the programmes. It can be proposed 
that the young audience wants to be talked with instead of talked to. The traditional 
hierarchy needs to be adjusted when getting involved with issues related to youth in 
order to accommodate them and make them react positively to concerns.  
 
By analysing the young audience of YouTube-based programmes, who expressed their 
trust and admiration for the online programmes rather than television, this chapter has 
implied that official Saudi television faces issues related to credibility and authenticity. 
Producing engaging and representative content that speaks to the Saudi youth – both 
men and women – is required to attract this large segment of society. The Saudi 
television channels have to be reformed, to break away from the old mindset that 
perceives the audience as a passive force, and adopt more resilient methods if it wants 
to stop losing the new generation of the Saudi audience.   
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
 
The aim of this thesis was to explore the economic, political and cultural context of 
YouTube-based programming in Saudi Arabia between 2010 and 2016. It has focused 
on the bottom up, professionally generated content (PGC) which was produced by Saudi 
youth exclusively for the platform of YouTube. The thesis has examined the perspective 
of the content creators by utilizing semi-structured online interviews, and the view of 
the Saudi audience by employing semi-structured offline focus group interviews 
conducted in Glasgow.  
 
The importance of this thesis stems from its goal to respond to the existing gap in Arab 
and Saudi social media studies, where a number of studies have positioned themselves 
in line with the technological determinist approach; for instance, to investigate the 
impact of social media during the Arab uprisings (Ali and Fahmy, 2013; 
Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos, 2012; Howard et al., 2011). Others perceive Saudi 
social media through the lens of political economy and international politics (Sakr, 2007; 
Al-Rasheed, 2008; and Sakr, Ratta, and Skovgaard-Peterson, 2015), which shape their 
outcomes, whereas other studies abstain from raising critical questions around the 
context of power and the structure of domination for various reasons including the 
political sensitivity of such investigations (Eid, 2003; and Kaba and Said, 2014).  
 
Very few studies have investigated YouTube, as a generic object of analysis, in the 
Arab or Saudi settings (Ramsay and Fatani, 2016), and it seems that no extensive 
studies were conducted about YouTube-based programmes in Saudi Arabia by the time 
the thesis concluded. The thesis has investigated specific aspects of YouTube, namely 
the professional production of YouTube-based programming in the specific context of 
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Saudi Arabia. The cultural and political specificity of Saudi Arabia make this analysis 
of YouTube-based programmes particularly significant because of the restrictive 
political and media environment they operate within.  
 
The thesis has advanced four research questions, three of them related to the perspective 
of the content creators and one exploring the audience’s views. Chapter Three addressed 
the first research question, which aimed to explore the role of YouTube-based 
programming in the political and cultural online context of Saudi Arabia. Chapter Four 
focused on the second research question, which uncovered the business element of 
YouTube-based programming in the Saudi media context, and Chapter Five looked at 
the Saudi government’s reactions to the programmes. Chapter Six shifted the focus 
towards the audience by answering the fourth research question, which examined the 
reasons behind the popularity of YouTube-based programmes from the participants’ 
points of view.   
 
The structure of this final chapter has been influenced by Silverman (2010); it consists 
of three sections. The first section seeks to synthesise the empirical findings in relation 
to the research questions. The second section discusses the implications of the findings 
for practice and policy. Finally, the chapter concludes by highlighting the limitations of 
the study and suggesting directions for further research.  
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         Findings 
 
               Limited Political and Cultural Empowerment Offline 
 
Chapter Three answered the first research question, which was concerned with the 
cultural and political role of YouTube-based programmes in the context of Saudi Arabia. 
The evidence has maintained that the Saudi youth’s launching of the programmes was 
primarily motivated by their desire to reflect upon their personal views in relation to 
public, political and cultural matters. The absence of offline political and cultural 
platforms and the unrepresentative nature of Saudi television content, both nationally 
and regionally (Boyd, 1982; Rinnawi, 2006; and Kraidy, 2012), have played significant 
roles in driving the youth online to seek a way of voicing their concerns, aspirations and 
opinions on issues related to the youth and to the public – away from the media 
gatekeepers. 
 
The chapter found that online participation has brought a sense of liberalism and a new 
critical culture to the Saudi online spheres, but this has not translated into effective 
offline political and cultural empowerment as yet. This online liberalism can be 
categorized as online political and cultural empowerment, which enabled the young 
people to speak publicly about what were deemed to be cultural and social taboos in 
Saudi society. Gender empowerment is another consequence; it has enabled Saudi 
women to present on YouTube, especially between 2011 and 2012, breaking away from 
the socio-cultural constraints on them.  
 
Moreover, the influence of Saudi culture and its practices have shaped the online 
activities and influenced their structure. For instance, while YouTube-based 
programmes offered Saudi women a sense of liberalism and the chance to participate in 
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public issues online, the offline Saudi cultural sensitivity towards women had moved 
online with massive online attacks against the female presenters, especially between 
2011 and 2012, because of their gender. This form of discrimination against women has 
become less prevalent recently online as the online community has adopted the change 
in the role of women. In addition, the offline Saudi male domination has moved online 
where few Saudi women participate in the production and the presentation aspects of 
these programmes, leaving the major contributions to the Saudi men, which echoes the 
sensitivity of gender in the Saudi culture.  
 
Through their attempts to provide a new perspective, the YouTube-based programmes 
have re-defined the position of the Saudi youth in the society, and they have shown that 
marginalized voices can act as political and cultural forces to generate economic value 
if they are integrated into a wider cultural policy framework with a relative degree of 
freedom.  
 
The programmes, as is evident in Chapter Three, have introduced new political 
narratives to the Saudi discourse as young people started critiquing a number of middle-
level officials and even minsters, which was not the cultural norm before. However, 
avoiding criticizing influential members of the royal family, including the King and the 
Crown Prince, is still a political norm that cannot be violated either online or offline.  
 
The influence of Saudi politics and culture upon the programmes cannot be 
underestimated, however, as these programmes have a role in introducing a new tone 
and new topics when it comes to covering public issues. More importantly, no 
YouTube-based programme (PGC) has participated in public activism activities such as 
the online campaign for Saudi women to drive, but rather this form of online activism 
has been left to individual online activists (UGC). The political and cultural voices of 
YouTube-based programmes were critical between 2010 and 2012, arguably in line 
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with the Arab uprisings, but then the tone gradually started to become less critical, 
focusing mostly on the commercialization of the programmes between 2013 and 2016.  
 
This has made the programmes’ creators and presenters behave as online celebrities 
(Turner, 2010) who manufacture cultural products that are largely apolitical. They 
became very keen on pursuing their own commercial interests, protecting themselves by 
not becoming too deeply involved in politics in order to sustain advertising and other 
streams of revenue.   
 
                Strong Financial Empowerment Offline 
 
In contrast to the limitations of offline political and cultural empowerment, the thesis 
found in Chapter Four that the offline commercialization activities of YouTube-based 
programmes were prominent, empowering and profitable for the content creators. The 
activities ranged from being able to develop various business models, to the flow of 
capital for the market, and to their engagement with the advertising market in Saudi 
Arabia, especially in the major cities such as Riyadh and Jeddah. The 
commercialization of YouTube-based programmes has created new opportunities in 
terms of employability for the Saudi youth and new patterns of advertising behaviour 
between commercial brands and online content, especially YouTube-based 
programming. 
 
The chapter found that the commercialization of YouTube-based programmes has been 
developed through various stages that are associated with different characteristics in 
relation to revenue, including the attitude of YouTube (Google Inc.), human capital and 
market behaviour. The chapter conceptualized this development into three stages – 
Abstract 2010-2011, Concrete 2012-2013 and Innovation 2014-2016 – to describe the 
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development of the business models and the YouTube-based market. The analysis has 
shown that the advertising market reacted differently towards YouTube-based 
programming throughout the different stages, ranging from underestimating their 
influence to adopting online advertising within the content of the programmes to finally 
getting the content creators to tailor online advertising to the advertisers’ targeted 
audiences.  
 
This advanced commercialization has two significant implications. First, it has affected 
the competitive relationship between YouTube-based programming and traditional 
television. Second, the commercialization has manipulated the tone and the critical level 
of these programmes. More importantly, this commercialization created a new online 
class in Saudi Arabia – the online celebrity (Turner, 2010) – and the financial incentives 
have intentionally or unintentionally moved programmes away from highly critical 
content to secure the engagement of brands and therefore ensure the flow of cash by 
focusing on soft news and light social issues. This became especially prominent 
between 2014 and 2016 when the YouTube-based market became stable and 
fragmented. In addition, this implication can be linked to the findings of Chapter Three: 
Because cultural and political empowerment is limited in offline Saudi society, content 
creators are motivated to conform to those offline norms in their online work in order to 
secure real world benefits (i.e. advertising revenue), and thus they are disinclined to 
produce content that is critical of the government.  
 
               The State Remains the Most Powerful Actor in The Context of 
the Media 
 
Another reason that could explain the unwillingness of young people to produce highly 
critical content is revealed in the analysis of Chapter Five, which addressed the third 
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research question by investigating the reactions of the Saudi government to YouTube-
based programming.  
 
The chapter illustrated that the restrictive Saudi media environment rests on a number of 
pillars, but licensing is the prevailing concept in this media context in which no audio-
visual productions can take place in the Saudi territories without the permission of the 
government (Duffy, 2014), namely the Ministry of Culture and Information. The 
absence of policy in relation to online content served as a catalyst to stimulate the 
production of the programmes, with content creators taking advantage of the ambiguity 
of the situation. The Saudi government allowed this phenomenon to emerge, but the 
content creators responded to this behaviour by adopting a self-regulatory approach that 
takes into consideration the cultural and political specificity of Saudi Arabia.  
 
The chapter conceptualized the reactions of the government to the critical content, 
especially during 2010 and 2013, as a containing strategy. This strategy consisted of 
hard measures and soft measures. Hard measures included imprisonment, blocking 
content and dispatching notification letters from the Ministry of the Interior. Soft 
measures included a visit from a senior member of the Royal family to one of the 
production houses for YouTube-based programmes and periodical meetings between 
the filmmakers and representatives of the Ministry of Culture and Information.    
 
The thesis argues that this attitude of the Saudi government towards the critical content 
of YouTube-based programmes, along with commercial factors, have all affected the 
output of YouTube-based programmes in terms of the nature of the content and the tone 
of their messages. YouTube-based programmes have acted between 2010 and 2012 as a 
limited democratizing channel for online public spheres. However, the above factors, 
which grounded this thesis, have shifted this limited democratization of the programmes 
only towards soft news and entertainment from 2012 onwards, preventing them from 
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engaging in any highly critical content. As a result, YouTube became a democratization 
tool primarily for soft news and light content.     
 
              The Relevance of the Content as A Main Driver for Its 
Popularity Amongst the Audience 
 
In Chapter Six, the fourth research question, which was concerned with the popularity 
of YouTube-based programmes from the perspective of the audience, was analysed. The 
focus group interviews revealed that the Saudi audience preferred watching Saudi 
YouTube-based programming to Saudi television because the mainstream media outlets, 
apparently, failed to address issues that reflected the young people’s concerns (Lynch, 
2006). Two main themes emerged to reflect the audience’s responses: the representative 
choices and the localism of YouTube-based programmes. These findings showcased the 
reactions of the young audience in the authoritarian context where the state-owned 
media and state-associated media were unable to attract the young audience and to 
address their needs.  
 
Nevertheless, the issue of gender also arose in this chapter when the female participants 
indicated little interest in watching the content of Saudi YouTube-based programmes; 
this can be linked to the findings of Chapter Three, which discussed the lack of Saudi 
female input in the production of these programmes. This could be one of the reasons 
for the lack of interest of the Saudi female audience along with other potential reasons 
such as the nature of the content.  
 
What is significant is that locally relevant content that is produced in the Saudi accent is 
highly appealing to the young audience and that they are not drawn to the content of 
Pan-Arab television, which is owned by Saudi princes and associated businessmen and 
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tends to serve certain economic and political agendas for the shareholders rather than 
serving the needs of the Saudi youth audience.   
 
 
            Implications for Policy and Practices  
 
Based on the above analysis, this section argues that the spontaneous practices of 
YouTube-based programmes in Saudi Arabia have resulted in unexpected outcomes for 
both the content creators and the policy makers in the country. The legal vacuum, which 
was discussed in Chapter Five, reflected the gap between government policy and the 
practices of social media including YouTube in Saudi Arabia and even the internet in a 
wider sense. Although the spontaneous emergence of YouTube-based programmes has 
brought some advantages such as creating new business opportunities and introducing a 
sense of liberalism to the online Saudi public discourse, the online growth and its 
practices can be utilized in a better way to produce significant benefits for the public 
and the private spheres of the content creators.  
 
Implications for policy  
 
Addressing the matter of policy, the thesis argues that there is an urgent need for a 
political decision to initiate a nationwide initiative in order to transform the Saudi 
digital growth and other related activities into meaningful enterprises that yield cultural 
and economic value for young people and for the public in general. This initiative 
should not concentrate on the YouTube phenomenon in isolation, but rather it should 
treat YouTube-based programmes as one part of a bigger picture to establish a creative 
industry in Saudi Arabia. YouTube-based programmes can be developed independently, 
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as shown in Chapter Four, building their talents and business models and generating 
revenues that overcome the obstacles of policy and infrastructure. The potential to set 
up a Saudi creative industry that is tailored and relevant to the Saudi specificity is very 
appealing, if we consider YouTube-based programmes as an indicator.   
 
The current political climate in Saudi Arabia has been marked by the rise of a number 
of young princes who tend to be relatively liberal and educated. This and, more 
importantly, the blueprint of Saudi Vision 2030 can all stimulate subtle and gradual 
changes around certain issues such as establishing a creative industry in the country.  
 
The development of such an industry would require political support because of the 
massive challenges that stand in the way of the development of a national entertainment 
industry; for instance, the opposition of the conservative establishment and the absence 
of an infrastructure such as cinema halls, training and funds. Another reason is that the 
concentration of power is in the few hands of members of the royal family, which gives 
them an enormous amount of power over the public sphere and equips them alone to 
make such a decision. This thesis predicts, based on the above analysis, that the socio-
cultural constraints on a number of issues such as women driving and cinema halls will 
only require time before being authorized in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, this would 
bring better opportunities for the potential Saudi-based entertainment industry and help 
to incorporate local talent in a meaningful way.    
 
Such a policy is needed to develop the practices that are already grounded in the 
activities of Saudi young people such as YouTube-based programmes, and other 
practices that are beyond of the scope of this thesis, for instance, filmmaking and 
comedy clubs. This means that the issue of women driving and the current ban on 
cinema are not hindering the bottom-up development of local entertainment in the 
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country by the young people and that the policy can advance this progress and can allow 
time for cultural change to occur.  
 
The concept and the practices of cultural policy in Saudi Arabia are relatively poor and 
humble, and the thesis suggests that there is an urgent need to develop and formulate a 
national framework to establish a creative Saudi industry for the huge youth population 
in the country. This policy can incorporate both online and offline creativity and 
advance better economic outcomes for the public.  
 
However, the thesis has two main concerns for such a potential cultural policy in Saudi 
Arabia, the first being the political repression against any critical cultural products or 
activities. The thesis has shown that the government allows for a margin of freedom 
regarding soft news, light material and even for critiquing minsters and middle-level 
public agencies, but content that is highly critical of public policy is subject to 
repression by the government.  
 
Chapter Four discussed the attempt of the Saudi regime to dominate the media scenes 
nationally and regionally across the Arab world for ideological and political reasons. 
The potential Saudi creative industry might act as a cultural and economic window for 
influential members of the royal family and associated business moguls who would aim 
to dominate the industry for their personal interests. This could result in ownership 
concentration, which would affect the outcomes of such a potential national project and 
eliminate unwanted voices, focusing on generating revenue and light entertainment 
products.    
 
The second concern is related to the identity of the industry. For example, MBC TV, the 
Pan-Arab network owned by the half-brother of the late King Fahd (1982-2005), 
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concentrates heavily on importing American programmes for the Arab and the Saudi 
audience for economic and ideological reasons. This might reflect a trend within a 
certain faction of the royal family and its associates, and this trend may extend to the 
proposed Saudi creative industry. All Pan-Arab television tends to be extremely liberal 
in general, adopting Western values and ideologies that might not sit easily with the 
Arab identity.  
 
One of the reasons behind the popularity of YouTube-based programmes is that they are 
grounded in local aspects of Saudi society and the audience wants cultural products that 
reflect their own experiences. The thesis suggests that the policy makers have to pay 
attention to the issue of identity and the specificity of the Arab and Saudi context in 
order to protect local culture and to develop a professional local industry by adopting 
certain measures. Liberal views and practices are needed for the creative industry in line 
with wider Arab liberalism, which is different from the Western understanding of 
liberalism and its applications.  
 
Implications for practices 
 
The thesis has argued that one of the advantages of YouTube-based programmes in 
Saudi Arabia is that they promote and develop local professional content that enriches 
the online Saudi culture, and establishes the base for the development of local talent 
through practice. What the thesis has shown is that the rapid development of the content 
has evolved around the theme of comedy and satire. The lack of entertainment 
platforms and activities in Saudi Arabia might be the main driver for this trend. 
 
As YouTube-based programmes have become professionalized and industrialized, it is 
worth considering the diversity of the content, offering more specialized and perhaps 
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educational programmes that can attract new audiences. However, one challenge that 
specialized programmes face is the economic return for production because the process 
of production has been operationalized and commercialized from 2013 onwards. In the 
absence of any policy then one can only rely on the goodwill of production houses to 
diverse and educational yet entertaining content for Saudi and Arabic consumers.  
 
One of the most significant issues that needs to be considered is the wider involvement 
of Saudi women in the process of YouTube-based programming, including writing and 
presenting the content. This has two implications. First, it contributes to the diversity of 
the content and its perspectives and therefore may attract a new audience, for instance, 
the Saudi women who were less interested than the men in watching the programmes, as 
the analysis revealed in Chapter Six. Second, it serves as a method to bridge the gender 
gap and empowers women to participate in public issues online.  
 
The content of these programmes has widened the consumption options for Saudi 
audiences and they have become selective in their viewing choices. This results in the 
stimulation of competitive behaviour amongst the production houses and contributes to 
the pluralism of the content.    
 
However, there are serious concerns regarding the future of PGC content on YouTube 
in Saudi Arabia. The first issue is the intervention of television in acquiring online 
presenters and moving them towards television programmes. A second issue is the lack 
of originality in their coverage, especially following the commercialization of the 
programmes from 2013 onwards. Finally, YouTube-based programmes are threatened 
by the emergence of other video platforms such as Instagram and Snapchat that tend to 
deliver short features and have built new communities and new stars for business and 
entertainment content.  In addition, the competition of Facebook video can be a 
detracting actor for YouTube use in Saudi Arabia. YouTube-based programming could 
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lose its brightest names and practices and become an ordinary medium for Saudis if it 
continues to be subject to the threats mentioned above without any reaction from both 
YouTube itself and the Saudi content creators.  
 
 
             Limitations and Future Scope of Research  
 
Although the scope of the thesis has covered certain aspects of YouTube-based 
programming and its findings have revealed important insights into the media practices 
of young Saudi people in the authoritarian context, there is still much work to be done. 
 
The main limitations of the thesis are related to the sample and translation factors. First, 
a number of observations can be pointed out about the size of the sample and its 
representation. For instance, the interviewees who participated in the focus group 
interviews were students based in Scotland. This conveys clear bias as it only reflects 
the views of Saudi interviewees who are educated in Western universities, and therefore 
it would be problematic to generalize their opinions for all Saudi audiences including 
those who are based in Saudi Arabia and are educated in Saudi universities or not 
university educated at all. 
 
In addition, the number of interviewees, in particular Saudi women, was small and the 
sample cannot be treated as representative of all Saudi women either at home or abroad. 
The findings may be limited to the specific interviewees’ experiences; for instance, the 
lack of interest of Saudi women in YouTube-based programming. The thesis has aimed 
to offer an in-depth analysis of the research problem rather than claiming any 
generalization related to the Saudi experience.  
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The second limitation is related to the translation process of the thesis. All interviews 
were conducted in Arabic and transcribed as Arabic texts before being translated into 
English. A bias can arise from, for example, choosing certain vocabulary to translate the 
opinions of the interviewees. In addition, being a native Arab speaker (insider) can 
influence the process of transcription and translation. Finally, the design of the 
questions and the structure of the interviews reflect the subjective cognitive experience 
of the researcher, but being aware of the limitations and applying critical reflection 
throughout the process has balanced the subjective process of qualitative research.  
 
In terms of future research, this thesis has stimulated a number of other avenues for 
research related to YouTube-based programming, social media and even the political 
economy of traditional media in Saudi Arabia. Future research can investigate the 
relationship between traditional Saudi television and YouTube figures in Saudi Arabia 
to better understand the development between the two parties by building on the 
analysis of this thesis.     
 
Other research can be conducted to examine whether there is any correlation between 
the content of YouTube and Snapchat amongst the young audience in Saudi Arabia 
because the growth of social media in the country is an eye-opener. The use of Twitter 
in Saudi Arabia is promising and critical investigation is needed to examine how Saudis 
react and respond to the domestic and foreign policies of the government. In addition, 
the use of Twitter by religious figures in Saudi Arabia is another area that can lead to a 
better understanding of the use of social media by conservatives to promote their 
messages. Another possible area of research is to focus on Saudi women online and how 
they use social media platforms from 2017 onwards to compare the experience of Saudi 
women with the analysis of this thesis, which covered the period between 2010 and 
2016.  
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Appendix A: Interview Guide 
 
1- Background information: (Establish relationships). 
 
Welcome. 
Aim of the research.  
Explain procedure: [ethical matters, themes of the interview and   anticipated time]. 
Record the interview.  
 
2- Opening questions: (Build rapports).  
 
Interviewee's information.  
Description of role and responsibility.   
Explain your typical day at work.  
 
3- Introductory questions: 
 
 Running YouTube activities in Saudi Arabia.  
 Describing the current state of YouTube in Saudi Arabia.  
 
4- The economic dimension: 
Business model.  
Process of production and distribution. 
The standards of production  
The environment of YouTube market. 
The targeted audience. 
 
5- The cultural dimension: 
 
Aims of your YouTube-based programme. 
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Defining the content. 
Format.   
Influence and representation.  
 
 
6- The policy dimension:  
 
The legal framework of your YouTube business. 
Censorship and intervention. 
The relationship with the government.    
 
 
 
7- Winding up  
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Appendix B: The Consent Form 
CONSENT TO THE USE OF DATA 
University of Glasgow, College of Arts Research Ethics Committee 
I understand that     Omar Daoudi   is collecting data in the form of recorded Skype 
interview for use in an academic research project at the University of Glasgow.  
 
  The issue that this study addresses is the economic, political and cultural context of 
local YouTube programs in Saudi Arabia, which is the biggest per capita global 
consumer of Google Inc.     This project would incorporate a qualitative research 
approach to critically investigate the correlation between the Saudi youth and the 
Saudi local YouTube broadcast practices through a unique analytical fieldwork.  In 
response to research methods, this project incorporates qualitative research 
methods, in-depth online interviews and focus groups to in an attempt to obtain 
valuable and reliable date in order to gain an insight and knowledge about this 
phenomenon. 
I give my consent to the use of data for this purpose on the understanding that: 
 My participation in this project is voluntary and I have the right to withdraw or discontinue my 
participation at any time.   
 I may be quoted directly in publications and my name used. 
 The full recoding and transcript will be treated as confidential and kept in secure storage at all 
times. 
 The full recording and transcript will be retained in secure storage for use in future academic 
research 
 The material may be used in future publications, both print and online. 
 
Signed by the contributor: __________________________      Date: 
 
 
Researcher’s name and email contact: Omar Daoudi - o.daoudi.1@research.gla.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor’s names and email contact:  
 
Prof. Raymond Boyle - Raymond.Boyle@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
Dr. Melanie Selfe- Melanie.Selfe@glasgow.ac.uk 
Department address: University of Glasgow - 13 The Square - Glasgow, G12 8QQ 
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Appendix C: The Consent Form for the anonymous 
interviewee 
CONSENT TO THE USE OF DATA 
University of Glasgow, College of Arts Research Ethics Committee 
I understand that     Omar Daoudi   is collecting data in the form of recorded Skype 
interview for use in an academic research project at the University of Glasgow.  
    The issue that this study addresses is the economic, political and cultural context of 
local YouTube programs in Saudi Arabia, which is the biggest per capita global 
consumer of Google Inc.     This project would incorporate a qualitative research 
approach to critically investigate the correlation between the Saudi youth and the 
Saudi local YouTube broadcast practices through a unique analytical fieldwork.  In 
response to research methods, this project incorporates qualitative research 
methods, in-depth online interviews and focus groups to in an attempt to obtain 
valuable and reliable date in order to gain an insight and knowledge about this 
phenomenon. 
I give my consent to the use of data for this purpose on the understanding that: 
 My participation in this project is voluntary and I have the right to withdraw or discontinue my 
participation at any time.   
 I understand that my name will be held anonymously.   
 The full recoding and transcript will be treated as confidential and kept in secure storage at all 
times. 
 The full recording and transcript will be retained in secure storage for use in future academic 
research 
 The material may be used in future publications, both print and online. 
 
Signed by the contributor: __________________________      Date: 
 
 
Researcher’s name and email contact: Omar Daoudi - o.daoudi.1@research.gla.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor’s names and email contact:  
 
Prof. Raymond Boyle - Raymond.Boyle@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
Dr. Melanie Selfe- Melanie.Selfe@glasgow.ac.uk 
Department address: University of Glasgow - 13 The Square - Glasgow, G12 8QQ 
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Appendix D: The Focus Group Interviews 
 
 
 
     Items 
 
 # of 
attendees 
 
Age 
group 
 
     
Location 
 
   
Duration 
FG1 3 32-40 Mena 
Centre 
70 
minutes 
FG2 6 18-26 Mena 
Centre 
95 
minutes 
 
FG3 
 
5 
 
17-25 
Glasgow 
Caledonian 
University 
85 
minutes 
 
FG4 
 
6 
 
19-23 
Glasgow 
Caledonian 
University 
65 
minutes 
FG5 
(females) 
 
4 
 
17-23 
Glasgow 
Caledonian 
University 
65 
minutes 
FG6 
(females) 
 
2 
 
25-31 
Glasgow 
Caledonian 
University 
35 
minutes 
    FG7 3 28-44 Mena 
Centre 
60 
minutes 
   Total 29 
participants 
- -  475 
minutes 
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Appendix E: The Fact Sheet for the participants of focus 
groups 
 
Focus Group Interview Number:  
Date: 
Time: 
Place:  
 
Demographic information: 
 
 
 
Name 
 
 
Age 
 
Level 
of 
study 
and 
area 
 
Previous 
job (If 
applicabl
e) 
    
    
    
    
    
 
Special condition or circumstances related to the interview: 
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Appendix F: The Consent Form for Focus Group Interviews  
 
CONSENT TO THE USE OF DATA 
University of Glasgow, College of Arts Research Ethics Committee 
 
I understand that Omar Daoudi is collecting data in the form of focus group by using 
the digital voice recorder for use in an academic research project at the University of 
Glasgow.  
 
The issue that this study addresses is the economic and cultural context of local 
YouTube programs in Saudi Arabia, which is the biggest per capita global consumer of 
Google Inc.     This project would incorporate a multi methods research approach 
to critically investigate the correlation between the Saudi youth and the Saudi local 
YouTube broadcast practices through a unique analytical fieldwork.  In response to 
research methods, this project incorporates mixed research methods, including 
questionnaires, in-depth interviews and focus groups to investigate the Saudi 
youth and the political, economic and cultural context of YouTube in Saudi Arabia 
in an attempt to obtain valuable and reliable date in order to gain an insight and 
knowledge about this phenomenon. 
 
I give my consent to the use of data for this purpose on the understanding that: 
 My participation in this project is voluntary and I have the right to withdraw or discontinue my 
participation at any time 
All names and other material likely to identify individuals will be anonymised. 
 The material will be treated as confidential and kept in secure storage at all times. 
 The material will be retained in secure storage for use in future academic research 
 The material may be used in future publications, both print and online. 
 
Signed by the contributor: __________________________      Date: 
 
 
Researcher’s name and email contact: Omar Daoudi - o.daoudi.1@research.gla.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor’s name and email contact: Prof. Raymond Boyle - Raymond.Boyle@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
Department address: University of Glasgow - 13 The Square - Glasgow, G12 8QQ 
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Appendix G: The questions of Focus Group 
 
Part one: Warm up question: 
How do you interact with the Saudi content on YouTube? 
 
 Level of engagements. (Share-like-comment)  
 Methods of viewing the content.  
Watching habits.  
  
Part two: The popularity of online programs: 
What are the reasons that make Saudi online content highly viewed? 
What are the elements that make certain YouTube programs very popular for you? 
What do you think of proliferation of Saudi YouTube programs? 
Do you think YouTube stars use their online profile for other purposes?  
How would evaluate the move of some YouTube programmes into Saudi TV screen? 
 
Part three: The cultural aspects of YouTube programs 
What do you think of Saudi female appearance on YouTube programmes? 
Have these programs /YouTube stars shaped your opinion on certain matters? 
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